There is no PM election. They are appointed by the Queen, usually from the
biggest party.
2010/5/6 robert bristow-johnson
>
> after the MPs are determined by FPTP for each constituency, then does not
> Parliament need to meet to vote for the PM? is a majority of MPs required,
> or does pluralit
ta. A has the least sum and its votes are collapsed:
1248: (A>B) >C>D
425.54: B>C>D>A
1224: C>D>B>A
417.28: D>B>C>A
12.39: (A>B) >D>C
12.39: C>D>B>A
12.39: D>C>B>A
1st stage - A: 1260.39, B: 1685.93, C: 1236.39, D: 429.67
B reaches the quota at the first stage, then it is elected.
Final outcome: {E, B}. Plain STV elects {B, C}
Diego Santos
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
2009/2/17 Kristofer Munsterhjelm
> Diego Santos wrote:
>
>> 2009/2/15 Dan Bishop mailto:danbisho...@gmail.com
>> >>
>>
>>
>>STV-CLE just happens to work the best when the political spectrum is
>>one-dimensional: Candidates are eliminated
ate reaches a quota, then
later preferences are added until some candidadate reaches the quota. But,
instead of this candidate is considered elected, the candidate with the
least sum is eliminated. Some examples with this method has generated good
outcomes.
Diego Santo
I think this method is Warren Smith's multiwinner "poorest first"asset
voting with predefined lists.
2008/11/16 Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Hi Kristofer,
>
> That's just the multiwinner adaptation of IRV.
>>
>
> I don't think so! The point is that the *candidates* provide the ranking
> f
2008/11/2 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>> A few thoughts:
>> Plurality or Approval cannot fill need.
>> IRV uses about the same ballot as Condorcet - but deserves rejection
>> for its method of counting.
>> Condorcet can - but I am trying to word t
2008/10/20 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> You could also have the approval version of Smith,IRV. Call it
> Condorcet,Approval. I think it's Smith (so it would be Smith,Approval), but
> I'm not sure. The method is this: Drop candidates, starting with the
> Approval loser and moving
I use PDF 995: http://www.pdf995.com/download.html
2008/10/20 Steve Eppley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Hi,
>
> Jonathan Lundell wrote:
>
>> On Oct 18, 2008, at 9:07 AM, Steve Eppley wrote:
>>
>> (It's best viewed with the Internet Explorer browser, I think, since it
>>> uses a Microsoft character set
2008/10/19 Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 4:18 PM, Kevin Venzke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Maybe I haven't read closely enough. I thought the method was to simply
> > have a runoff between the top two approved candidates.
> >
> > In the example mentioned, it didn't se
4, and B
still is in the runoff. Then IAR reduces the probability that a candidate
wins because of strategic nomination.
2008/10/18 Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 3:12 AM, Diego Santos <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> wrote:
> > Hi Raph,
> >
> &g
t;[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
>>
>> On Sat, Oct 18, 2008 at 5:48 PM, Diego Santos
>>> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>>
>>> Because Smith is more complex to explain, my current
>>>>
>>>
>>> favorite election
>>>
Hi Raph,
2008/10/18 Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> On Sat, Oct 18, 2008 at 11:45 PM, Diego Santos <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> wrote:
> > Raph, you should see my Improved Approval Runoff. This method avoids that
> > the approval winner competes in the runoff with his/her
I`m currently using Google cache of the pages. Who`s the owner of Electorama
wiki?
2008/10/18 Greg Nisbet <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> I keep getting this:
>
> Database error
> >From Electowiki
> Jump to: navigation, search
> A database query syntax error has occurred. This may indicate a bug in
> the s
IAR definition:
http://listas.apesol.org/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2007-August/020654.html
2008/10/18 Diego Santos <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> 2008/10/17 Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
>>
>> So my list is something like
>>
>> 1
2008/10/17 Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> So my list is something like
>
> 1++: Approval + top-2 runoff
> 1+: Range
> 1-: Approval
> 1--: Condorcet
>
> 2: IRNR (pending more info)
> 3: IRV
>
Raph, you should see my Improved Approval Runoff. This method avoids that
the approval winner competes
Many members of this list prefer a Condorcet method to any other voting
method, especially if it meets Smith. But how vulnerable are ranked methods
to strategic voting?
Consider these two assumptions:
1. Sincere Condorcet cycles would are too rare if used in real elections.
2. Strategies are some
Jobst,
2008/10/16 Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Dear Diego,
>
> But randomness of FAWRB can cause institutional conflicts, especially if
>> the minority faction leader was the winner.
>>
>
> My focus has always been to decide issues, not to elect people.
The risk of minority will remain
Jobst,
2008/10/16 Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Dear Raph,
>
> you wrote:
>
>> The thing is that in such a case, it isn't really a single 'demos'. It is
>> two groups voting as one.
>>
>
> Do you mean to say democracy is only for societies which are
> sufficiently homogeneous?
>
>
>> That
2008/10/16 Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> On Oct 15, 2008, at 1:59 PM, Peter Barath wrote:
>
> I'm not sure I would vote honestly in such circumstance.
>>
>> Let my "honest" rangings be:
>>
>> 100 percent for my favourite but almost chanceless Robin Hood
>> 20 percent for the frontrunner Cinde
2008/7/17 James Gilmour <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> Diego Santos > Sent: Thursday, July 17, 2008 5:32 PM
>> 2008/7/17 <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>> > The main issue is the party list vs PR-STV question. The problem is
>> > that a party list system breaks the link
2008/7/17 <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> Juho wrote:
>
>> I can see three different local/personal representation concepts here.
>> (just to clarify my thoughts, and maybe help some others too)
>
> I think a better way of breaking down those options would be based on the
> how the seats are allocated.
> T
some correlation with distribution of issue vectors and electoral
districts?
Diego Santos
2008/6/20 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> Hello all,
>
> (says the newcomer.)
>
> I think I have found a metric for comparing multiwinner systems, at least
> as
How about antiplurality?
2008/5/4 <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> I was thinking of a possible modification to your system that may take the
> chances of C to 100%.
>
> 1) Each voter submits a ballot rating each candidate.
>
> 2) The initial probability of each candidate is set at the proportion of
> high
When I tried to formulate a proof I realized some can became uneliminated
and defeat the previous winner. I will try other rules or proof the
imcompatibility of mono-add-top and Smith if its exists.
Diego Santos
Election-Methods mailing list - see http
2008/1/1, Steve Eppley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> I think the method Diego Santos is considering can elect outside the
> Smith set (a.k.a. top cycle), depending on the tie-breaker. Here's an
> example with 21 voters and 4 candidates:
>
>
eliminated
c(5): b(3,7), e(5,9)
d(3): c(3,5)
e(9): b(1,7), d(9,3) eliminated
f(7): b(7,7), c(1,5), d(1,3), e(1,9)
c beats a, d and f, then c is elected.
Diego Santos
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
2007/12/31, Kevin Venzke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> Hi Diego,
>
> --- Diego Santos <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit:
> > Definition: "Some candidate X is a potential winner if, for all Y that
> > beats
> > X, the margin of Y against X is lesser than t
Smith, because always
Minimax(margins) and Smith//Minimax(margins) winners are potential, although
Markus said that no known method passes both criteria
--
________
Diego Santos
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
A correction:
2007/12/22, Diego Santos <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> Ian,
>
> I do not understand your argument. Borda elimination is not so simple to
> comprehend for all voters. If is not possible to use Schulze or MAM in an
> election, perhaps pairwise sorted plurality wou
h sense to
> try to find a Condorcet method that looks as much as
> possible like IRV or as much as possible like Borda.
> The best method according to IRV's underlying heuristic
> will always be IRV; the best method according to the
> underlying heuristic of the Bor
C.
Probably A supporters will be too unhappy, because their favorite candidate
would win if B was not nominated.
>
> > I'm not saying that it's unarguable, nor that the voting system should
> > somehow anticipate the situation (through the use of '>>',
e, if range ballots are used) of the
most approved candidate. This simple rule also solves DH3 pathology.
________
Diego Santos
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
and choose a method from this larger set.
>
>
- Sometimes withdraw option is not applicable (e. g., referenda)
- I think that effective use of CWO should be avoided, because of their
possible negative perception of change of winner after elections.
Diego Santos
-
strategic truncation.
--
____
Diego Santos
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
2007/11/30, Steve Eppley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> Hi,
>
> In Diego Santos' example (below) the A voters who strategically
> downranked B had a strong incentive not to do so, assuming they were
> aware the B voters intended to truncate. This highlights some
> advan
d,
it is only an initial thought. I have fear that some methods can encourage
people to bullet their vote.
Diego Santos
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ed plurality offers weak burial resistance
and is summable, opposite to Smith,IRV.
Diego Santos
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
2007/11/19, Kevin Venzke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>
> I don't remember that it is possible for surplus transfers to go to
> different parties.
According Brazilian law, parties of same coalition are counted as a single
party. After elections, is not rare these parties to separate to opposite
politic
38 matches
Mail list logo
