On Oct 5, 2008, at 8:21 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Jonathan
Not a bad solution at all Jonathan, although there is a lack of
transparency to any electronic count for the average citizen
That's true enough, though it's also true that the average citizen
isn't going to recount (or even observe a
On Wed, Oct 8, 2008 at 7:14 PM, Jonathan Lundell [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
That's true enough, though it's also true that the average citizen isn't
going to recount (or even observe a recount of) a plurality election. I've
participated in one myself, and it requires true dedication.
True. But
On Oct 8, 2008, at 6:26 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Your method is not method-independent because the only way to check
machine counts is with hand counts and some methods are LOTS easier to
accurately and efficiently hand count than other methods, and checking
the results of running a small set of
On Tue, 7 Oct 2008 01:03:47 -0400 Brian Olson wrote:
On Oct 6, 2008, at 11:30 AM, AllAbout Voting wrote:
So I will ask a pair of constructive questions:
1. Can Condorcet voting be compatible with precinct level optical scan
systems? (which many election integrity advocates consider to be
Kathy Dopp wrote:
It seems to me that most of the persons on this list would rather have
votes fraudulently counted using some alternative voting scheme that
requires an unverifiable unauditable electronic voting system, than
accurately counted using the plurality election method.
Some have that
On Oct 6, 2008, at 5:42 AM, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
BTW, it seems to me that there's a relatively straightforward
solution
in principle to the problem of computerized vote counting, based on
the use of separate data-entry and counting processes. Let voters vote
on
On Oct 6, 2008, at 11:19 AM, Raph Frank wrote:
Condorcet is precinct countable. You just need an N*N grid of numbers
from each precinct.
OTOH, that degree of compression is hardly necessary. IRV/STV ballots
could be captured at the precinct level, cryptographically signed, and
On Oct 6, 2008, at 11:30 AM, AllAbout Voting wrote:
So I will ask a pair of constructive questions:
1. Can Condorcet voting be compatible with precinct level optical scan
systems? (which many election integrity advocates consider to be
pretty good)
Yes.
2. Can Condorcet voting be
Dave Ketchum Sent: Sunday, October 05, 2008 1:16 AM
We have to be doing different topics.
Yes, we must indeed be doing different topics.
If you are electing the City Mayor or the State Governor and there are only two
candidates, plurality is as good as it gets. If
there are more than two
On Sat, Oct 4, 2008 at 3:51 PM, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In fact some computer scientists just recently mathematically PROVED
that it is impossible to even verify that the certified software is
actually running on a voting machine.
Tell us more, a bit more convincingly as to
Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Sat, Oct 4, 2008 at 3:51 PM, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In fact some computer scientists just recently mathematically PROVED
that it is impossible to even verify that the certified software is
actually running on a voting machine.
Tell us more, a bit more
Raph Frank Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2008 11:01 PM
These disks have to be kept securely for four years -
no access to anyone except with a Court Order.
What is the basis for granting access?
We do not have any precedents for access to the images of ballot papers because
there were no
On Sun, 5 Oct 2008 12:22:37 +0100 James Gilmour wrote:
Dave Ketchum Sent: Sunday, October 05, 2008 1:16 AM
We have to be doing different topics.
Actually we seem together on topics, but you reacted to what you took as a
cue statement without noticing what I was saying. Perhaps the
]; 'Dave Ketchum' [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2008 7:41 AM
Subject: Re: [EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines
Dave Ketchum wrote:
Mixed into this, Plurality is easily done with paper; better systems,
such as Condorcet
Kathy Dopp wrote:
In fact there has never been even a theoretical design for an
electronic voting system or even electronic paper ballot vote counting
system that does not have known security leaks.
In my design, whether or not there are security holes in the vote-counting
system itself, the
Just for the record -
Raph Frank Sent: Thursday, October 02, 2008 11:27 PM
On Thu, Aug 28, 2008 at 12:00 PM, James Gilmour
Here in Scotland there is a somewhat hidden debate that must be had.
STV-PR was introduced for local government elections in 2007. The
counting rules adopted
]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; 'Dave Ketchum' [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2008 7:41 AM
Subject: Re: [EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines
Dave Ketchum wrote:
Mixed into this, Plurality is easily done with paper; better systems
On Fri, 3 Oct 2008 18:24:09 -0600 Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Fri, Oct 3, 2008 at 1:23 PM, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
More complete defenses are possible with electronics.
Totally FALSE statement.
Sad that we cannot look at the same reality!
Conceded that rogue programmers can do all
On Fri, Oct 3, 2008 at 11:26 AM, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
ANYTHING cam get tampered with if enough doors are left ajar, including
paper ballots (such as discarding, editing, or replacing some).
True, but paper ballots must be tampered with one at a time and it
takes many many more
On Fri, 3 Oct 2008 11:45:16 -0600 Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Fri, Oct 3, 2008 at 11:26 AM, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
ANYTHING cam get tampered with if enough doors are left ajar, including
paper ballots (such as discarding, editing, or replacing some).
True, but paper ballots must be
On Fri, Oct 3, 2008 at 1:23 PM, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
More complete defenses are possible with electronics.
Totally FALSE statement.
In fact there has never been even a theoretical design for an
electronic voting system or even electronic paper ballot vote counting
system that
On Thu, Aug 28, 2008 at 12:00 PM, James Gilmour
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Here in Scotland there is a somewhat hidden debate that must be had.
STV-PR was introduced for local government elections in
2007. The counting rules adopted (Weighted Inclusive Gregory Method for
consequential
]
Cc: Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED];
election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Sent: Thursday, October 02, 2008 6:26 PM
Subject: Re: [EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines
On Thu, Aug 28, 2008 at 12:00 PM, James Gilmour
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Here in Scotland there is a somewhat hidden
21:58:39 +0100
From: James Gilmour [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines
I thought this might be of interest:
BBC Digital Planet takes a look at Brazil's e-voting system
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/technology/7644751.stm
James
Election
Dave Ketchum Sent: Thursday, August 28, 2008 4:54 AM
Regrettably James is making an incorrect analysis of the problem.
Oh dear! I never thought for one moment that posting a link to a relevant
news item for information would be taken as necessarily
signifying my agreement with its
Here's an alternative view from the ones I highlighted yesterday, and from the
same source:
Resurrecting E-voting
http://blogs.zdnet.com/Murphy/?p=1228tag=nl.e019
As before, with no endorsement intended, and I would not presume to comment on
the technical content.
JG
No virus
On Wed, 27 Aug 2008 22:16:53 -0600 Kathy Dopp wrote:
From: Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines
Regrettably James is making an incorrect analysis of the problem.
I believe that is a mischaracterization because James' prior email
Dancing on E-voting’s grave
http://blogs.zdnet.com/Murphy/?p=1227tag=nl.e019
Election loser: touch-screen voting
http://www.newsobserver.com/politics/story/1185482.html
JG
No virus found in this outgoing message.
Checked by AVG.
Version: 7.5.526 / Virus Database: 270.6.9/1636 -
Regrettably James is making an incorrect analysis of the problem.
Agreed that there have been some expensive disasters associated with
computers and voting.
ASSUMING computers were as unreliable as James' sources imply, we had
best retreat from our computer-based civilization, much of which
From: Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines
Regrettably James is making an incorrect analysis of the problem.
I believe that is a mischaracterization because James' prior email
simply cited some recent articles.
BETTER to accept
Date: Sat, 23 Aug 2008 01:02:44 -0400
From: Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines
Federal certification? The many horror stories tell us either:
Equipment is failing that has never been certified or
The certifiers are signing
Dave Ketchum wrote:
You claim that many fragments can be done by specialized machines.
AGREED, though I do not agree that they can do it any better than a
normal computer - which has equivalent capability.
In a technical capacity, of course not. Since a computer is
Turing-complete, it can do
Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Thu, Aug 21, 2008 at 10:00 PM, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
First, this is not intended to be used in a zillion precincts - just to
validate the programs.
OK. Well if you don't care about validating the election outcome
accuracy, and just want to verify the
Federal certification? The many horror stories tell us either:
Equipment is failing that has never been certified or
The certifiers are signing off without bothering to look
seriously for the many defects in the offered systems,
Thus the certification process needs overhauling.
I
4. Re: Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines (Dave Ketchum)
On Sun, 17 Aug 2008 11:14:34 +0200 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
I DO NOT like printout-based machines. To start some thinking, how about:
All machines have identical valid code,
Some have video
On Thu, 21 Aug 2008 16:37:32 -0600 Kathy Dopp wrote:
4. Re: Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines (Dave Ketchum)
On Sun, 17 Aug 2008 11:14:34 +0200 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
I DO NOT like printout-based machines. To start some thinking, how about:
All
On Thu, Aug 21, 2008 at 10:00 PM, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
First, this is not intended to be used in a zillion precincts - just to
validate the programs.
OK. Well if you don't care about validating the election outcome
accuracy, and just want to verify the small amount of
On Sun, 17 Aug 2008 11:14:34 +0200 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
So you're saying that computers are better than specialized machines?
I'm not sure that's what you say (rather than that machines are
better than paper ballots), but I'll assume that.
Your specialized
Rob,
As I said, I am not responding to any more of your unsupported
internal chatter/attacks.
Instead here is interesting news coverage today by CBS news:
Voting Machine Doubts Linger - Concerns Over Vulnerability Of
Electronic Machines Sending Many States Back To Paper Ballots
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Aug 16, 2008, at 12:54 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
I am for a record on disk of each ballot, but done in a maner to
not destroy secrecy.
You have to be very careful when doing so, because there are many
channels to secure. A vote-buyer might tell you to
Dave Ketchum wrote:
So you're saying that computers are better than specialized machines?
I'm not sure that's what you say (rather than that machines are better
than paper ballots), but I'll assume that.
Your specialized machines can each do a fragment of the task. However,
dependably
But murderers get away with murder, police are being bought
off by criminals, government employees steal office supplies. No one knows
exactly how much any of things happen. We try to limit them (balancing the
degree of the problem and the cost of addressing it), and we go on with our
lives.
On Sun, Aug 17, 2008 at 10:09 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Won't the people, as a last stop, keep fraud from being too blatant? You
don't need scientific methods to know that something's up if a state was
80-20 Democratic one cycle and then suddenly becomes 80-20 Republican (or
vice versa) the
Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2008 02:01:45 -0400
From: Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines
Well here is where you and I differ. I think if electoral fraud in the
US were eliminated, it would be a good thing, but not dramatically
change things
On Aug 16, 2008, at 12:54 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
I am for a record on disk of each ballot, but done in a maner
to not destroy secrecy.
You have to be very careful when doing so, because there are many
channels to secure. A vote-buyer might tell you to vote exactly at
noon
On Sat, 16 Aug 2008 07:27:10 -0700 Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Aug 16, 2008, at 12:54 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
I am for a record on disk of each ballot, but done in a maner to
not destroy secrecy.
You have to be very careful when doing so, because there are many
channels to
On Fri, Aug 15, 2008 at 11:07 PM, Kathy Dopp [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2008 02:01:45 -0400
From: Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines
Well here is where you and I differ. I think if electoral fraud in the
US were
To clarify:
Kristofer
Me
Kristofer
On Sat, 16 Aug 2008 09:54:28 +0200 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
As I say above, we are in trouble. Until we both fix the machines and
demonstrate success of the repairs, such use of paper backups makes sense.
Complicating all this, paper
On Sat, Aug 16, 2008 at 7:48 PM, rob brown [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I do not believe that such fraud changes the
outcome of a large percentage of elections, and in those it does, it
was pretty close anyway.
And how do you know this since elections are not subjected to
independent audits
On Aug 17, 2008, at 3:49 , Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Aug 16, 2008, at 5:24 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Sat, 16 Aug 2008 07:27:10 -0700 Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Aug 16, 2008, at 12:54 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
I am for a record on disk of each ballot, but done in a
maner to
On Sat, Aug 16, 2008 at 9:40 PM, Kathy Dopp [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Rob,
You can tell when someone has absolutely no facts to back them up when
they attack and disparage the person rather than the issue that is
under discussion. So anyone who has done actual research on the issue
that
On Aug 16, 2008, at 10:08 PM, Juho wrote:
I wonder what kind of a vote-by-mail system is in use there. If it
is just based on ordinary mail that one can send from one's home or
anywhere (and doesn't offer any way to cancel and replace the vote)
then that seems to offer opportunities for
On Sat, Aug 16, 2008 at 11:25 PM, Message: 4
Date: Sat, 16 Aug 2008 22:25:45 -0700
From: rob brown [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Message-ID:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Content-Type
On Wed, 13 Aug 2008 22:00:06 -0700 rob brown wrote:
On Wed, Aug 13, 2008 at 9:16 AM, Kathy Dopp [EMAIL PROTECTED]
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Tue, Aug 12, 2008 at 11:28 PM, rob brown [EMAIL PROTECTED]
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
How? Do we want an infinite loop of a
On Thu, Aug 14, 2008 at 11:01 PM, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED]wrote:
(most of Dave's comments snipped out, I responded to only a few)
Open source is ESSENTIAL:
While it encourages quality programming by those who do not want to get
caught doing otherwise, it also encourages thorough testing
Dave Ketchum wrote:
Or do we want the voter to be able to cancel the ballot and let
the poll workers know that he needs a paper ballot instead that
he can mark himself?
I'm fine with the latter. Actually that seems like a reasonable
thing to do.
I agree,
On Fri, 15 Aug 2008 16:01:10 +0200 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
Or do we want the voter to be able to cancel the ballot and let
the poll workers know that he needs a paper ballot instead that
he can mark himself?
I'm fine with the latter.
On Tue, Aug 12, 2008 at 11:28 PM, rob brown [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
How? Do we want an infinite loop of a voter running paper through a
cheap printer trying to obtain an accurate ballot record and the
machine refusing to print one while it switches a vote wrongly? Or do
we want the voter
On Wed, Aug 13, 2008 at 9:16 AM, Kathy Dopp [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Tue, Aug 12, 2008 at 11:28 PM, rob brown [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
How? Do we want an infinite loop of a voter running paper through a
cheap printer trying to obtain an accurate ballot record and the
machine refusing
On Tue, Aug 12, 2008 at 4:47 PM, Kathy Dopp [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
As virtually all (all I know) independent computer scientists (who do
not profit from certifying or working for VVV's - vulture voting
vendors) agree, it is *not* possible to fix DREs because their
fundamental design is
fundamental design is flawed? If so, obvious response is to redo the
design.
Hi David,
The only design that is *not* flawed (that I know of) is
voter-marked paper ballots because it provides voter-verifiED ballots.
However the optical scanning machines that count them today are very
flawed
Message: 2
Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2008 18:17:49 -0700
From: rob brown [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines
The two strikes you are out rule is not inherent to machine voting -- that
is fixable, obviously.
How? Do we want an infinite loop of a voter
Somehow we are not connecting, but I will try one more time.
On Tue, 12 Aug 2008 21:34:56 -0600 Kathy Dopp wrote:
fundamental design is flawed? If so, obvious response is to redo the
design.
Hi David,
The only design that is *not* flawed (that I know of) is
voter-marked paper ballots
On Tue, Aug 12, 2008 at 9:01 PM, Kathy Dopp [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Message: 2
Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2008 18:17:49 -0700
From: rob brown [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines
The two strikes you are out rule is not inherent to machine voting
Summary:
Shamos describes MANY serious problems with elections that NEED
fixing. Offers some serious thought about fixes, including making
DREs usable.
Responses concentrate on fact that present DREs and paper
ballots have problems, and do not consider fixing the DREs.
I am
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