Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Fri, 17 Oct 2008 22:08:32 +0200 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
I suggest a two-step resolution:
Agree to a truce between Condorcet and Range, while they dispose
of IRV as being less capable than Condorcet.
Then go back to the war between Co
On Fri, 17 Oct 2008 22:08:32 +0200 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
I suggest a two-step resolution:
Agree to a truce between Condorcet and Range, while they dispose
of IRV as being less capable than Condorcet.
Then go back to the war between Condorcet and Range.
Dave Ketchum wrote:
I suggest a two-step resolution:
Agree to a truce between Condorcet and Range, while they dispose of
IRV as being less capable than Condorcet.
Then go back to the war between Condorcet and Range.
I think the problem, or at least a part of it, is that if we (the
On Wed, 15 Oct 2008 18:49:41 +0200 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Raph Frank wrote:
On 10/9/08, Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
If there is a near tie among three or more, they often disagree but
usually get one of the leaders - matters little since the leaders
were about
equall
Dear Kristofer,
you wrote:
Since Condorcet is a majoritarian method (as it needs to be in order to
be a good single-winner method) ...
A good single-winner method *must not* be majoritarian but must elect C
in the situation of
55% voters having A 100 > C 80 > B 0 and
45% vote
On Wed, Oct 15, 2008 at 5:49 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Since Condorcet is a majoritarian method (as it needs to be in order to be a
> good single-winner method), the resulting parliament would also be
> majoritarian. This means that a party whose candidates consistentl
Raph Frank wrote:
On 10/9/08, Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
If there is a near tie among three or more, they often disagree but
usually get one of the leaders - matters little since the leaders were about
equally deserving.
It matters because IRV reinforces the 2 party system.
heir hated choice.
Terry Bouricius
- Original Message -
From: "Aaron Armitage" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Monday, October 13, 2008 6:58 PM
Subject: Re: [EM] IRV vs Condorcet vs Range/Score
--- On Mon, 10/13/08, Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Chris
--- On Mon, 10/13/08, Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: [EM] IRV vs Condorcet vs Range/Score
> To: "EM"
> Date: Monday, October 13, 2008, 11:35 AM
> >CB: Not necessarily, no. I have in mind something like
> >(with sincere ratings):
> >
> >
On 10/13/08, Aaron Armitage <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Any strategically informed voter will give approval-like ratings, and will
> approve the top two frontrunner he likes better, as well as any candidates
> he prefers to that frontrunner, which means that the stated ratings will
> look like
--- On Sun, 10/12/08, Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: [EM] IRV vs Condorcet vs Range/Score
> To: "EM"
> Date: Sunday, October 12, 2008, 11:18 PM
> >"Low social utility (SU)" Condorcet winners
> with
> >little solid support and depend
On 10/13/08, Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> CB: Not necessarily, no. I have in mind something like (with sincere
> ratings):
>
> 49: A(99) > C(2) > B(1)
> 48: B(99) > C(2) > A(1)
> 03: C(99) > A(98) > B(1)
>
> C is the CW, but A is a much more stable, much higher SU, arguably as
> fa
--- On Sun, 10/12/08, Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: IRV vs Condorcet vs Range/Score
> To: "EM"
> Cc: "Aaron Armytage" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Date: Sunday, October 12, 2008, 11:01 AM
> Aaron,
> I agree that not electing a voted CW is
Hopefully we are picking a method that will:
See the CW if one exists and thus elect that one.
See the cycle if there is no CW, and elect the best member of the
cycle. Identifying the best member of a cycle is difficult and method must
be defined as part of choosing the method.
On S
kings.
--- On Sat, 10/11/08, Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: [EM] IRV vs Condorcet vs Range/Score
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Date: Saturday, October 11, 2008, 10:30 AM
> All possible Condorcet methods?
>
&g
I think his point is that he prefers any and all Condorcet methods over
IRV, and probably over any non-Condorcet method. I happen to agree.
--- On Sat, 10/11/08, Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: [EM] IRV vs Condorcet vs Range/Score
> To:
On Thu, 9 Oct 2008 15:18:50 +0100 Raph Frank wrote:
On 10/9/08, Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
If there is a near tie among three or more, they often disagree but
usually get one of the leaders - matters little since the leaders were about
equally deserving.
This was part of my
On 10/9/08, Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> If there is a near tie among three or more, they often disagree but
> usually get one of the leaders - matters little since the leaders were about
> equally deserving.
It matters because IRV reinforces the 2 party system.
it would be inte
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