Participants,
In response to me writing:
To seriously make the case that IRV is not better than Plurality,
instead of talking about the made-up example a person
should
(a) make the case that compliance with mostly sundry mathematical
neatness criteria (like Participation and Monotoncity)
weigh
The other day I thought of an interesting way to complete condorcet if
there's no CW. But it seems simple enough that I figure it must have been
proposed before. So I'm wondering if this method has indeed been proposed
before, and so what it's generally called. In either case, I'm wondering if
At 10:21 AM -0400 4/27/04, Ken Taylor wrote:
I'm dropping the weakest candidate, as defined by number of first
choice votes, which causes all their defeats of other candidates
to be dropped.
What will you do when two or more candidates are tied for least first
choice votes?
I'm not
Hi Bill,
On Apr 27, 2004, at 8:23 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Eric Gorr wrote:
I don't consider the likelihood of the failure [to select the CW]
to be relevant with respect to IRV.
Why not? If IRV does a better job than Plurality of selecting the CW
(a
point you don't seem to be refuting)
Eric Gorr wrote:
What do you get when you have an drop of water and a gallon of sewage?
Sewage.
What do you get when you have a drop of sewage and a gallon of water?
Sewage.
Oh, okay. I think I understand your position better now.
It still seems to me that you show a certain animosity
Dr. Ernie Prabhakar wrote:
Hi Bill,
Hi Ernie,
I personally am somewhat ambivalent about IRV, but I can give a couple
reasons:
a) The 'spoiler' effect. There's a fear that if IRV is adopted as
'the' voting reform, and it fails to live up to its hype, then it will
actually make it
Adam H Tarr wrote:
If there was an IRV movement where I lived, I would argue with the
people in charge of it, and failing convincing them, I would publicize
information about IRV flaws and the better alternatives. But if all my
efforts failed, and I was in the voting booth, I would vote yes
Curt wrote:
Due to the fact that the EC requires a majority (not plurality) to win
outright, and due to the winner-take-all nature of the states, this is
how the EC encourages a two-party system.
I think it's more accurate to say that the EC greatly benefits from a two
party system, than to
On Apr 27, 2004, at 4:55 PM, Adam H Tarr wrote:
Curt wrote:
[ The first issue really illustrates what I find so impossible about
IRV advocates, because many of them advocate IRV *in presidential
elections*, but *before* removing the EC. Implementing IRV in pres.
elections on a state level,
On Tue, 27 Apr 2004, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Eric Gorr wrote:
What do you get when you have an drop of water and a gallon of sewage?
Sewage.
What do you get when you have a drop of sewage and a gallon of water?
Sewage.
Oh, okay. I think I understand your position better now.
It
Why not pit all the best methods head to head against Plurality, and then
adopt the method that beats Plurality by the greatest number of votes (if
plurality isn't the CW).
Wouldn't that be a more democratic way of deciding the voting method than
having a committee of unelected nincompoops
At 10:30 AM -0400 4/27/04, Ken Taylor wrote:
At 10:21 AM -0400 4/27/04, Ken Taylor wrote:
I'm dropping the weakest candidate, as defined by number of first
choice votes, which causes all their defeats of other candidates
to be dropped.
What will you do when two or more
Reason I choke on this thread is that this idea inflicts strategy on
Condorcet I have to warn my voters that ranking even a minor candidate in
front of me can get me discarded.
Condorcet should stay with voters ranking purely by desires.
Dave
On Tue, 27 Apr 2004 22:55:21 -0400 Ken Taylor
First I hit some serious topics; then I comment on some of what Curt
Adam wrote:
Destroying the EC is neither practical nor useful.
There are doable improvements for the EC.
IRV people need to be locked out of this debate.
Practical nor useful?
Not practical, for it requires
Dave wrote:
Destroying the EC is neither practical nor useful.
There are doable improvements for the EC.
IRV people need to be locked out of this debate.
Practical nor useful?
Not practical, for it requires at least some of the low population
states to approve a
A lot of energy is expended on how to resolve cycles. Is this really a problem
in practice? One reason I ask is that having run a number of elections on my
election server, I find that cycles seem not to be an important issue. In fact,
not only is there no cycle involving the top candidate, often
Curt wrote:
I should have been more clear - Such an IRV scheme has no effect on
making it more likely their candidate will win or that their interests
will
be reflected. They can't win the EC until they have 270 EVs, at which
point they're not exactly a third party anymore.
Sure. That's a
Hi,
Sorry I don't have time to read the replies to Curt's comments
about the Electoral College. I just want to point out a couple
of possibilities that leave the EC as is, yet could break up
the two party, one candidate per party presidential system:
1. Suppose each state uses a good
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