Hello,
--- En date de : Ven 19.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a
écrit :
> > > Highly speculative. Bucklin probably experiences
> about the
> > > same level of bullet voting due to LNH fears as
> IRV, not
> > > much more, because the "harm" only
> happens when a
> > > majority isn't found in the firs
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/113492794/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0
Preferential voting and the rule of the majority
Melvin P. Porter
The progress of the Bucklin system to date (June 1, 1914) can be
seen from the following list of preferential voting cities on page 582.
In the Janua
http://publications.ohiohistory.org/ohstemplate.cfm?action=detail&Page=01117.html&StartPage=7&EndPage=&volume=111¬es=&newtitle=Volume%20111%20Page%207
The URL above, for me, loads some HTML code, which I was able to view
as it was designed by selecting it all and copying it into a text
file, ch
On Sat, 20 Dec 2008 19:19:02 - James Gilmour wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2008 12:42 AM
I don't have time to read any of the extended essays that now feature on this
list, but these two remarks in a recent post caught my
eye and I could not let them pass.
R
Here's one explanation to why LNH might be more
important to voters than monotonicity.
Most voters are used to election methods where
they bullet vote one of the candidates. It is a
quite natural thought that if one votes multiple
candidates on a single ballot then the vote that
the second favouri
At 02:19 PM 12/20/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2008 12:42 AM
> LNH, has, I think, been pretty widely misunderstood. I don't consider
> it desirable *at all*. That is, it interferes with the very desirable
> process of compromise that public elec
Kevin Venzke > Sent: Tuesday, December 16, 2008 1:49 PM
> The reason I believe LNHarm is more valuable than
> monotonicity is that when a method fails LNHarm, the voter is
> more likely to realize in what insincere way to vote
> differently, in order to compensate. When a method fails
> monoto
I've done a couple major runs of simulating voters and elections. I
think reviewing those models might help the discussion.
Most recently I've been doing the opinion space diagrams. They are
based on some two-dimensional world of political thought (possibly the
fiscal and social liberal-con
At 10:36 PM 12/18/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hello,
--- En date de : Mar 16.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman
Lomax a écrit :
>However, in defense of Venzke, he thinks that the situations where IRV
>is non-monotonic are rare enough that it's not worth worrying about.
What I think would be rare is that suc
Well, we have a huge body of work examining the performance of voting
systems under various conditions, but what may be the most common and
most influential condition that real voting systems face,
particularly in political applications, but also elsewhere.
Voter ignorance. Normal, non-reprehe
At 12:00 AM 12/20/2008, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Authors of RR have their own primary goals and properly avoid the election
methods wars that take place in EM, etc, - simply recommending that group's
rules authors should be careful as to what methods they choose to define
for their groups.
Robert's
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2008 12:42 AM
> LNH, has, I think, been pretty widely misunderstood. I don't consider
> it desirable *at all*. That is, it interferes with the very desirable
> process of compromise that public elections should simulate.
I don't have time to
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