Kevin,
Do we agree that working from closest pairs outward solves the Plurality
problem (at the expense of
compromise and less monotonicity)?
From: Kevin Venzke
Hi Forest,
--- En date de?: Ven 15.7.11, fsimm...@pcc.edu
a ?crit?:
I think I will try implementing the eliminate the
I doubt it's monotonic, though it's probably not a practical
problem. That
is, it would probably be totally impractical to try to use the
nonmonotonicity for anything strategic, and it wouldn't even
lead to Yee
diagram ugliness.
You would have to have at lest four candidates to get a
Hi,
--- En date de : Jeu 14.7.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com a
écrit :
Nonmonotonicity could be considered an error even with
honest voters. The argument would go something like: Okay,
if we raise X, then X goes from winner to loser. That means
that the method is either
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Trying to build a metric from a set of ranked ballots is fraught with
difficulties, and your outline of a procedure for doing it is
interesting to me.
The simplest, least sophisticated idea I have so far that seems to
have some use is to define the distance between two
candidates, eliminate the pairwise loser of
the two that are least close
to each other.
- Original Message -
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Date: Wednesday, July 13, 2011 2:35 pm
Subject: Re: [EM] A distance based method
To: fsimm...@pcc.edu
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Here's a simpler version that is basically the same:
Make use of cardinal ratings so that the rating of candidate X on
ballot b is given by b(X).
Define the closeness of candidate X to candidate Y as the dot product
Sum b(X)*b(Y)
where the sum is taken over all b in
On 11.7.2011, at 2.34, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
First find a clone consistent way of defining distance between candidates.
Then while two or more candidates remain
of the two with the greatest distance from each other
eliminate the one with the greatest pairwise defeat
EndWhile.
This system seems explicitly designed to elect a centrist. In their
experimental
paperhttps://sites.google.com/site/ridalaraki/xfiles/BalinskiLarakiExperiEvid%28LastVersion%29.pdf?attredirects=0on
Majority Judgment, system inventors Badinski and Laraki run a
simulation
to see how often different
Do you know remember their arguments, or your own, on why centrists are not
good? I think methods that elect centrists (like CW) are quite good general
purpose single-winner methods. But on the other hand there are many kind of
single-winner elections, and in many cases the targets may well be
You can read the paper - I linked it - if you want to. Without going back
and quoting them, basically they argued that if a method always elects
centrists, candidates will always be competing to be the most centrist,
which will make it difficult for voters to make a meaningful choice. They
also
Thanks, those are good arguments too. I'll check the paper to see if they can
convince me that compromise oriented methods should not be used by default.
Juho
On 11.7.2011, at 14.46, Jameson Quinn wrote:
You can read the paper - I linked it - if you want to. Without going back and
quoting
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
First find a clone consistent way of defining distance between candidates.
This could be an interesting algorithm problem in itself. It is possible
to triangulate points in space (assuming Euclidean distances) if you
have the exact distances; but what if you have only
Yes, by sequentially eliminating one member of the remaining largest diameter
pair, the method elects a
centrist.
If this is considered a problem, it can be overcome by sequentially eliminating
one member of the
current smallest diameter pair. However, this variant introduces a strong
Trying to build a metric from a set of ranked ballots is fraught with
difficulties, and your outline of a
procedure for doing it is interesting to me.
The simplest, least sophisticated idea I have so far that seems to have some
use is to define the
distance between two candidates X and Y to
2011/7/11 fsimm...@pcc.edu
Yes, by sequentially eliminating one member of the remaining largest
diameter pair, the method elects a
centrist.
If this is considered a problem, it can be overcome by sequentially
eliminating one member of the
current smallest diameter pair. However, this
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