hi James,
thanks for the reply. comments below.
> ER-IRV(whole) is more of an IRV-approval "hybrid", and does a better job
> of reducing the incentive for the compromising-reversal strategy, but
> ER-IRV(fractional) is probably more acceptable to the general public, and
> less likely to
Paul Kislanko wrote:
That many different sets of ballots can result in the same pairwise matrix
is something that could be perceived as a problem. In many of the examples
I've seen, I'd have chosen a different winner than one of the cycle-breaking
methods does based upon the specific the ballot con
Gervase Lam <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>> From: Matthew Dempsky
>> Subject: Re: [EM] Re: Election-methods Digest, Vol 4, Issue 13
>> Date: Thursday 14 October 2004 02:09 am
>
>> On Mon, 2004-10-11 at 20:45, Gervase Lam wrote:
>> > Kemeny can be basically described as follows:
>
>> > [...example e
I mentioned that not only because of Dr. Tideman's study, but also because
at least one definition I read (on this list) described a voting method as a
mapping of ballots to results.
That many different sets of ballots can result in the same pairwise matrix
is something that could be perceived as
On Oct 12, 2004, at 8:34 PM, James Cooper wrote:
I'm a activist in Washington state who is interested in eliminating
the plurality system here. We have a state-wide inititiative trying
to get on the ballot in 2005 (http://www.irvwa.org/). It proposes
using IRV. In addition, it would eliminate th
> Date: Tue, 12 Oct 2004 20:34:41 -0700
> From: James Cooper
> Subject: [EM] Approval vs. IRV
> The requirement to rank all the
> candidates also results in some odd side effects (like 'how to vote'
> cards, and the horrific 'donkey vote').
May be it is not strictly a 'how to vote' card, but for
> From: Gervase Lam
> Subject: Re: [EM] Re: Election-methods Digest, Vol 4, Issue 13
> Date: Thursday 14 October 2004 22:41 pm
> > From: Matthew Dempsky
> > Subject: Re: [EM] Re: Election-methods Digest, Vol 4, Issue 13
> > Date: Thursday 14 October 2004 02:09 am
> >
> > On Mon, 2004-10-11 at 20:4
> From: Matthew Dempsky
> Subject: Re: [EM] Re: Election-methods Digest, Vol 4, Issue 13
> Date: Thursday 14 October 2004 02:09 am
> On Mon, 2004-10-11 at 20:45, Gervase Lam wrote:
> > Kemeny can be basically described as follows:
> > [...example elided...]
>
> It seems similar in concept to find
At 2:14 PM -0700 10/14/04, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I've never heard of anyone wanting to take results and map them back
to ballots.
There has been at least one study by Dr. Tideman which did exactly this.
It can be a useful thing as long as people take into account the fact
that there can be man
On Thu, 14 Oct 2004, Paul Kislanko wrote:
"Likewise, IRV can suffer spoilers, a problem Condorcet avoids by reading
all the ranking in each ballot."
Condorcet does not reference ballots, Condorcet depends upon the pairwise
matrix which cannot be mapped back to ballots.
I've never heard of anyone wa
I have to interject again.
"Likewise, IRV can suffer spoilers, a problem Condorcet avoids by reading
all the ranking in each ballot."
Condorcet does not reference ballots, Condorcet depends upon the pairwise
matrix which cannot be mapped back to ballots.
Election-methods mailing list - see
Hi James, and welcome to the list.
>
>I am convinced of the technical superiority of Condorcet over other
>methods.
I agree with you there. But keep in mind that "Condorcet" is not a single
voting method but rather refers to any Condorcet-efficient voting method,
the variety of which is
Could it be that this is made more difficult by asking the wrong question?
I will try a bit:
Condorcet is in the business of finding the best liked candidate, just as
Plurality is.
Often one candidate is truly much the best liked, Plurality will have no
problem, and Condorcet will agree since
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