Re: [EM] Equal Rankings IRV

Hallo, Mike Ossipoff wrote (27 March 2004): ERIRV(whole) meets WDSC. Surprisingly, ERIRV(fractional) seems to also. ERIRV(fractional) doesn't meet WDSC. Example: 20 A=B=CE... 20 A=B=DE... 20 A=C=DE... 7 BE... 7 CE... 7 DE... 38 E... A majority of the voters strictly

Re: [EM] equal rankings IRV (was: Approval vs ??)

Eric, --- Eric Gorr [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Based on what I was told by Dave Robinson of http://demochoice.org, the problem with whole votes is that it would allow: some voters will be able to use duplicate votes to bury candidates they don't like, giving them an unfair

[EM] ERIRV(fractional) doesn't fail WDSC in Markus' example.

I'd said: ERIRV(whole) meets WDSC. Surprisingly, ERIRV(fractional) seems to also. Markus replied: ERIRV(fractional) doesn't meet WDSC. Example: 20 A=B=CE... 20 A=B=DE... 20 A=C=DE... 7 BE... 7 CE... 7 DE... 38 E... A majority of the voters strictly prefers candidate A to

[EM] Gilmour, sincere rankings.

James Gilmour-- Everyone here agrees that a sincere ranking is one that ranks candidates in order of preference. What you are referring to, a ranking that produces desired results, is known here as a strategic ranking, especially when it violates the voter's sincere preferences. Replying to

[EM] Typo: falsify, not reverse

In my just-posted sincerity definition, substitute falsify for reverse. Mike Ossipoff _ Find a broadband plan that fits. Great local deals on high-speed Internet access.

[EM] Primaries?

Original Message From: Bart Ingles [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: EM List [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [EM] Argument for Approval Primaries Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 09:49:40 -0800 It occurs to me that one place where ranked ballot methods are entirely unsuitable is in party primary elections.