A couple of days ago, Forest Simmons posted an interesting message about
how Approval can elect a third-party candidate within a few election
cycles if that party is truly preferred by the electorate.
His argument seems reasonable enough to me, and it helped me to
understand the different tende
I'd said:
The claim that natural selction isn't possible, or that, if it happened, it
couldn't result in new species, is absure.
Of course, instead of "absure", I meant "absurd". Or at least without any
justification.
Mike Ossipoff
___
Today I'm posting several messages, because I might be away from the
computer for a while, and I don't know for how long. It could be up to a
week or more. So I should add, too, that if someone refutes something that
I've said, and I'm not heard from replying to that, that's only because I'm
a
I've described an enhancement of the Best Frontrunner strategy. It could
be further enhanced, by considering the possibility that if there's a tie or
near-tie maybe neither F1 nor F2 is in it. That leads to a way of getting
the Pij for Weber's strategic value formula. Any easily estimated way o
When I've mentioned the Acceptable/Unacceptable strategy, I've spoken of as
if it's a separate strategy. Actually it would be the result of the other
expectation-maximizing strategies, for people who believe that there are
completely unacceptable candidtates who could win, or who consider the
On 20 Jan 2005 at 14:54 PST, Ted Stern wrote:
> So your defeat rankings should actually be
> Bi>Ai , strength 11 (the 3 "straight upward" beats)
> A1>A2>A3>A1 , strength 10 (the "upper clockwise" 3-cycle)
> B1 Ai>Bj (i!=j), strength 8 (the 6 "diagonal downward
Dear Forest!
Your grand compromise sounds very interesting and will make a good
occupation for me this weekend I guess :-) By the way, I was quite
annoyed to find a very simple example of only six candidates in which
the condorcet lottery probabilities are all but monotonic (which I will
also post
James--
Yes, the result of the 1st election is as you said. I don't know how I got
a different result, but
I probablly didn't include the RLC voters and the LRC voters. I probably
just asked "How many of these are voting for C as a compromise?"
In the 2nd election,, with the same candidates or
On 6 Jan 2005 at 01:32 PST, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
> Dear Forest!
>
> Your sprucing up technique is a very nice idea since it can simplify the
> tallying of those methods which fulfil beat-clone-proofness and
> uncoveredness. However, some of which you wrote has confused me
> completely: Did I und
Ralph,
--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
> Because it would be next to impossible for any approval
> strategy formula to account for all these differences, I'm
> skeptical about all formulas that purport to express ideal
> strategies for supporters of particular candidates. Before
> one can hope t
On Thu, 20 Jan 2005, Paul Kislanko wrote:
Forest Simmons wrote (Thursday, January 20, 2005)
Here's a quick way to find the Condorcet Winner if there is one:
Use Rob LeGrand's ballot by ballot approval idea, but instead
of ballot by
ballot, use voter by voter.
For fairness, either randomize the orde
Correcting - I wrote in too much haste:
> 1. For each ballot, for each pair of candidates {X, Y} count
> defeat.X =
> defeat.X if the voter ranked Y better than X
if it were not obvious, I meant
defeat.X = defeat.X +1
Apologies.
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mai
Forest Simmons wrote (Thursday, January 20, 2005)
> Here's a quick way to find the Condorcet Winner if there is one:
>
> Use Rob LeGrand's ballot by ballot approval idea, but instead
> of ballot by
> ballot, use voter by voter.
>
> For fairness, either randomize the order of polling the
> vo
Here's a quick way to find the Condorcet Winner if there is one:
Use Rob LeGrand's ballot by ballot approval idea, but instead of ballot by
ballot, use voter by voter.
For fairness, either randomize the order of polling the voters or else
poll them twice, once from left to right, and once from r
In this "Grand Compromise" voters can choose which kind of ballot they
want. The ballot styles to choose from are ordinal rankings,and a variety
of cardinal ratings style ballots including range ballots, grade ballots
(whether A to F or A to Z), 0 to 10 olympic, 0 to seven psychological,
Yes/N
On Thu, 20 Jan 2005, James Green-Armytage wrote:
Forest,
Interesting stuff; I'll have to look at this for awhile.
Might be good to mention the operative approval strategy at the beginning
of these posts, to avoid confusion. You mentioned a few possible
strategies in your 1/17 e-mail; I'm not quite
From: Ted Stern <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [EM] Re: Approval/Condorcet Hybrids
To: Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: election-methods-electorama.com@electorama.com, Ted Stern
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
On 11 Jan 2005 at 14:40 PST, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
But ... your argument that, if W
Kevin,
I think my message was prompted by Alex Small's message,
but I wasn't replying specifically to him or to Russ Paielli.
Rather, I was trying to say that many comments I've read
on this list about how supporters of particular candidates
should vote stratetgically in approval elections make li
Below I will talk of "Ranked" rather then IRV, for it would be rare, if
ever, that strategists could plan on voting fitting one of the
distributions for which Condorcet (IRR) awards a different winner than IRV.
Quoting 'Approval *is* considerably simpler than IRV' from below, I have
to choke.
Forest,
Interesting stuff; I'll have to look at this for awhile.
Might be good to mention the operative approval strategy at the beginning
of these posts, to avoid confusion. You mentioned a few possible
strategies in your 1/17 e-mail; I'm not quite sure which one you are
assuming voters will fo
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