Hi,
A British charity that I chair is looking for a new election method for
its Board of Trustees. The scenario is a little more complex than typical
political elections, and I haven't been able to find anything on how this
should be tackled.
I'm aware that you may be mainly interested in establ
Adam Tarr wrote:
>
> Ken Johnson wrote:
>
> >With Borda, the sincere ranking translates to a Borda count identical to
> >the above sincere CR rating,
> >C1 < C2 < C3 < C4 < C5 < C6 --> C1(0), C2(1), C3(2), C4(3), C5(4), C6(5)
> >But if you try to use rank equality to mimic CR strategy, it
Ken,
--- Ken Johnson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : >
> My impression was that Arrow stipulated several
> basic criteria that any "reasonable" social choice system should
> satisfy, with one criterion being that it be based on ranked preferences
> and the other criteria being stated in terms t
> From: Gervase Lam
> Date: Sun, 7 Mar 2004 13:59:27 +
> Subject: [EM] Condorcet, Weber and Info
> All that
> needs to be known is whether you think one candidate is better than
> another. However, I get the feeling that Utilities will matter more the
> more complicated the scenario.
The las
Date: Mon, 08 Mar 2004 09:19:23 -0500
From: Adam Tarr <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [EM] Elections methods performance criterion
...
With Borda, ...
C1 = C2 = C3 < C4 = C5 = C6 --> C1(1), C2(1), C3(1), C4(4), C5(4), C6(4)
I believe that insofar as Borda allows equal rankings, yo
Ken Johnson wrote:
Borda performed surprising well. I think this is because Borda, in effect,
tries to reconstruct a CR profile from preference rankings, and thus tends
to perform somewhat like CR. However, the simulations are only for
"sincere" Borda, and in practice voting strategy may degrad
Date: Sat, 06 Mar 2004 02:35:02 -0800
From: Ken Johnson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
... I think the cardinal
rating concept provides a useful basis for defining the objective of
election systems (i.e., maximize "social utility" or "social
representation")...
Cardinal ratings are, in my view, a more
