Range voting is neither a majority rule method, a supermajority rule
method, nor a proportional representation method. Therefore, its
applications are very limited.
Let's say that our voting scenario is a large group of people choosing an
executive (e.g. a mayor or president), and there is enough
Chris Benham wrote:
Ok, suppose there are two candidates and three voters, and the voting
method is Range Voting
using the scale 0-100. All three voters are completely sincere.
Voters 1 and 2 both prefer candidate A to candidate B, but not by much
and they are not very impressed by either. The
Date: Tue, 4 Jan 2005 12:06:14 EST
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Corrected commentary re IRV
To: election-methods-electorama.com@electorama.com
Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
The commentary is better suited to its purpose than any that I have ev
For the purpose of my critreria, I have a definition of sincere voting. It
doesn't involve ratings. Here I'm using "sincere" with a different meaning.
For the purposes of this message, sincere voting means voting that expresses
the voter's true ratings to the extent possible with CR balloting or
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Here is the corrected
version.
Dang...that was excellent.
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
After sending the following, I noticed that when recopying
what I had drafted in my word processor into an email I had
started earlier, the result was that the initial 5-line quote was
copied twice. I really need to be more careful about proofing
my emails before sending them. Here is the corrected
Brian Olson wrote:
> I think it's been shown that the optimum strategy is not to
> vote-for-one (plurality) on a ratings ballot, but to vote
> max-rating for any choice above some threshold internal to you,
> and min-rating for the rest. Thus straight cumulative vote
> degenerates to Approval under
Mike Ossipoff wrote (Sat.Jan1), beginning with a quote from my post of
the same date:
You continued:
To cheerfully assert, as W.D. Smith does, that "minimizing Bayesian
regret" trumps majority rule is tantamount to saying
that more emotional voters should have more power than less emotional
v
This message is minor: it says that Mr SChulzse ought not copy from
economists, adn concludes with a request for Mr Schulze to solve the
2 candidate elections (with the cases: 0 winners, 1 winner, and
2 winners).
At 2005-01-03 18:01 +0100 Monday, Markus Schulze wrote:
...
>However, Hylland prov
