What about this rule, if simplicity is required.
1) Run a standard PR-STV election.
2) If the result violates the criterion
- permanently eliminate the weakest candidate of the over-represented
gender and repeat
The first candidate to be eliminated is weakest and the first
candidate to be elected
On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 8:24 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
> Here is an example to illustrate the problem:
> Coalition 1: 32: w1>w4>w3>m3
> Coalition 2: 33: w1>w3>w4>m4
> Coalition 3: 35: w2>w5>m1>m2
> Thus, the right distribution, intuitively is:
> 4th seat - m3
> 5th seat - w5
Is this a constraint i
On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 9:47 AM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
> James, Jonathan,
>
> I need that the quoted-in people are quoted-in in such a way, that the
> proportionality of the election is not significantly disturbed.
James Gilmour has the right idea.
Elect 5 seats, but don't eliminate a candidate if
On Mon, Jan 21, 2013 at 5:05 PM, Michael Ossipoff
wrote:
> Elimination would start at the extremes. Transfers would be sent
> inward, until the candidates adjacent to the CW would have collected
> all of those inward-transferred votes, enough to eliminate the CW.
It seems more realistic that the
On Fri, Jan 11, 2013 at 5:19 AM, Michael Ossipoff
wrote:
> In a 3-candidate Condorcet cycle, for any pair of candidates, only one
> of those could elect the other by withdrawing. If the other withdrew,
> that would elect the 3rd candidate.
Fair enough, I was thinking of IRV (or Asset), but looks
On Tue, Jan 8, 2013 at 12:43 AM, Michael Ossipoff
wrote:
> Here's Steve's proposed fix:
>
> After an election, any candidate can withdraw from the election, and
> call for a new count of the ballots, with his name deleted from all
> the ballots.
>
> I liked JITW, because it saves FBC-failing metho
On Tue, Dec 4, 2012 at 10:21 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
> In Finland the political system has resembled this approach in the recent
> years although there are no specific supermajority requirements to form or to
> break governmnets. Having such rules could strengthen similar behaviour even
> more. L
On Tue, Nov 27, 2012 at 9:16 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
> However, if you need supermajority support for decisions, then you have to
> have something to put in place when the supermajority support isn't there.
One option is to select 2 PMs. That is what they do in Northern Ireland.
The cabinet i
Sorry, hit "reply" instead of
- reply All, then move EM to "to" field and delete Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Gmail really hates the system EM uses.
On Sun, Nov 25, 2012 at 10:03 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
wrote:
> Would that configuration weaken the consensus aspect of the system? Perhaps
> a govern
On Thu, Sep 6, 2012 at 5:34 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
wrote:
> I'd use the same ballots, or subsets of them.
Ahh, ok, I misunderstood. That doesn't break the secret ballot then.
> In the US, you know there will always be a Senate and a House of
> Representatives. That's okay. The House meets i
On Wed, Sep 5, 2012 at 5:17 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
wrote:
> You fill the body using PR, but each body is assigned a set of voters, or
> rather ballots, so that the discrepancy between (say) Schulze and Schulze
> STV is minimized. I think Hamming distance would make the most sense for the
> dis
On Tue, Sep 4, 2012 at 10:15 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
wrote:
> So here's the system. Say you have k different legislative bodies (n doesn't
> matter, but should probably be small, and if possible highly composite, so
> something like 2, 3, or if you're really pushing it, 6).
3 isn't technically
On Wed, Jul 18, 2012 at 1:58 PM, Michael Ossipoff
wrote:
> Yes, but if a large party suplus-transfers to another party,and it,
> too,as a result, acquires a quota and must transfer,then the
> destination for that next transfer can just be that 2nd party's
> transfer-choice. All of the transfers, s
On Mon, Jul 16, 2012 at 2:27 PM, Michael Ossipoff
wrote:
>
> On Sat, Jul 14, 2012 at 4:53 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
> > I was thinking that "excess" above their fair share could be distributed.
> > If a party gets 25 seats but 25.2 seats worth of votes, the 0.2 could be
On Thu, Jul 12, 2012 at 5:47 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
> But, when it happens without being the rssult of successful splitting
> strategy, it could just as easily _disfavor_ small parties. Maybe they're
> all just barely short of a round-up point.
>
True, similar to bloc voting, the strategy c
On Sat, Jul 7, 2012 at 5:10 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
> Raph:
>
> Looking again at your Sainte-Lague splitting-strategy example, I don't
> think that the situation is quite as bad as you said.
>
> The smaller group, with 39% of the voters ends up with only 53% of the
> seats, unless I've made an
Another possibility is "alternative-vote" based PR.
You rank up to 2 parties. Something like,
Use divisors 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, ...
This is Websters but is d'Hondt-like for the first seat.
The seats would be allocated using that rule, and any party which got no
seats would be "eliminated" and the vo
On Sat, Feb 18, 2012 at 8:47 PM, Richard Fobes
wrote:
> Another way to understand the second problem is to consider what would
> happen if 55% of the voters in a state favor the Republican Party, and the
> remaining 45% favor the Democratic Party, and there is an even distribution
> of these prefe
On Tue, Feb 7, 2012 at 1:40 AM, David L Wetzell wrote:
> dlw: There are ways to increase intra-party discipline for major parties to
> prevent their fragmentation and
> help them to coordinate the making of serious needed changes that perhaps
> were spotlighted by 3rd parties.
I think if there is
The reason to elect 1/3 of the Senators for 6 years instead of all for
2 years was presumably to give stability, rather than to save money.
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On Mon, Feb 6, 2012 at 2:55 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
> Nope. I'm advocating the use of the Hare Quota, not the Droop Quota.
Ahh ok.
So to be guaranteed 2/3 of the seats, you need 2/3 of the vote. But
if some voters vote for non-concentrated parties, then you can get
your 2nd seat for 1/3 mo
On Mon, Feb 6, 2012 at 3:57 AM, David L Wetzell wrote:
> Moreover, if the bicameral state legislatures were selected by both LR Hare
> 3-seats and a single-winner rule (insert your favorite here), then it'd make
> it so that what helped with gerrymandering in one branch would hurt in the
> other b
On Sat, Feb 4, 2012 at 8:07 PM, Bryan Mills wrote:
> Now, despite a 50/50 natural split, the rural party has a 60% supermajority.
> And, of course, if you draw the district lines differently you can do the
> same thing for the urban party.
This was attempted in Ireland, look up Tullymander.
The
On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 12:41 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> Yes, this works. One downside is that, unlike STV, a hand count becomes
> quite untractable.
I think the random selection method for doing surplus transfers may
still work somewhat.
Approval voting is inherently harder to hand count than pl
On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 3:22 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
> Voter can vote as in:
> . FPTP, ranking the single candidate liked best, and treating all others
> as equally liked less or disliked.
> . Approval, ranking those equally liked best, and treating all others as
> equally liked less or dis
One possible way of combining AV + STV is to allow equal ranks. This
method becomes a method that is very similar to approval in the single
winner case.
When determining if a candidate is elected, all candidates at the rank
share the remaining vote strength, but when determining if a candidate
sh
On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 5:26 AM, Ken & Karla wrote:
> [Ken B.] That is incorrect; I know of no such law. Each state can specify
> its own method of electing its federal representatives.
Isn't there a Federal law which states single seat districts? It
isn't constitutionally required, but Congres
You could also solve the narrow-preferences problem by having ranked
ballots. If a candidate gets more than double the average number of
votes, then any other votes received go to the next highest
candidates.
This might break strategy free-ness. You could have the candidate has
a list of alterna
On Mon, Nov 21, 2011 at 10:57 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
> 1. While all forms of PR fall short of proportionality in representation,
> the best predictor of proportionality is the number of contested seats.
> Yet, PR with fewer seats induces more turnout than PR with a greater
> numbers of seats.
On Mon, Sep 26, 2011 at 3:29 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
> I'd like to be in group 1. Both in the case that I want to be use strategies
> and in the case that I do not want.
>
> - If I don't use strategies in any circumstances, then I'll keep that
> information to myself, and the others can not use th
On Sun, Sep 25, 2011 at 10:32 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
> The problems of Approval might remain and even get stronger.
> 30: A > B >>
> 30: B > A >>
> 40: C >>
That pretty much looks like an A/B tie to me?
Anyway, the general problem is that you have a game of "chicken"
between the A and B factions
I notice it is hosted by the wikimedia foundation. I assume the idea
is that it is a new clean slate?
Is there any difference in functionality compared to wikipedia, or is
it still the same underlying software?
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Tue, Apr 19, 2011 at 1:03 AM, Alex Small wrote:
> The first few seats will mostly go to the largest constituencies. So, if you
> have 50 states with a broad distribution of populations, and you have a
> legislative chamber with 60 seats, most of your states will be
> under-represented.
Wha
On Mon, Apr 18, 2011 at 1:19 AM, ⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote:
> Because I would use the SplitLineAlgorrithm. The next power of 2 over
> 700 is 1024. ¿Do you want to see how the United States of America would look
> without Gerrymandering:
>
> http://rangevoting.org/USsplitLine.png
The split
On Fri, Feb 25, 2011 at 2:28 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
wrote:
> I'm not a UK politics expert, but it seems this is a minimal concession, of
> the sort one would see in negotiation.
Also, since the concession was for a referendum not the actual policy,
it isn't even a 100% concession.
Ironically
On Thu, Feb 24, 2011 at 7:36 PM, Bob Crossley
wrote:
> (PS. I'd be interested in links to good research contesting the claimthat AV
> makes tactical voting redundant - although I will vote Yes, I think the
> false claims being made by the Yes camp are dangerous and
> counterproductive).
It makes
On Fri, Feb 18, 2011 at 7:54 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
> If you want to keep this property, the approach proposed by Michael Rouse
> could determine
> the number of board members. If most votes go to few candidates, then there
> would be 5 members
> (with different weight). If the votes are more dis
Warren has a way of calculating the score for each candidate using the
fast fourier transform.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
How are you handling the ranks?
Is it 4 ranks?
one first ranked
one second ranked
as many 3rd ranked
rest 4th ranked
Deciding the 3rd rank requires similar strategy as approval and could
change how the diagrams look.
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On Mon, Jan 24, 2011 at 1:16 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
wrote:
> That's interesting, though it would by necessity be a truncated Gaussian.
It's not truncated exactly. If the square was -10 to +10, then any of
the points on the edge would go to infinite distance.
You break the square up into a 1
I implemented one that can handle PR methods, but that didn't use randomness.
It also uses java to let the user move the voter centre around. Two
circles are use. The inner one contains 50% of the voters (if I
remember correctly).
http://raphfrk.com/ping_yee/results.html
Under the system, if a
Another issue is the fact that the resulting legislature would end up
using majority rule for making decisions.
A legislature of
60) A
0) C
40) B
gets the A faction almost all of its policies and the B faction nothing.
Replacing that by
0) A
100) C
0) B
means that the A faction loses some of
Btw, this is also the approval version of reweighted score voting, so
if they adopted it, it would mean that there is an organisation using
a limited form of the method.
It sounds like it will use 2-3 seat constituencies for any given
election, so proportionality might not be that great.
Elec
On Tue, Aug 31, 2010 at 11:08 AM, Juho wrote:
> The serious problems of Approval come into play only when there are more
> than two potential winners. As long as T1 and T2 are called "T" (i.e.
> "minor") things are fine.
I disagree. However, we don't really know the how the mechanics of
approval
On Mon, Aug 30, 2010 at 2:42 PM, Juho wrote:
>> What is nice about approval is that even if each candidate is a
>> centrist, the "menu" can be different in each district. You don't
>> just get the same 2-option menu in every district.
>
> What kind of election did you refer to? Did the districts
One of the things that the Burr dilemma assumes is that the voters are
split into 2 groups and each group rates their candidates as vastly
superior to any candidate from the other side.
However, in practice, that isn't true, at least for many people.
Approval (and condorcet) shifts power from the
On Sun, Aug 29, 2010 at 5:31 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Will Approval just turn into Plurality? Not really, because in Plurality
> once you have two frontrunners, this pretty much can't change: There's
> no way for a third candidate to break in. In Approval it can: If the
> third candidate can win,
On Wed, Aug 25, 2010 at 9:41 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
wrote:
> Third, the primary is not open and so
> even if a good ranked method were used, it would elect the candidate closest
> to the party's median, not that of the electorate in general.
Not necessarily. The candidates could easily argue
On Sun, Aug 15, 2010 at 11:55 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
wrote:
> After talking about that Approval should be DSV, I thought of this method.
> It is:
>
> - Voters submit ranked ballots.
> - First count as in Plurality. Candidates that are tied at top rank may
> either get one point each, or 1/k if
On Sun, May 23, 2010 at 8:40 PM, Aaron Armitage
wrote:
> I've considered the question myself, although I've never described my
> ideas publicly. Now's as good an opportunity as any.
>
> I came at it from the opposite direction, so to speak; trying to graft
> lists onto STV to make it scalable, rat
On Sat, May 22, 2010 at 11:39 PM, wrote:
> Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral
> Method
>
> One way to generalize Proportional Approval voting to range ballots is by
> finding the most natural smooth extension of the function f that takes each
> natural
On Sat, May 22, 2010 at 1:02 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
wrote:
> If we ignore that and consider voters as having to vote (like they would
> have to in a nation of compulsory voting) and otherwise as rational economic
> beings, then that problem vanishes,
Another option would be to assume that the
The ballot layout issues would still be there. If the voter is to be
able to rank all candidates, then you need to have each candidate's
name on the ballot.
It would still save time, since you could sort the ballots into piles
for each party. Also, coalition negotiations could start once the
par
On Thu, May 20, 2010 at 7:05 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> I was talking about SPA, not SAV. SPA (summable proportional approval) is a
> summable method which, with very high probability, corresponds to Sequential
> Proportional Approval, first proposed by Thiele (c.1890).
Ahh, sorry about that.
---
On Thu, May 20, 2010 at 4:54 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> The relevant criterion is "If more than k Droop quotas approve of p
> candidates ONLY, then at least min(k,p) of these candidates must be
> elected". Otherwise, if you have 2 droop quotas approving 4 candidates, then
> the method fails becaus
Proportional Approval voting uses a different satisfaction metric.
Each voter is consider to have satisfaction of
1 + 1/2 + 1/3 + + 1/N
where N is the number of approved candidates who are elected.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Wed, May 19, 2010 at 10:18 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
>> - You mentioned earlier that the first vice president should come from a
>> different grouping than the president. If people agree with this, then they
>> should agree that similar principles should apply also to the rest of the
>> co
On Wed, May 19, 2010 at 3:38 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
> Frank, just one comment: Vote management is very common in our party. And
> yes, we have voters often split up in groups, or factions.
"Vote management" has a specific meaning in terms of PR-STV. It is
possible that a faction that has 1.7 q
On Tue, May 18, 2010 at 5:46 PM, wrote:
> In particular, such a highly proportional method is more
> likely to be vulnerable to strategic voting.
In what way?
> Personally I regard resistance to strategic voting to be
> very important, and it should not be neglected just to
> achieve what on th
Another argument that can be used is that it maximizes the number of
people who are directly represented.
If you elect using a single seat method, then you could end up with a
situation where 51% of the party are represented and the other 49%
aren't.
With PR, if you have 5 seats, then each counci
On Thu, May 6, 2010 at 10:19 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> Only when the vote is an
> election, not a poll, does dishonesty come into the picture, as utility
> conflicts with expressivity.
However, as you say, choosing to vote approval style under range is a
statement too.
The ideal system would be
On Fri, May 7, 2010 at 4:27 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
> The proportional ranking needed is not P>VPa>VPb>Ma>Mb>Mc>Md,
> but P>[VPa, VPb]>[Ma, Mb, Mc, Md].
> Let us call this required ranking for "boundary conditions".
Schulze's method can do that too.
Step 1: Elect the Schulze single seat method
2010/5/6 Peter Zbornik :
> Dear Markus Schulze, dear readers,
>
> The example below is intriguing. But I am afraid I fail to understand
> this formulation of Schulze's proportional ranking.
> I would be grateful if M. Schulze or someone else, could give an
> example, which could help me get it.
> S
On Thu, May 6, 2010 at 10:53 AM, Markus Schulze
wrote:
> Then the n-th seat goes to a candidate B
> such that the set {A(1),...,A(n-1),B} satisfies
> Droop proportionality for n seats.
Expanding this using the (k+1) solid coalitions definition.
If a group of voters representing a fraction,
On Thu, May 6, 2010 at 8:05 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
wrote:
> Warren thinks, and I would be inclined to agree, that the compact would have
> had a greater chance if it had specified "the popular vote within the states
> that are part of the compact". Then states would want to join to balance out
On Wed, May 5, 2010 at 9:19 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
> What is the advantages of Schulze proportional ranking to the simpler top
> down STV modified method described in
> http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE9/P5.HTM?
The first problem with this one is that it will elect the President is
the IRV
On Wed, May 5, 2010 at 12:08 AM, Juho wrote:
> (I note that Raph Frank proposed also an approach where the election of the
> last representative would be free of these sex related requirements. That is
> one way of relieving the proportionality related problems since at least the
>
On Tue, May 4, 2010 at 8:12 AM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
> I am affraid that this is not possible. First we have mostly odd-numbered
> council sizes, and secondly the gender rule does not require that half of
> the men should be men and the other half women.
> Our current gender rule goes as following
2010/5/3 Juho :
> (What I mean by "distorting effect" is that if you have left, centre and
> right, and centre has less first place support than the other two, then a
> good approach may be to elect C if one elects only one representative. But
> if one elects two then one could pick L and R (to be
On Mon, May 3, 2010 at 10:52 AM, Markus Schulze
wrote:
> I recommend:
>
> --the president is the top-ranked candidate of the Schulze
> single-winner ranking,
> --the vice president is the second-ranked candidate of the
> Schulze single-winner ranking,
> --the other members of the council are cho
On Sun, May 2, 2010 at 8:48 AM, wrote:
> See above. Also, based on this comment I've added three links to this
> answer in the FAQ.
Great.
> Previously I had presumed that election-method experts would go to the pages
> that contain the rigorous descriptions (as above). I had intended the FAQ
On Fri, Apr 30, 2010 at 8:22 PM, wrote:
>> I would appreciate if Votefair ranking would have some mathematical
>> description and at least well described and discussed in some
>> peer-reviewed paper.
>
> If you replace the word "paper" with the word "article," there is a widely
> peer-reviewed, p
On Wed, Apr 28, 2010 at 9:00 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
> Approval voting was used in the French presidential election, first round,
> where far-right nationalist Le Pen got to the second round.
> Le Pen was hardly a centrist.
> See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Approval_voting#Effect_on_elections
N
On Wed, Apr 28, 2010 at 7:19 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
> Condorcet methods have not been used in politics yet, I think.
Not sure if they have been used in politics. However, they have been
used by various open source organisations.
Schulze's method seems reasonably popular.
> Are there by any c
On Wed, Apr 28, 2010 at 4:52 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
> This is, I think, a decent general solution to ordering a set of STV
> winners: re-count, with only the current winners eligible, for successively
> smaller numbers of seats.
Yeah, it is reasonable.
The fundamental problem is that if you
On Wed, Apr 28, 2010 at 4:05 PM, Juho wrote:
> Do you mean that voters would concentrate on the first rankings and
> strongest candidates? The used method should be such that this kind of
> behaviour will not be rational.
Yes. If the order of election matters, then your first rank is
effectively
On Wed, Apr 28, 2010 at 4:47 AM, Juho wrote:
> You assume that there is only one VP.
Well, if more than 1 VP is possible, then the election could be
- Elect council with PR-STV
- The condorcet winner (only including the councillors) is President
- Elect 2 of the councilors as VPs using PR-STV
H
On Tue, Apr 27, 2010 at 2:09 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> Why?
The principle on which PR is based is that all seats are equal.
> Actually, it could be "first seat", or "plurality winner", which is mostly
> equivalent.
It could also have some strategic effects, where people decide to rank
their fa
On Tue, Apr 27, 2010 at 7:19 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> Why not:
> - ranked votes
> - STV for council. Keep track of which members are elected first and second,
> one of them will be VP.
> - Condorcet winner among the councilmembers is P. (You could use original
> ballots or have the council revot
On Tue, Apr 27, 2010 at 1:54 AM, Juho wrote:
> A fully separate P election would make the board less proportional - unless
> the elected P would have voting power only if he/she is already a member of
> the board.
I think if there are a reasonable number of members, then the
non-proportionality w
On Mon, Apr 26, 2010 at 7:50 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
> Yes that is indeed the problem - it allows for bribery and blackmailing.
> The secret ballot was introduced together with the equal voting right in
> many states of Europe, including the Czech Republic.
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret_b
On Sun, Apr 25, 2010 at 9:24 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
> DELIVERABLES FOR IMPLEMENTATION:
> In the end, if proportional elections are to make their way into the
> party statutesm, then I have to deliver the following:
> 1. a proposal of a text to the statutes, describing the election rules
> and pr
On Mon, Apr 19, 2010 at 9:42 PM, Duane Johnson wrote:
> The voting process would go like this:
> 1. (By some process outside the scope of this proposal), it is determined
> that an issue needs to be voted on
This could be an issue, as controlling what people get to vote on
represents considerab
Btw, there is also a stricter criterion for equilibrium points:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proper_equilibrium
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On Wed, Apr 14, 2010 at 4:11 PM, Warren D. Smith (CRV cofounder,
http://RangeVoting.org) wrote:
>
>> Clay: I think you're massively overcomplicating this. Just define it to be
>> more optimal to have Hitler win by 1 point than by 2.
>
> --no, you are massively oversimplifying this.
I agree with W
On Wed, Apr 14, 2010 at 12:57 PM, Bruce Gilson wrote:
> I tend to think along the following lines. One vote almost never changes a
> result. However, if a sufficiently large number of voters change their
> behavior together to make a change, the result is what one wants to
> consider.
No, that is
On Wed, Apr 14, 2010 at 11:06 AM, Michael Allan wrote:
> It's also an indication of the problem. Consider these two facts:
>
> 1. Current voting methods lack the Nash-redeeming addition. In a
> typical election, no individual vote has any effect on the result.
> The effect is exactly zero
There is a pretty complex process for creating a usenet group (not
even sure if they are still doing it). It also depends on what type
of group is being created (for example, alt. groups are easier but
not-moderated).
However, if you did that, then you would be creating a new list, not
converting
On Tue, Apr 13, 2010 at 5:02 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> This is a great idea at its heart, but I can see a couple of problems which
> need fixing. For one thing, you didn't specify that the sum of the means for
> all vote types must be 1.
Actually, it would probably be better to require 1 ballo
On Wed, Apr 7, 2010 at 11:25 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
> Write-ins permitted (if few write-ins expected,
> counters may lump all such as if a single candidate - if assumption correct
> the count verifies it; if incorrect, must recount).
How do you handle write-ins. Are write-ins assumed to be equa
On Mon, Mar 29, 2010 at 4:02 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
wrote:
> I'd like to get specific comment on this method. I use the Hare quota,
> generally, with Asset methods, because it provides natural consequences for
> inability to compromise. The loss of a seat is not particularly harmful if
> this is
On Sat, Mar 27, 2010 at 9:30 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
wrote:
> Raph Frank wrote:
>
>> This is less complex, but not as fair as transferring the surpluses.
>
> Your first method is more proportional than your second. If what you
> want is a majoritarian/centrist outcome,
On Fri, Mar 26, 2010 at 6:41 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
wrote:
> You can't hold a "runoff election," and here is why: Some voters already got
> their candidate. A runoff under these conditions has no way of knowing who
> "won" and who didn't.
The multi-seat equivalent of top-2 runoff could be someth
On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 9:12 PM, Juho wrote:
> Would it be possible to plant one's own candidates inside the competing
> parties and vote for them? Probably not in practice even if this was
> possible in theory.
>
> Ability to influence which candidates of the other parties will be elected
> chang
On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 6:14 PM, James Gilmour wrote:
> No, it is not at all like MMP in that. ALL the votes are party votes. All
> the votes are used to allocate seats to parties and then
> the votes within parties are used to decide which candidates should fill the
> allocated seats. Import
On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 4:01 PM, James Gilmour wrote:
> No, it's not at all like MMP. In MMP half or more of the members are elected
> from single-member electoral districts (usually by
> FPTP). The "additional members" in MMP are elected by party-list (usually
> closed-list) taking into accou
On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 4:54 AM, robert bristow-johnson
wrote:
> is that why IRV
> (under whatever name) was first plugged for government elections in
> multiparty environments?
It seems that what Fairvote want is PR-STV.
The hope is presumably, that if they can get voters used to ranked
ballots
On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 4:27 PM, Bob Richard
wrote:
> Google turned up this description of the Swiss electoral system:
>
> http://www.democracy-building.info/particularities-switzerlands-proportional-election-system.html
Thanks.
So, from my read, it is party list, but with cumulative voting to
d
On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 2:46 AM, robert bristow-johnson
wrote:
> and, i'm not sure who, but someone introduced a measure in the state
> legislature to elected the governor by IRV (there is a perennial Prog
> candidate that doesn't get any traction because Vermont is not all like
> Burlington or Br
On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 12:08 AM, James Gilmour
wrote:
> In the (much) more complicated Swiss system, the "apparentenement" is
> determined by each individual
> voter.
Do you have a link to the method that they use? Is it just open party list?
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