It was my understanding that Arrow's theorum does apply to CR. Actually
it applies to Approval as well, it's just that Approval meets all of the
conditions except allowing voters to rank three or more choices in
order.
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I like CR Approval as well, in particular
On Feb 26, 2004, at 5:46 AM, Adam Tarr wrote:
Ernest Prabhakar wrote:
However, it seems like there can well be extreme cases, due to either
detailed information or sub-optimal strategic behavior by opponents,
where a different strategy would actually be more -effective-
(optimal doesn't mean
Participants,
Here is my improvement on previous versions of "Weighted Median Approval"
single-winner ranked-ballot method.
Voters rank the candidates. Equal preferences and truncation ok.
(1) Symetrically complete the ballots.
(2) Based on these now symetrically completed
Hi Adam ,
Good work Ernie.
Thanks.
So this would be just such a case, where due to the extremely precise
knowledge and the hair's-breadth nature of the election, the marginal
utility for each additional point for candidate C is not constant. If
we were to make this election have a plausible
My ballot is as follows:
George W. Bush [43] [] [1]
Howard Dean [9] [X] [50]
Edwards [10] [] [48]
Kerry [8] [X] [55]
Kucinich [2] [X] [96]
Nader [1] [X] [100]
Sharpton [19] [] [30]
Jim Hightower [40] [] [5]
Amy Goodman [29] [] [5]
Ron Daniels [22] [] [5]
Medea Benjamin [32] [] [5]
Winona LaDuke
On Friday 27 Feb 2004 4:46 am, Eric Gorr wrote:
Apparently the Haifa Linux Club (Israeli Linux User Group
- http://www.haifux.org/) used my Condorcet voting
calculator to select their logo. There were 16 options
and 20 voters. I found it interesting that no cycles were
generated in this case.
Augustin wrote:
On Friday 27 Feb 2004 4:46 am, Eric Gorr wrote:
Apparently the Haifa Linux Club (Israeli Linux User Group
- http://www.haifux.org/) used my Condorcet voting
calculator to select their logo. There were 16 options
and 20 voters. I found it interesting that no cycles were
I've just released version 0.3 of pSTV. The most significant change is
that Cambridge, MA rules are now implemented.
Methods available are:
- SNTV
- IRV
- Simple STV (description included with the program)
- ERS97 STV
- Cambridge, MA
- Meek STV
- highly customizable random
My Ballot
1. BALLOT PARAMETERS AND CONVENTIONS:
My ballot uses 5-slot CR, corresponding to usual academic grading.
From top to bottom, the five grades are the usual A,B,C,D,F - corresponding
to ranks 1,2,3,4,5 and to cardinal-rating or grade-point values 4,3,2,1,0.
Approved slots are
Participants,
Here is my improvement on previous versions of Weighted Median
Approval single-winner ranked-ballot method.
Voters rank the candidates. Equal preferences and truncation ok.
(1) Symetrically complete the ballots.
(2) Based on these now symetrically completed ballots, give each
It was my understanding that Arrow's theorum does apply to CR. Actually
it applies to Approval as well, it's just that Approval meets all of the
conditions except allowing voters to rank three or more choices in
order.
It was my understanding that Arrow's theorem only applies to ordinal
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