Bart wrote:
>It's probably a safe bet that almost everyone
>who voted for Nader (at least in a competitive state such as Florida)
>didn't much care what happened between Bush and Gore, and placed a
>higher value on placing a protest vote.
I don't buy this. The fact is that, even in a battlegroun
(Sometimes top-posting feels right.)
David's post is an example of one of the more novel arguments for IRV.
Basically, it goes like this:
Axiom 1 - We're electing a legislature. There are three (perhaps more)
parties. The "centrist" party is the weakest, in terms of first-place
preference.
Adam H Tarr wrote:
>
> AS LONG AS you have two major factions that have comfortably more than two
> thirds of the first-place preference between them, IRV does a good job of
> preventing minor party candidates from "interfering" in the two party system.
> In this respect, it manages to solve the
Various people have said that IRV has no real advantage over Plurality.
Consider a three party system like England ( or a four party system like Wales or Scotland). The third party In England the Liberal Democrats is consistently underrepresented in the House of Commons. In their book (The Britis
Eric wrote:
>At 7:17 PM -0500 1/24/04, Bill Lewis Clark wrote:
>
>> It's nowhere near as good as Condorcet
>>(IMHO) but it's not "change for the sake of change."
>
>Apparently, it is.
My position on IRV's advantages over plurality is this:
AS LONG AS you have two major factions that have comfor
Bill Clark asked:
> What are some examples where IRV performs worse than Plurality?
Adam Tarr answered:
> 10% FarRight>Right>Centrist>Left>FarLeft
> 10% Right>FarRight>Centrist>Left>FarLeft
> 15% Right>Centrist>FarRight>Left>FarLeft
> 16% Centrist>Right>Left>FarRight>FarLeft
> 15% Centrist>Left>
At 7:17 PM -0500 1/24/04, Bill Lewis Clark wrote:
> None.
Then IRV is superior to Plurality.
Looks like I was incorrect. Adam and Bart have provided some far
better information then I did with respect to this issue...I will
concede the point to them and look forward to reading your responses
t
Eric Gorr wrote:
> Sorry, but to support so obviously an inferior method which simply does
> not provide a net benefit over Plurality is just silly.
I don't believe IRV "simply does not provide a net benefit over Plurality."
> You seem to recognize that Condorcet is the superior system, but
> su
>Incidentally, I've read claims in the past that there are potential
>scenarios in which IRV even does worse than Plurality, and I've conceded
>these as being true but describing extremely unrealistic situations.
>People have asked me in private correspondence what these situations might
>be, and
At 4:40 PM -0500 1/24/04, Bill Lewis Clark wrote:
But my point is mainly that I'd like to see less badmouthing of IRV and
its supporters, and more uniting for a common goal. IRV has a lot more
visible public support at the moment, and stands an actual chance of
coming into the national spotlight.
Bart Ingles wrote:
> In a near replay of 2002, but using FPP this time, Arnold took Riordan's
> place as the moderate republican, and McClintock replaced Simon in the
> recall election of 2003. With the simpler FPP system, more voters
> understood the need to support Schwarzenegger in order to d
Bill Lewis Clark wrote:
>
> So, when (if ever) does IRV perform worse than Plurality?
The recent 2002 and 2003 gubernatorial elections in California might be
an example. Although not an IRV election, the 2002 elections were held
in two rounds, and had three candidates who were clearly more viab
I'd be interested in seeing your proof, since everything else I have
seen shows them to be quite different.
40 A>B>C
25 B>C>A
35 C>B>A
Borda scores:
A=80 B=125 C=95; B wins (= the Condorcet winner).
IRV result:
B eliminated, C wins.
FPP result:
A wins (unless C voters use obvious strategy a
Paul wrote (here converted to plain text):
> It is fairly easy to prove that IRV always selects the Borda
> winner.
Surely this statement is wrong?
Consider 3 candiates and 7 voters:
A>B>C: 4
B>C>A: 2
C>B>A: 1
Borda winner: B
IRV winner: A
> Personally, I have no objection to that, but it
Bill Lewis Clark wrote:
>> Number of potential presidential candidates supporting IRV: 2
>> (Dean and Kucinich)
>> Number of potential presidential candidates supporting Condorcet: 0
Rob LeGrand added:
> Number of potential presidential candidates supporting Approval: 1
> (Badnarik)
That's gre
Bill Lewis Clark wrote:
> Number of potential presidential candidates supporting IRV: 2
> (Dean and Kucinich)
>
> Number of potential presidential candidates supporting Condorcet: 0
Number of potential presidential candidates supporting Approval: 1
(Badnarik)
Michael Badnarik also recommends Appr
Eric Gorr wrote:
> These numbers are _only_ relevant if the candidates are aware of
> Condorcet and have spent time understanding the differences.
They're relevant for getting one or the other actually implemented anytime
soon.
Realistically, I think if either of the candidates I mentioned (Dean
At 9:56 AM -0500 1/24/04, Bill Lewis Clark wrote:
Eric Gorr wrote:
You have yet to show that IRV provides any benefit over Condorcet.
Dave Ketchum agreed:
AGREED.
Number of potential presidential candidates supporting IRV: 2
(Dean and Kucinich)
Number of potential presidential candidates suppor
Not that that's a bad thing, necessarily, but it is true in
the sense that any IRV winner would've won by Borda (and with less effort, I
might add).
IRV adjusts ballots that include the eliminated alternatives
to transfer rankings upward when the eliminated alternatives are not last on
spe
On Wed. Jan.21,2004 I posted:
Here is an example that Mike Ossipoff posted (Tues.Jan.20)
Presumed sincere preferences:
40:A>B>C
25:B>A>C
35:C>B>A
100 ballots. B is the Condorcet Winner (and the SCRRIRVE winner).
A voters Bury (offensively order-reverse against)B, while all other vot
Paul said:
>>, and what most people on this list do is
switch criteria>>from a post to a reply to an objection to their
post.
Mike replied:
>The meaning of that sentence isn't quite clear. But it suggests
that people >switch criteria. I don't know about that. People seem quite
consistent a
Marcus,
I wasn't thinking of your paper when I made that post as is hopefully evident from my reply to Mike. I (subjectively) find your paper objective. I also notice that you mention a criterion (participation) that Schulze, Swartz Sequential Dropping, Beatpath, call it what you will, fails and g
Mike wrote:
>The CW is the social utility maximizer.
I replied:
Not always. Please justify this statement
Mike replied in summary:
With 1 issue dimension, the CW is the SU maximizer, if disutility is
measured by distance.
Thankyou for this clarification. Issue space in most political systems
Eric Gorr wrote:
>> You have yet to show that IRV provides any benefit over Condorcet.
Dave Ketchum agreed:
> AGREED.
Number of potential presidential candidates supporting IRV: 2
(Dean and Kucinich)
Number of potential presidential candidates supporting Condorcet: 0
So far as getting some so
At 5:54 AM +0100 1/24/04, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Eric,
--- Eric Gorr <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
At 5:01 AM +0100 1/24/04, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> >40 A>B>C
>35 B>C>A
>25 C>A>B
> >
>A wins. The 35 votes are not counted.
Actually, the 35 votes matter a great deal in an RP election -
assumin
On Wed, 21 Jan 2004 21:55:04 -0500 Eric Gorr wrote:
At 9:01 PM -0500 1/21/04, Bill Lewis Clark wrote:
First and foremost, IRV is a change.
Change is perfectly capable of doing more harm then good.
Any change at all gets people
thinking about election system reform. That's a good thing. The n
Dear David,
you wrote (23 Jan 2004):
> A common way for somebody to promote a 'pet' electoral method is to do
> the following:
>
> 1/ Find a set of criteria that your system meets and state them.
> 2/ Dismiss the criteria your method doesn't meet as irrelevant or even
>better just don't mentio
Mike Ossipoff wrote:
The CW is the social utility maximizer.
David replied:
Not always. Please justify this statement.
I reply:
Are you sure I said it that way, without any qualification. If so, it should
have been qualified. But for what day is that message listed in the
archives, the messag
Bart Ingles wrote:
>
> Another worst-case SU-related standard is to look at the SU "deficit"
> when compared to the highest-SU candidate. For example, a FPP election
> can have an SU deficit of up to 2/n, since it's possible for a candidate
> with nearly perfect SU to lose to a 1/n candidate:
W
I haven't found any method better than plain old FPP for eliminating
extremely low CW candidates. The minimum SU in a FPP election is
basically 1/n, where n is the number of candidates. Pairwise methods
have a minimum of zero. Approval and IRV are in the middle, with
Approval slightly better th
Some methods are advocated for maximizing social utility (SU). With the
assumption of sincere voting, Borda & CR are suggested for that purpose.
Sincerely voted CR would do the best job. Sincerely voted Borda would do a
better job than any other rank method, if we assume that utilities vary
lin
Paul Kislanko said:
For every example that meets such-and-such criterion
I reply:
Actually, for determining criterion compliance or noncompliance, what we
want is _failure_ examples, not success examples. As already explained to
Chris, an example in which a method doesn't fail a criterion prov
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