Someone wrote
> >the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite
> >Theorem says that there is no paretian non-dictatorial
> >method that isn't vulnerable to strategical voting.
>
Is random ballot considered "dictatorial?"
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama
Strong FBC: Revisited.
I wont actually prove that strong FBC is impossible, but I will prove
that Approval Voting is superior to any ranked method if your goal is to
let voters defend their interests without betraying their favorite. I
apologize for the length, but the methods Im using require
>>> The biggest problem I see is, who gets to define the rules for what
>>> gets decided at which level? If the authority for that is too
>>> dispersed, you get a logjam. If too centralized, you risk devaluing
>>> certain levels which would seemingly defeat the whole purpose of the
>>> arrangemen
On Mar 10, 2004, at 4:41 PM, Philippe Errembault wrote:
The biggest problem I see is, who gets to define the rules for what
gets decided at which level? If the authority for that is too
dispersed, you get a logjam. If too centralized, you risk devaluing
certain levels which would seemingly defeat
