robert bristow-johnson wrote:
what do you mean: weight? rankings are just rankings. if a voter
ranks Candidate A above Candidate B (independent of what the absolute
rank values are), all that means is that this voter would vote for A if
it were a simple two-candidate race with B. and all
Note that Majority Judgment, Range, and even arguably Approval are
independent of irrelevant alternatives. Majority Judgment is the clearest;
it passes IIA even with simple zero-information strategy. (That is to say,
with MJ it is reasonable to vote honestly on an absolute scale, unlike
Range or
Jameson:
You said:
There are other methods which you don't mention even though their advantages
are similar to those of the ones you do.
2011/11/25 MIKE OSSIPOFF nkk...@hotmail.com
Regarding the co-operation/defection problem, there are about 4 possibilities:
1. Just propose MTA and
Kevin said:
By definition an election method doesn't use
approval ballots.
[endquote]
Whose definition?
Do you think that if you hold an election by Approval, you
aren't using an election method?
Mike Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list
Here's a bunch of responses
dlw:My approach replaces STV with LR Hare, I guess I don't really care
whether rankings get used or not, but I do like having fewer seats with PR
with a Hare Quota, so we can avoid those arbitrary percentage
restrictions. It lets third parties decide who's the
On Sat, 2011-11-26 at 16:56 -0500, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 11/26/11 4:08 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
the counterexample, again, is Burlington Vermont. Dems haven't sat in
the mayor's chair for decades.
Is this due to a split of the liberal vote by progressives or other
liberal
Mike,
I like MMPO2 because (unlike MMPO1) it takes into account opposition from
supporters of eliminated candidates, so is more broad based, and it is easily
seen to satisfy the FBC. Also it allows more brad based support than MMPO3 where
only the support by top raters is considered in the tie
There are several ideas that can be used to make variations on MMPO.
1. One is to use a bottom Tier Pairwise rule that counts bottom level candidates
on a ballot as being opposed by all other bottom level candidates (analogous to
the TTP rule in other methods). Note that this rule doesn't get
While working with MinMaxCardinalRatingsPairwiseOpposition (MMcrwPO) I got an
idea that high resolution Range might have an acceptable solutin to the
defection problem that we have been considering:
Sincere ballots
49 C
x: AB
y: BA
where x appears to be slightly larger than y in the polls.
The
On 11/26/11 6:58 PM, matt welland wrote:
On Sat, 2011-11-26 at 16:56 -0500, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
the counterexample, again, is Burlington Vermont. Dems haven't sat in
the mayor's chair for decades.
Is this due to a split of the liberal vote by progressives or other
liberal blocs? Or
Both Score and Approval are non-starters, because of the nature of the
ballot. but a ranked ballot is not a non-starter,
Score and Approval are not the only rated systems. I favor a rated ballot -
both more information and, if you can avoid the strategic burden, actually
easier for the
Here's I think the crux of your mistake:
We can't say it's just a matter of opinion, cuz it's probably not such,
I don't want to get too far into philosophical issues here, but I think
that in one sense we can basically take it for granted that it's not such:
that, in the proverbial phrase,
On Sat, 2011-11-26 at 22:31 -0500, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 11/26/11 6:58 PM, matt welland wrote:
Also, do folks generally see approval as better than or worse than IRV?
they don't know anything about Approval (or Score or Borda or Bucklin or
Condorcet) despite some effort by me to
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