On 17.10.2011, at 1.44, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Hi Juho,
>
> Sorry in advance if I didn't read your message carefully enough, but I think
> I probably
> did:
For a skilled reader like you those two rows below that define the method
should be enough. So I guess you know what the method will do.
On Mon, 2011-10-17 at 00:19 +0100, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Hi,
>
> --- En date de : Dim 16.10.11, matt welland a écrit :
> > > It has been shown, here, and in journal articles, that
> > Approval will
> > > soon home in on the CW. After a few
> > > elecions. But "a few elections" can be a decade or
Hi,
--- En date de : Dim 16.10.11, matt welland a écrit :
> > It has been shown, here, and in journal articles, that
> Approval will
> > soon home in on the CW. After a few
> > elecions. But "a few elections" can be a decade or
> more. We'd like
> > better results before that, and so
>
> Does th
Hi Juho,
Sorry in advance if I didn't read your message carefully enough, but I think I
probably
did:
--- En date de : Dim 16.10.11, Juho Laatu a écrit :
Use a Condorcet method to elect the winner among the most approved candidate
pair and those who are at least as approved as the less
Hi Mike,
--- En date de : Dim 16.10.11, MIKE OSSIPOFF a écrit :
>I had several FBC-complying methods that I liked very much, with such names as
>MMC, MAMPO, MDDB, SR...etc.
>
>I haven't been able to find what MDDB and SR were. Or MAMPO either.
>
>Can anyone tell me, or tell me where I can look
On Sun, 2011-10-16 at 20:51 +, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
> [snip]
> It's difficult to choose between Approval and a good rank method, for
> a public proposal.
>
> Rank methods elicit more interest from people, because they can offer
> more.
>
> But rank methods have the disadvantage that ther
I've just realized what I liked so much about MMPO: It meets FBC. That means
that we _don't_ do a CC-check with MMPO, and so it fails CC. That's ok. I'd
gladly trade CC
for FBC.
It seems to me that someone posted an example in which the wv methods give
someone a way to
improve their outcome
In order to back up my comments on problems with replacing plurality with
Condorcet here are also some requirements and one example method that could be
used when we want to keep single-member districts and the idea that the
strongest party wins, but still allow also other than the leading two
Richard Fobes wrote:
How about a wording such as this:
"Unanimously we agree that all of these supported methods are
significantly better than plurality voting, and we endorse using them in
governmental elections."
This wording could replace the following sentence:
"Every person signing thi
