Re: [EM] Approval vs. IRV

2004-10-18 Thread Bart Ingles
James Green-Armytage wrote: > >> That's why we want an election method that can find the compromise choice that serves 60% of the people when we might otherwise get some faction's 40% or 41% choice. > > > > Of course, majoritarian methods like Condorcet can't guarantee 60%, or > anything ove

[EM] correction

2004-10-18 Thread James Green-Armytage
James Green-Armytage writes: > Also, actually ranking later choices in the compromise group at 100 is >rarely necessary to prevent members of the greater evil group from >winning. It depends on the size of the majority, the size of the cycle, >etc. I just wrote "100" because that is the simpl

Re: [EM] strong defensive strategy criterion

2004-10-18 Thread James Green-Armytage
> >To conclude that James' interpretation is most reasonable, >I think one must take Mike's words out of context, since >elsewhere Mike wrote that truncating a preference shall >_not_ be considered falsely voting two candidates equal. Yes, I assumed that Mike didn't intend it my way, but

Re: [EM] Approval vs. IRV

2004-10-18 Thread James Green-Armytage
>That's why we want an election method that can find >the compromise choice that serves 60% of the people when we might >otherwise get some faction's 40% or 41% choice. Of course, majoritarian methods like Condorcet can't guarantee 60%, or anything over 50.1%. But anyway, I agree w

Re: [EM] Approval vs. IRV

2004-10-18 Thread Matthew Dempsky
Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > If they get 10% of whatever PR body, that's fine and there's no need > to augment that with anything else. > > For a single seat, I think the vast majority would be poorly served by > four years of office holding by a tiny majority. I'm even more scared >

Re: [EM] Approval vs. IRV

2004-10-18 Thread Brian Olson
On Oct 18, 2004, at 7:09 AM, Bill Clark wrote: On Fri, 15 Oct 2004 11:03:28 -0700, Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: I think I'm allergic to the use of randomness in election methods, so I don't plan on implementing such an option. The unique appealing feature of random methods is that they

Re: [EM] strong defensive strategy criterion

2004-10-18 Thread Steve Eppley
Hi, James G-A wrote: > I suggest that ordinary winning votes methods (beatpath, > ranked pairs, river, etc.) fails Mike Ossipoff's "strong > defensive strategy criterion", according to what I think > is the most reasonable interpretation of that criterion, > whereas cardinal pairwise passes

Re: [EM] Approval vs. IRV

2004-10-18 Thread Bill Clark
On Fri, 15 Oct 2004 11:03:28 -0700, Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I think I'm allergic to the use of randomness in election methods, so I > don't plan on implementing such an option. The unique appealing feature of random methods is that they're the only ones that can be completely imm