Hallo,
Eric wrote (2 March 2004):
I am currently in communication with a dedicated IRV supporter
who may be claiming that they would move away from IRV if a
real example could be given where IRV selected an obviously
wrong winner.
Actually, I believe that it is quite impossible to use
Richard,
--- Richard Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Kevin,
Can your sims compare approval results for cases where the ranked
voting produces cycles, vs. cases where there are no cycles?
It finds whether there is a CW, although that's not reflected in the stats.
So it would be easy to
Bill,
--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Kevin Venzke wrote:
It's surely a fluke that Two Evils outperforms Zero-Info here. I
have to doubt that random information could be better than none at all.
I wonder if it might make sense to think of the random information as a
At 04:44 PM 3/2/2004 -0500, Eric Gorr wrote:
Also, wanted to thank Adam Tarr for providing the following two examples:
(you're welcome; examples snipped)
For the moment, none have been able to mount a defense for why IRV selects
the winner it does.
The best defense of IRV against these examples
At 12:37 PM -0500 3/5/04, Adam Tarr wrote:
Other than giving the lib dems a bit more first place support than
they usually do, this is a stock example, something you could
probably find in a real British election.
I may have found such data from a real British elections.
See my posting on the
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 2004 23:27:06 +0100 (CET)
From: =?iso-8859-1?q?Kevin=20Venzke?= [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Arrow's axioms could well be justifiable, but his proof doesn't provide
the justification. There may be good reasons why CR should be rejected
as a viable election method, but
Ken,
--- Ken Johnson [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
This is like saying There may be good reasons why Random Ballot should be
rejected as a viable election method, but Arrow's premises don't elucidate
those reasons because if the theorem were generalized to encompass dictatorship
methods, its
On Mar 5, 2004, at 5:45 PM, Philippe Errembault wrote:
Arrow's axioms do NOT apply to real world, since he wants to make
ranked results from ranked individual choices, while strict ranking of
preferences is incompatible with human nature.
Hi Philippe,
I'm not sure I understand your point. My
Eric Gorr wrote:
I am sure others are aware of this data, but I just got my hands on
it and spent some time analyzing it with single winner methods.
Apparently in Dr. Tideman's research into voting methods, he was able
to obtain many (86) ranked ballots from elections held in England.
I
At 11:31 PM + 3/5/04, James Gilmour wrote:
Eric Gorr wrote:
I am sure others are aware of this data, but I just got my
hands on it and spent some time analyzing it with single winner
methods. Apparently in Dr. Tideman's research into voting
methods, he was able to obtain many (86) ranked
I had written:
If these ballots come from the dataset I think they do, much
of those
data were machine-generated (reconstructed) from election result
sheets, ie they are not actual voters' ballots.
Then Eric asked:
What would be the actual difference?
We'll never know because we do not
On Fri, 5 Mar 2004, Markus Schulze wrote:
Hallo,
Eric wrote (2 March 2004):
I am currently in communication with a dedicated IRV supporter
who may be claiming that they would move away from IRV if a
real example could be given where IRV selected an obviously
wrong winner.
Actually, I
At 12:26 AM + 3/6/04, James Gilmour wrote:
We'll never know because we do not have access to the real ballots.
You'll find papers by Brian Wichman and others on the generation of
plausible election data in the journal 'Voting matters' and
possibly elsewhere.
What do they argue?
[snip]
On Fri, 5 Mar 2004, Ernest Prabhakar wrote:
On Mar 5, 2004, at 5:45 PM, Philippe Errembault wrote:
Arrow's axioms do NOT apply to real world, since he wants to make
ranked results from ranked individual choices, while strict ranking of
preferences is incompatible with human nature.
Hi
On Fri, 5 Mar 2004, Ken Johnson wrote:
snip
Kevin,
It isn't evident. It is reasonable to stipulate non-dictatorship
axiomatically because this principle is non-controversial and nobody is
championing dictatorship as a viable election method. On the other hand,
if the objective of
Hi Ernest,
I hope we understand each other's. Since English is not my mother tongue, I could pass
over some misunderstanding without realising
it. I will try to be clearer.
My point is that if you want to rank multi-dimensional information, you will have to
project your space to a
Hi Forest,
But Arrow does require transitivity in the partial orderings,
which excludes ballots of the form A B C A,
which is quite compatible with human nature.
Just try to order all your friends by preference, and you will see that human nature
preferences are not transitive by essence.
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2004 21:38:59 +0100 (CET)
From: =?iso-8859-1?q?Kevin=20Venzke?= [EMAIL PROTECTED]
I should have been clearer. You said that if the theorem were generalized
to encompass cardinal methods, its conclusion would be that rank methods cannot
satisfy the axioms whereas CR can. This
I see hope in what Phillippe writes below. Perhps what I wrote in 1998
will encourge more effort:
---
Something is needed to strengthen by the people. An alternative method
of representation is offered for thought:
* Everyone retains
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