Bill Clark wrote:
In Approval Voting, a candidate is voted higher by being approved
rather than disapproved.
If one candidate is preferred over each of the other candidates, that
candidate is the Ideal Democratic Winner (IDW).
Condorcet Criterion (CC)
If all votes are sincere, the Ideal
Bill--
I'm still reading the new list e-mail, and probably won't get a chance to
attack it (figuratively) tonight. So I'll do so tomorrow. But it's important
that I reply to this matter about our definitions at the website.
You wrote:
[ Quoting from
Bill Lewis Clark wrote:
CC doesn't say anything about requiring fully specified preferences.
I skipped over this part (because I figured I already knew what a sincere
vote was, but apparently not:)
[ From
Smith PC doesn't have any important faults. As other wv versions have been
proposed, we've tended to be perfectionists, and so Smith PC has gone out of
favor. But it's still a very good method.
Smith PC's disadvantages:
It doesn't meet GSFC or SDSC.
Others will name other criteria, but
Mike Ossipoff wrote:
Sincere preferences:
40: ABC
25: BAC
35: CBA
B is the CW.
A possible set of sincere Approval ballots:
40: A
25: B
35: C
The premise of our CC is complied with: There's a CW, and everyone is
voting sincerely. But the CW doesn't win. So the requirement isn' t
On Tue, 27 Jan 2004 21:28:52 -0800 Ernest Prabhakar wrote:
Hi Dave,
Thanks for the input, very helpful. More comments below:
On Jan 27, 2004, at 7:29 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
I like what Ernest writes, though I see a bit of room for improvement
and suggest tournament as a less
James Gilmour wrote:
Have you ever wondered who was drilling that into your skull and why
they might want do that? Some who would keep us from the light don't
always have the best of motives.
Agreed. But independently, I still thought that the choice was between
Geographic Representation
Bill Clark said:
I'll look into STV-PR, then. Stephane Rouillon has also
suggested to me that I examine SPPA, which I believe may be a
variant of (or at least similar to) STV-PR.
Searching for both of those terms in conjunction has yielded
quite satisfying results from the archive.
You
On Sat. Jan.17,2004 I posted this:
I propose and reccomend this single-winner Condorcet compliant method:
Plain ranked-ballots, equal preferences and truncation ok.
1: Eliminate all candidates who are not members of the Schwartz set.
2: If more than one candidate remains, then based on the
Bill Clark wrote:
Agreed. But independently, I
still thought that the choice was between
Geographic Representation and a system that gave political parties
a
priveleged status (such as party list systems of PR
do.)
If you're married to the idea of geographic representation (I'll admit it
has
Dear election methods fans,
As regards the issue of geographic representation, I just wanted to point
out that if you switch from a low-district-magnitude version of STV-PR to
a high-district-magnitude version of STV-PR, even if you keep the total
number of seats constant, this doesn't
On Tue, 27 Jan 2004, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Mon, 26 Jan 2004 11:11:32 -0800 (PST) Forest Simmons wrote:
On Sat, 24 Jan 2004, Dave Ketchum wrote:
IRV is not as similar to runoff as some claim - at runoff time I know the
result of the original vote; with IRV I must do all of
On Wed, 28 Jan 2004 12:56:14 -0800 (PST) Chris Hahn wrote:
My suggestion about a better name: Ranked Voting or Ranked Voting Method, etc.
I am not too excited about tournament or instant matchup.
Tournament sounds like a game rather than something more serious. Instant Matchup is a technically
At 02:20 PM 1/28/2004 -0500, Rob Speer wrote:
I also approve of the word tournament.
Tournament isn't bad, but I think it's a trifle inaccurate, since nearly
all sporting tournaments (College World series and a few others being
notable exceptions) are single elimination. While a single
Ernie Prabhakar wrote:
-snip-
On Jan 27, 2004, at 7:29 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
I like what Ernest writes, though I see a bit of room
for improvement and suggest tournament as a less
foreign-sounding title (even though its ancestry
is also French).
-snip-
Well, tournament does have the
I defined two kinds of radial symmetry, and said that even with the weaker
radial symmetry, the CW is always SU, even when Euclidean distance is used.
The weaker radial symmetry requires only that, for each ray from the center,
there's a ray in the opposite direction from the center, along
Why does the CW always maximize SU, with city block distance?
This is completely straightforward. Say we start at the median point, the
point where the equal sections intersect. (The equal sections are the
sections of the issue space that divide the voters into 2 parts).
Say we start moving
We at electionmethods reserve the right to only put up critreria that seem
important to us. As you can tell from our introduction, we want to get rid
of the lesser-of-2-evils problem, minimize or eliminate the need for
drastic defensive strategy. Therefore it shouldn't surprise anyone if we
Richard Moore wrote:
You may be reading to much into the statement CR is strategically
equivalent to Approval. What this statement means is just the
following: If S is an optimum strategy for an Approval election, and
S' is the equivalent CR strategy (in which an S' ballot is one that
gives
On Wed, 28 Jan 2004 12:09:00 -0800 (PST) Forest Simmons wrote:
On Tue, 27 Jan 2004, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Mon, 26 Jan 2004 11:11:32 -0800 (PST) Forest Simmons wrote:
On Sat, 24 Jan 2004, Dave Ketchum wrote:
IRV is not as similar to runoff as some claim - at runoff time I know the
Mike,
--- MIKE OSSIPOFF [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Approval doesn't meet our CC. But Approval Plurality meet Blake Cretney's
CC. Or they would except that Blake avoids that by stipulating that CC
applies only to rank methods. Our CC applies meaningfully and as-expected to
all methods.
At 12:45 AM -0500 1/28/04, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Under Approval, if one candidate is preferred / voted higher / approved
more than each of the other candidates, then that candidate will win.
Therefore Approval meets CC.
Approval does not meet CC.
Again, you may want to check out:
Bill,
--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Then I don't see the significance of the strategic equivalence, at all.
If my strategy is going to be different for the exact same election with
the exact same voter preferences, with the only difference being whether
Approval or CR
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