Juho,
summarize my argument concerning generalized ballot and generalized ballot
completion and in the end of this email I suggest a new single-member
Condorcet election system.
Nomenclature: I think that null-candidate (marked X) is a fitting name
for voting for not filling a seat. The other
On Sat, May 28, 2011 at 5:53 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
From simplest to less simple but still simple enough:
1. Asset Voting
2. Approval
3. DYN
4. MCA
5. The Bucklin Variant of Venzke and Benham
Forrest,
Can you remind me what the Bucklin Variant of Venzke and Benham is? If
it's that
OK, it seems that there are no objections to using this list to organize a
statement. I think this would explain the connection to this list, but
explicitly disclaim being an official position of any persons or
organizations besides its signatories.
Here's the general points I'd like it to make:
2011/5/30 Kathy Dopp kathy.d...@gmail.com
Date: Sun, 29 May 2011 23:41:47 +0100 (BST)
From: Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr
To: election-meth...@electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] Remember toby KD
Kevin,
Could you please explain in fairly simple terms how
Condorcet/Approval works?
On May 30, 2011, at 1:21 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
OK, it seems that there are no objections to using this list to
organize a statement. I think this would explain the connection to
this list, but explicitly disclaim being an official position of
any persons or organizations besides its
On 30.5.2011, at 18.41, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Juho,
summarize my argument concerning generalized ballot and generalized ballot
completion and in the end of this email I suggest a new single-member
Condorcet election system.
Nomenclature: I think that null-candidate (marked X) is a
Hi Kathy,
--- En date de : Lun 30.5.11, Kathy Dopp kathy.d...@gmail.com a écrit :
Thanks Kevin, I like the simplicity of that plan --
Condorcet/Approval.
Have you thought about only counting the first two rank
ballot choices
of voters if the Approval step becomes necessary due to a
Hi Jameson,
--- En date de : Lun 30.5.11, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com a écrit :
If ballot design considerations limited the number of ranks available for
Condorcet/Approval, one could still use equal ranking to approve an unlimited
number of candidates. I agree that an explicit
