Like Jameson and Toby, I have spent some time thinking about how to make a
median-based PR system.
The system I came up with is similar to Jameson's, but simpler, and uses the
Hare quota!
Say there are 100 voters and you're going to elect ten representatives.
Each representative should
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:45 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
So, here's the simpler procedure:
While there are more uneliminated candidates than empty seats:
Divide each ballot by the number of uneliminated candidates it approves
If there are any candidates with more than a
Andy Jennings wrote:
Like Jameson and Toby, I have spent some time thinking about how to make
a median-based PR system.
The system I came up with is similar to Jameson's, but simpler, and uses
the Hare quota!
How about clustering logic? Say you have an electorate of n voters, and
you want
On Sat, Jul 23, 2011 at 11:28 AM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
If one of the finalists is chosen by a method that satisfies the majority
criterion, then you can skip step
one, and the method becomes smoother.
Here are some possibilities for the method that satisfies the majority
criterion: DSC,
Kathy Dopp wrote:
The system you describe *is* still precinct summable in the sense of
reporting the sums for each possible slate of candidates for each
precinct or polling location - this is at least a whole lot fewer sums
than the number of possible ballot choice permutations including
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Andy Jennings wrote:
Like Jameson and Toby, I have spent some time thinking about how to make a
median-based PR system.
The system I came up with is similar to Jameson's, but simpler, and uses
the Hare quota!
How about clustering logic? Say you have an
Andy Jennings wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Andy Jennings wrote:
Like Jameson and Toby, I have spent some time thinking about how
to make a median-based PR system.
The system I came up with is similar to Jameson's, but simpler,
and uses the Hare
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Kristopfer.
Look at it this way, the process of amalgamating the factions is a
low pass filter that gets rid of some fo the noise. So why not
consider the resulting ballots as the true ballots, and the
associated weights tell how many of them there are of each kinsd.
Kevin Venzke wrote:
I also tried implementing the most obvious (I suppose) method: Take the
ratings and conduct simulated approval polling, either for some
determined or semi-random number of iterations, or until someone wins
twice in a row. This doesn't test as well as I thought it would
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Andy Jennings wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Andy Jennings wrote:
Like Jameson and Toby, I have spent some time thinking about how
to make a median-based PR system.
The system I came up with is similar to Jameson's, but
One approach to summability and auditing is to say that the target is to allow
the district to count the votes and later check that at the top level their
votes (or the votes of all districts) were counted correctly, AND to allow the
top level to check that the districts will report their
2011/7/23 Andy Jennings electi...@jenningsstory.com
On Sat, Jul 23, 2011 at 7:45 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
And so I'd like to suggest that we should be looking for a PR system which
satisfies the following criteria:
c1. Truly proportional (of course). I would be
I agree with Juho's argument that all methods are summable these days.
However, I'd suggest a few vaguely-defined related criteria. The general one
is auditable - is it possible to gain confidence that the result is
correct through some process besides a full recount? This breaks down into
2011/7/24 Andy Jennings electi...@jenningsstory.com
Like Jameson and Toby, I have spent some time thinking about how to make a
median-based PR system.
The system I came up with is similar to Jameson's, but simpler, and uses
the Hare quota!
Say there are 100 voters and you're going to elect
The ranked majority criterion is: if one candidate is top-ranked by a
majority of voters, that candidate must win.
To me, the natural extension of that to rated systems is: if only one
candidate is top-rated by any majority of voters, that candidate must win.
You are suggesting that we use the
2011/7/24 Andy Jennings electi...@jenningsstory.com
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:45 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
So, here's the simpler procedure:
While there are more uneliminated candidates than empty seats:
Divide each ballot by the number of uneliminated candidates it
Just to alert those who may be interested, I've added SODA-PR to the SODA
page on
electowikihttp://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval#SODA-PR_.28proportional_representation_version_of_SODA.29
.
It includes some minor adjustments since the last time I expounded it here:
I've replied to Jameson and Kevin in the same post here, so hopefully it's come
out alright!
From: Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com
To: Toby Pereira tdp2...@yahoo.co.uk
Cc: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Sent: Sun, 24 July, 2011 2:50:12
Subject:
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Dim 24.7.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com a
écrit :
I also tried implementing the most obvious (I suppose)
method: Take the
ratings and conduct simulated approval polling, either
for some
determined or semi-random number of iterations, or
On 23.7.2011, at 17.45, Jameson Quinn wrote:
We had a discussion about the best practical single-winner proposal, which,
while it certainly wasn't as conclusive as I'd hoped, seemed productive to
me. I think we should have a similar discussion about PR.
Obviously, the situations in the UK
Hi Toby,
--- En date de : Dim 24.7.11, Toby Pereira tdp2...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
Strategy-resistant systems do have certain advantages as you say,
but in the single-winner case it would end up reducing range to a
Condorcet method, which arguably isn't as good, and ends up pushing
out a
2011/7/24 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
On 23.7.2011, at 17.45, Jameson Quinn wrote:
We had a discussion about the best practical single-winner proposal,
which, while it certainly wasn't as conclusive as I'd hoped, seemed
productive to me. I think we should have a similar discussion about
From: Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr
To: election-meth...@electorama.com
Sent: Sun, 24 July, 2011 20:34:33
Subject: Re: [EM] PR for USA or UK
Hello again.
--- En date de : Dim 24.7.11, Toby Pereira tdp2...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
Strategy-resistant systems do
From: Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com
To: Toby Pereira tdp2...@yahoo.co.uk
Cc: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Sent: Sun, 24 July, 2011 19:45:06
Subject: Re: [EM] PR for USA or UK
I don't necessarily think sophisticated voters are required in
One feature of single-winner district based political systems is that voters
will have a clearly named own representative that is as local as possible. In
a PR context with multiple parties one could redefine this idea so that people
should have a known representative that represents them in
Jameson Quinn wrote:
The ranked majority criterion is: if one candidate is top-ranked by a
majority of voters, that candidate must win.
To me, the natural extension of that to rated systems is: if only one
candidate is top-rated by any majority of voters, that candidate must win.
That must
Hi Toby,
--- En date de : Dim 24.7.11, Toby Pereira tdp2...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
[begin quote]
Strategy-resistant systems do have certain advantages as you say,
but in the single-winner case it would end up reducing range to a
Condorcet method, which arguably isn't as good, and ends up pushing
Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/7/23 Andy Jennings electi...@jenningsstory.com
On Sat, Jul 23, 2011 at 7:45 AM, Jameson Quinn
jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
And so I'd like to suggest that we should be looking for a PR system
which satisfies the following criteria:
c1. Truly proportional (of
This kind of approach has been experimented with for a long time by Rob
LeGrand, and there doesn't
seem to be any good way to make it monotone.
Here's a very conservative and simple approach that may have some value in some
context, if not this
one:
For each rating ballot b approve the top
I assume this is from Colorado, and have no idea who else has seen it.
I see it as worth considering the thinking, although I AM NOT signing
on as backing any of it.
On Jul 23, 2011, at 11:32 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Knowing of IRV and Condorcet methods of counting ballots, the first
On Sun, Jul 24, 2011 at 4:53 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
Ah, yes. This leads me back to an older thought that perhaps the criterion
of summability should be refined for multiwinner methods by turning it into
two criteria. These criteria would be:
- Weak
Hi,
--- En date de : Dim 24.7.11, Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com a écrit :
De: Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com
Objet: Re: [EM] [COVoterChoice] RB gives an equal chance of winning to not
just all parties, but all combinations of programs,
À: electionscience Foundation
Hi Forest,
--- En date de : Dim 24.7.11, fsimm...@pcc.edu fsimm...@pcc.edu a écrit :
This kind of approach has been experimented with for a long
time by Rob LeGrand, and there doesn't
seem to be any good way to make it monotone.
Yes, but if it were strategy-free somehow, I think it would be
On Jul 24, 2011, at 5:01 PM, Toby Pereira wrote:
From: Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr
...
I think the Range method itself is pretty incapable of this, but you
could do it either with rated ballots or with a rank ballot that has
truncation incentive.
Is a range ballot not a rated ballot?
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