MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp-at-hotmail.com |EMlist| wrote:
Russ continued:
But it goes way
beyond that. In the course of our discussions, I sent Mike a link about
an analysis of the WTC collapse by a prestigious team of perhaps dozens
of structural engineering experts. I don't have the link handy, but I
Russ,
--- Russ Paielli <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> I'm replying to myself because I would like to expand on the point I was
> making.
>
> A couple of proposals were made to alleviate the voting dilemma I
> pointed out above. I did not reply to them because I honestly don't know
> if they
Russ Paielli 6049awj02-at-sneakemail.com |EMlist| wrote:
Voter strategy in Approval will be simple at first, but it could become
very difficult later. Simple formulas are nice, but they cannot resolve
the dilemma that voters could eventually face.
Let's say that Approval has just been adopted. W
James Green-Armytage wrote:
Here is the first situation I have concocted. It is a relatively
straightforward one, not specifically designed to lead to any specific
result. There are three candidates: Left, Center, and Right (L, C, and R
for short.) L and R are the candidates from well-established
Forest Simmons wrote:
Ballots are ordinal rankings or cardinal ratings.
Any candidate with more than average first place rankings or ratings
gets a point. Any candidate with fewer than average last place (or
truncated) rankings or ratings gets a point or an additional point.
The candidate with
Some assumptions of enhanced Best Frontrunner strategy (replacing my
previous posting):
1. If there's a tie or near-tie it will be between only 2 candidates. Valid
assumption in public election. Food assumption in committees.
2. Since you prefer F1 to F2, and they're the likely top 2, you vote
I left in the original text, to show the changes. To read as revised,
delete the indicated number of original pars when you see "R 1", "R 2", etc.
On Mon, 3 Jan 2005 16:40:53 EST [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> This is something I posted on an anti-war list in response
> to the post of an editorial adv
A better definition of "tied or near-tied" is:
For a parrticular voter, two candidates are tied or near-tied if, by voting
for one of them and not for the other, that voter could make or break a tie
for first place between them.
[end of definition]
In the inequalities in my previous posting, I
Ralph,
--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
> Many comments about approval strategy have made little sense
> to me, because they ignore the fact that strong supporters of a
> particular candidate can have very divergent views about other
> candidates.
>
> Given the great diversity of voter opinions o
It's true that no Approval strategy formula is useful for everyone, or even
every progressive.
Certainly I disagree with most progressives' Plurality strategy, which I
claim is based on unreliable information. But even if it were true that
Kerry were the best that we could get, I still wouldn't
But doesn't that wikipedia definition define the Smith set in terms of
sincere preferences? The Smith set is defined in terms of actual
pairwise-defeats based on votes. The _sincere_ Smith set is the one that is
based on sincere preferences.
We discussed Smith set algorithms on EM some years a
Russ said:
Beyond that, he cited bogus excuses for canceling the site, such as my
re-worded definitions.
I reply:
That wasn't bogus. Perhaps you're forgetting that you're posting to the
mailing list where your sloppified definitions were criticized. Your
befuddled and ambiguous wordings were well
Ballots are ordinal rankings or cardinal ratings.
Any candidate with more than average first place rankings or
ratings gets a point. Any candidate with fewer than average last place
(or truncated) rankings or ratings gets a point or an additional point.
The candidate with the most points wins.
From: "James Green-Armytage" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
because of unfamiliarity (and a sense that C's party is less well-equipped
to govern than the major parties), but most people prefer C to their least
favorite major party candidate, and C also develops a substantial core
following of his own. Below
Many comments about approval strategy have made little sense
to me, because they ignore the fact that strong supporters of a
particular candidate can have very divergent views about other
candidates. Using the 2004 U.S. presidential election as an
example, supporters each candidate, from the social
Dear Mike Ossipoff,
you wrote:
>Approval quickly homes in on the voter median, and then stays there.
>Condorcet goes directly to the voter median in its 1st election. Approval
>&
>CR do so in thei r 2nd election. That's the price of simplicity and easy
>proposability.
I reply:
This is a
Russ Paielli wrote:
Russ Paielli 6049awj02-at-sneakemail.com |EMlist| wrote:
It occurred to me a while back that the two criteria may be
equivalent. That is, if a method passes monotonicity, perhaps it must
also pass summability, and vice versa. That's just a hunch. Can
anyone prove (or disprove
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