On Thu, Jul 7, 2011 at 8:33 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
Andy, I like both of your suggestions. Why don't you try putting them on the
pagehttp://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approvalyourself?
I don't want this system or that page to be mine, I just
This is not an answer to the question of how to arrange them into a tree,
but here is an idea for how to compare factions of different sizes:
If there are N total candidates, then the score of a faction (a subset of
candidates) of size M could be the voter count of that faction (the number
of
Here's an off-the-wall idea. Haven't fully thought through the strategic
implications, but here goes:
What if, instead of requiring the candidates to vote sequentially, they all
have to go at the same time, but we introduce another level between
approve and don't approve which is conditional
On 8.7.2011, at 8.55, Russ Paielli wrote:
On Thu, Jul 7, 2011 at 3:32 PM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
What didi people think before the nowadays generally agreed idea that all
countries should be democratic. Maybe some idealists discussed the
possibility that one day ordinary
Russ Paielli wrote:
Let me just elaborate on my concerns about complexity. Most of you
probably know most of this already, but let me just try to summ it up
and put things in perspective.
Some of the participants on this list are advanced mathematicians, and
they have been discussing these
Jameson Quinn wrote:
Russ's message about simplicity is well-taken. But the most successful
voting reform is IRV - which is far from being the simplest reform. Why
has IRV been successful?
I want to leave this as an open question for others before I try to
answer it myself. The one answer
Toby Pereira wrote:
I'm not sure I exactly followed that. Jameson's option 2 is to look at
the nominated slates and see which is best. You could also still use one
of the other methods to find a possible winner and then compare it with
the best nominated slate (if they are different). Is that
Bob Richard wrote:
It turns that real live voters (including real live politicians) care
a lot about the later-no-harm criterion, even if they don't know what
it's called.
If true, that is unfortunate. Perhaps we would have to pick a better
criterion that is also easy to understand,
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
i was looking for Kristofer's posts to EM and came across this, i may
have missed it:
On Jun 22, 2011, at 5:30 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
I've mentioned it before, but I think Condorcet enjoys an additional
advantage here. Say there's a CW and he is not
On Fri, Jul 8, 2011 at 12:32 AM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
On 8.7.2011, at 8.55, Russ Paielli wrote:
On Thu, Jul 7, 2011 at 3:32 PM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
What didi people think before the nowadays generally agreed idea that all
countries should be democratic.
On 8.7.2011, at 11.00, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
But now consider a parallel universe where the CW always won (and these
victories were significant, i.e. people really preferred the CW to the rest).
Say Montroll won. Then Kiss-supporters and Wright-supporters might try to
unite in the
Juho Laatu wrote:
On 8.7.2011, at 11.00, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
But now consider a parallel universe where the CW always won (and
these victories were significant, i.e. people really preferred the
CW to the rest). Say Montroll won. Then Kiss-supporters and
Wright-supporters might try to
Bob Richard lists001 at robertjrichard.com
Subject: Re: Learning from IRV's success
It turns that real live voters (including real live politicians) care a lot
about the later-no-harm criterion, even if they don't know what it's called.
--Bob Richard
--I think that's bullshit. IRV got
Also, I think IRV's seemingly intuitive nature has something to do with it.
For those who *did* investigate more deeply, IRV seemed sensible, too:
instead of holding a bunch of expensive runoffs, collect all the required
information at once and then act as if there were runoffs. That fails to
2011/7/8 Andy Jennings electi...@jenningsstory.com
Also, I think IRV's seemingly intuitive nature has something to do with it.
For those who *did* investigate more deeply, IRV seemed sensible, too:
instead of holding a bunch of expensive runoffs, collect all the required
information at once
On 8.7.2011, at 17.16, Andy Jennings wrote:
Also, I think IRV's seemingly intuitive nature has something to do with it.
For those who *did* investigate more deeply, IRV seemed sensible, too:
instead of holding a bunch of expensive runoffs, collect all the required
information at once and
On Jul 8, 2011, at 10:43 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 8.7.2011, at 17.16, Andy Jennings wrote:
Also, I think IRV's seemingly intuitive nature has something to do
with it. For those who *did* investigate more deeply, IRV seemed
sensible, too: instead of holding a bunch of expensive runoffs,
What I see:
.. Condorcet - without mixing in Approval.
. SODA - for trying, but seems too complex.
. Reject Approval - too weak to compete.
Dave Ketchum
On Jul 8, 2011, at 6:56 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
First, I'd ask people on this list to please stop discussing tax
policy here.
I'm sorry, but aarrhh.
I think that people on this list are smart, but this is pathetic. I don't
mean to be hard on Dave in particular. But why is it impossible to get any
two of us to agree on anything? I want to make a list of systems which are
1. Commonly
Some more observations.
Party officials and representatives have more weight in decision making than
regular voters. The opinions of regular supporters of party A could be
ACentristB, but the opinions of people whose future and career are tied to
the party have more ACentristB orientation.
Russ Paielli wrote:
On Thu, Jul 7, 2011 at 3:32 PM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
mailto:juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
What didi people think before the nowadays generally agreed idea
that all countries should be democratic. Maybe some idealists
discussed the possibility that one
Hi,
--- En date de : Ven 8.7.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com a
écrit :
Bob Richard wrote:
It turns that real live voters (including real live
politicians) care a lot about the later-no-harm criterion,
even if they don't know what it's called.
If true, that is
Jameson Quinn wrote:
First, I'd ask people on this list to please stop discussing tax policy
here. It's not the place for it.
(What happened to that idea of finding a compromise method that
everybody on EM could support? Did the idea get sidetracked by SODA?)
More or less. My
There are many reasons why it is difficult to find a statement that numerous
people on this list would be willing to sign. As you know there are probably as
many different opinions on different methods as there are people on this list.
There have been some related (inconclusive) discussions
On Fri, Jul 8, 2011 at 9:47 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
I'm sorry, but aarrhh.
I think that people on this list are smart, but this is pathetic. I don't
mean to be hard on Dave in particular. But why is it impossible to get any
two of us to
just a quick comment on a minor point:
IRV may be a counterexample, but I suspect that (1) it has only been
adopted in very liberal cities,
I don't think that's because they're liberal, per se, but rather because
they were burned by the 2000 election. We'll see how it works after a
You're right, the same example dawned on me last night after I used up all of
my computer time.
But the Hasse diagram of the partial order does yield a weighted DAG (directed
acyclic graph) where the
weight of each coalition is the sum of the weights of the factions that are
included in it.
I agree that there are plenty of reasons, good and bad, for not signing on
to any given statement. My plea is simply that people consider the reasons
for signing it too. No joint statement will ever say exactly what each
inidividual signator would have said, but I for one am still willing to make
On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Russ Paielli wrote:
As I wrote a couple days ago, I strongly suspect that any vote
counting rules beyond simple addition will be extremely difficult to
sell on a large scale. IRV may be a counterexample, but I suspect that
(1) it has only been adopted in very liberal
On Fri, Jul 8, 2011 at 3:56 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
So, I guess the question is: is there anyone who would support Approval but
not SODA? Respond in text. Also, I made a poll on betterpolls - go vote.
http://betterpolls.com/v/1425
Wow, that results page is hard to
The thing about SODA is that it's harder to get than Approval Voting. I
haven't exactly read through all the posts on it here thoroughly but I've
looked
at the page -
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval - and I do
find myself thinking What? All of its
I can see the point about strategic range just being approval, but strategic
First-Past-The-Post is just ignoring everyone except the top two candidates,
and
you wouldn't just cut out all other candidates in an election to make it
simpler. (I think I nicked that point from Warren Smith). If
2011/7/8 Toby Pereira tdp2...@yahoo.co.uk
The thing about SODA is that it's harder to get than Approval Voting. I
haven't exactly read through all the posts on it here thoroughly but I've
looked at the page -
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval - and I
do find
While discussing median-based range voting -
http://rangevoting.org/MedianVrange.html, Warren Smith says Average-based
range
voting generalizes to a multiwinner proportional representation voting system
called reweighted range voting. (See papers 78 and 91 here.) But there
currently
is no
--- En date de : Ven 8.7.11, Toby Pereira tdp2...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
The thing about SODA is that it's harder to get than Approval Voting.
I haven't exactly read through all the posts on it here thoroughly but
I've looked at the page - http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/
2011/7/8 Toby Pereira tdp2...@yahoo.co.uk
While discussing median-based range voting -
http://rangevoting.org/MedianVrange.html, Warren Smith says Average-based
range voting generalizes to a *multiwinner* proportional
representationhttp://rangevoting.org/PropRep.htmlvoting system called
On Jul 8, 2011, at 12:47 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
I'm sorry, but aarrhh.
I think that people on this list are smart, but this is pathetic. I
don't mean to be hard on Dave in particular. But why is it
impossible to get any two of us to agree on anything? I
2011/7/8 Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com
On Jul 8, 2011, at 12:47 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
I'm sorry, but aarrhh.
I think that people on this list are smart, but this is pathetic. I don't
mean to be hard on Dave in particular. But why is it impossible
On Fri, Jul 8, 2011 at 11:41 AM, Andrew Myers an...@cs.cornell.edu wrote:
On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Russ Paielli wrote:
As I wrote a couple days ago, I strongly suspect that any vote counting
rules beyond simple addition will be extremely difficult to sell on a large
scale. IRV may be a
Sorry, as Jameson pointed out, he has invented a voting method he calls AT-TV
which (he claims)
1. obeys a proportional representation theorem
2. in the single-winner case reduces to median-based range voting.
I should update http://rangevoting.org/MedianVrange.html
to reflect that. Why
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