On Jun 1, 2011, at 2:26 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/6/1 Dave Ketchum
On Jun 1, 2011, at 3:57 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
It seems to me that thevoters are more worried about the ballot type
and ease of voting it than they are of the exact counting rules.
There are
- Original Message -
From: Jameson Quinn
Date: Wednesday, June 1, 2011 11:27 am
Subject: Re: [EM] Remember Toby
To: Dave Ketchum
Cc: Kristofer Munsterhjelm , election-methods@lists.electorama.com,
fsimm...@pcc.edu
> 2011/6/1 Dave Ketchum
>
> > On Jun 1, 2011, at 3:57 AM, Kristofer Munster
On Jun 1, 2011, at 11:38 AM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
I agree with everything you've said here re. simplicity etc.
Condorcet with Approval to break Condorcet cycles would be great.
Simple to explain, precinct-summable with the use of an NxN matrix,
with N= # candidates and the matrix diagonal availabl
see
http://rangevoting.org/SPRates.html
http://www.rangevoting.org/French2007studies.html
--
Warren D. Smith
http://RangeVoting.org <-- add your endorsement (by clicking
"endorse" as 1st step)
and
math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama
There's been some recent discussion of which ballots are easiest to use.
Does anyone know of published (experimental) studies of usability of
non-plurality ballots (perhaps vs. plurality ballots)?
I'd be happy to take personal responses and summarize for anyone who would
rather not post to the
2011/6/1 Dave Ketchum
> On Jun 1, 2011, at 3:57 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>
>> fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
>>
>>> It seems to me that thevoters are more worried about the ballot type
>>> and ease of voting it than they are of the exact counting rules.
>>> There are several Condorcet methods t
I agree with everything you've said here re. simplicity etc.
Condorcet with Approval to break Condorcet cycles would be great.
Simple to explain, precinct-summable with the use of an NxN matrix,
with N= # candidates and the matrix diagonal available for other data.
(such as the total number of bal
On Jun 1, 2011, at 3:57 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
It seems to me that thevoters are more worried about the ballot type
and ease of voting it than they are of the exact counting rules.
There are several Condorcet methods that are clone proof and
monotonic without b
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 1.6.11, Juho Laatu a écrit :
> > I agree with Kevin that "elect the CW if there is one,
> else elect the
> > candidate ranked (or ranked above last) on the
> greatest number of ballots" is plenty simple, and is much
> > more satisfactory than MinMax or Copeland in
On 1.6.2011, at 5.46, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
> I agree with Kevin that "elect the CW if there is one, else elect the
> candidate ranked (or ranked above last) on the greatest number of ballots" is
> plenty simple, and is much
> more satisfactory than MinMax or Copeland in other respects.
In w
On 31.5.2011, at 12.58, Peter Zbornik wrote:
> That would be, I think the smallest improvement on IRV, which could make a
> positive change in real life and would support centrist candidates.
From the Condorcet criterion point of view, the Condorcet winner is a good,
often "centrist" candidate.
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On May 31, 2011, at 10:46 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
It has been averred many times on this list that in Australia, where
partial rankings are considered
spoiled ballots,
that sure makes little sense. is this related to the mandatory voting
laws for Aussies
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
It seems to me that thevoters are more worried about the ballot type
and ease of voting it than they are of the exact counting rules.
There are several Condorcet methods that are clone proof and
monotonic without being too complicated.
Perhaps, but not to the extent that
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