Russ Paielli 6049awj02-at-sneakemail.com |EMlist| wrote:
It occurred to me a while back that the two criteria may be equivalent.
That is, if a method passes monotonicity, perhaps it must also pass
summability, and vice versa. That's just a hunch. Can anyone prove (or
disprove) it?
Let me partial
Russ Paielli wrote:
I have an "off the wall" question that some of the math geniuses on
this list might find interesting.
Before its recent modification, the ElectionMethods.org website had a
page called "Technical Evaluation of Election Methods." Two of the
criteria listed on that page were mo
I have an "off the wall" question that some of the math geniuses on this
list might find interesting.
Before its recent modification, the ElectionMethods.org website had a
page called "Technical Evaluation of Election Methods." Two of the
criteria listed on that page were monotonicity and summa
Hi,
--- MIKE OSSIPOFF <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> I welcome other criteria too, including any by you that accomplish something
> similar to WDSC & SDSC without mentioning preference.
I think I will take this opportunity to propose the "Majority Opposition"
criterion. I think it's easy to u
Russ-
I would think that the strategy is straight-forward: If the Green is one of the top 2 contenders in pre-election polls then the Green's supporters should vote for the Green and anybody they prefer to the Green. Of course, strategic adjustments can then change the dynamics of the race, and
Hi,
--- Russ Paielli <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> But now let's say that Approval has been in use for several election
> cycles, and the Green is starting to catch up to the Democrat. Well, the
> Green Party will certainly urge their supporters to drop their vote for
> that pesky Democrat.
Let me try my first "normal" post. At the risk of repeating a point that
has probably already been made many times in the past ...
Voter strategy in Approval will be simple at first, but it could become
very difficult later. Simple formulas are nice, but they cannot resolve
the dilemma that vot
From: Anthony Duff <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [EM] approval strategy
My favourite approval strategy to recommend generally is "vote for
your strategic plurality candidate and every candidate you like
better." (suggested to me by Marc LeBlanc)
Besides Kevin's suggestion (approve everybody that
Paul Kislanko kislanko-at-airmail.net |EMlist| wrote:
Would you guys both take the discussion offlist? Please?
I understand your frustration, but let me remind you that Mike started
this feud on EM with his posting that "electionmethods.org is cancelled."
That bold assertion in itself should tell
STILL NEED A COMMITTEE!
On Sun, 16 Jan 2005 13:31:59 -0800 Russ said:
Given all that, I am willing to consider handing over control of the
domain to an election-methods expert who agrees, more or less, with
the current position of the site and likes the basic layout but
would like to develop
I liked electionmethods.org when I first came across it. I learned a lot from the site. I have recommended it to people over the last few years.
I could think of various places where I might disagree with one or both of the relevant people on off-topic matters, as well as places where I might e
Would you guys both take the discussion offlist? Please?
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
] On Behalf Of MIKE OSSIPOFF
> Sent: Monday, January 17, 2005 4:18 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: [EM] Very brief Russ reply
>
>
> Russ said:
>
>
Russ said:
I made the mistake of trying to persuade him that the 9/11 attacks were
unlikely to have been planned and organized by someone involved with the
Bush Administration. However, I cannot "prove" that it wasn't, which
apparently means to Mike that I have tried and failed to "refute" this
con
On Mon, 17 Jan 2005 12:03:49 -0800, Dan Keshet <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> This is a little presumptious of me to make suggestions regarding
> electionmethods.org as I have nothing invested in it, but I think it would be
> good to turn it into an election methods wiki.
Incidentally, I brought up
Well, there you have it folks, straight from the "horse's mouth."
I don't think a reply is even necessary, but I would like to make a few
points anyway.
Mike is a very intelligent person, but I think he fails to understand a
some very basic concepts.
I made the mistake of trying to persuade him
Dan Keshet wrote:
> This is a little presumptious of me to make suggestions regarding
> electionmethods.org as I have nothing invested in it, but I think
> it would be good to turn it into an election methods wiki.
I like this idea.
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em
This is a little presumptious of me to make suggestions regarding
electionmethods.org as I have nothing invested in it, but I think it would be
good to turn it into an election methods wiki.
Why a wiki would be useful:
1) Unlike a static committee, a wiki allows new contributors to get their fe
A preliminary definition:
X is publicly preferred to Y if more people prefer X to Y than vice-versa.
X beats Y if more people rank X over Y than Y over X.
The _sincere_ Smith set is smallest set of candidates such that they're all
publicly preferred to everyone outside the set.
[end of sincere S
Kevin--
You wrote:
These are Mike Ossipoff's SDSC and WDSC. I prefer the wording I
used since it can be applied even when sincere preferences are unknown.)
I reply:
No one's actual preferences need to be known in order to apply WDSC and
SDSC. For instance, I've demonstrated here that IRV fails b
Russ posted:
Dear EM subscribers,
I just joined this list to reply to a post regarding me and my website
http://ElectionMethods.org. Some of this post may be off-topic, but I am
replying to a post that went off-topic regarding me, so I feel that I
should have an opportunity to reply.
I reply:
No, m
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