On Fri, Aug 29, 2003 at 05:43:25PM -0400, Eric Gorr wrote:
> >I have to disagree strongly with that last sentence. Utility is
> >important. A low utility 'least bad' centrist turkey is not the same
> >as a genuinely preferred compromise.
>
> Considering both groups would prefer to have B over th
At 5:19 PM -0400 8/29/03, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Eric Gorr wrote in part:
45 A>B>C
6 B>A>C
5 B>C>A
44 C>B>A
(snip)
The entire population would rather have B then the apparently primary
opposition.
So, B should win.
Actually neither myself nor those who disagree with me can be
certain as to whe
Eric Gorr wrote in part:
>>45 A>B>C
>>6 B>A>C
>>5 B>C>A
>>44 C>B>A
(snip)
>The entire population would rather have B then the apparently primary
>opposition.
>So, B should win.
>>Actually neither myself nor those who disagree with me can be
>>certain as to whether B is really a low util
The moral of Rob's example below is that PR should not be done by
sequential choice.
That's why PAV is superior to sequential PAV, for another example.
Since STV is a sequential choice method, it is essentially a bailing wire
and string kluge that may be good enough for government work, but shoul
Furthermore, what we call "election methods" have many applications beyond
public elections. We call the alternatives "candidates" because that is a
colorful case that interests a lot of people.
Forest
On Thu, 21 Aug 2003, Alex Small wrote:
> John B. Hodges said:
> > Some time back I asked why t
The simplest method to understand and implement works for both single
winner elections and proportional representation: Candidate Proxy.
Each voter votes for one candidate as in plurality. The candidates
represent (as proxies) the voters that voted for them in an election
completion convention tha
At 7:34 PM -0400 8/28/03, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
My favourite type of example to post on this list is the following:
45 A>B>C
6 B>A>C
5 B>C>A
44 C>B>A
I argue that B shouldn't win because he/she is very likely to be a
low utility compromise- the least worst.
Many people on this list disagree w
Let's talk about a very hypothetical model. Say that we use Approval
Voting. We have N candidates and an M-dimensional issue space. Say also
that voters decide which candidates to approve based solely on where the
candidates stand on the issues, and not based on how the candidates are
faring in
