Rob LeGrand honky1998-at-yahoo.com |EMlist| wrote:
Russ Paielli wrote:
Here's what I modeled. I have three candidates only. I randomly
generate votes, with equal probabilities for all six possible
preference orders. The only control variable for each vote is
where the voter draws the line. In this
Dear Craig Carey,
instead of insulting those who don't agree with you,
you should rather try to convince them.
Example 1:
38 ABC
32 BCA
30 CBA
The IFPP winner is candidate A although a majority of the
voters strictly prefers candidate B and candidate C to
candidate A. This
MIKE has got me black-listed so, as with Mr Piaelli, I can only reply publicly
and I can never cut out the step when MIKE makes messages be diluted and
verbose by expressing false and untrue ideas.
In this matter you were simply in the wrong: it is a dull brainless piece
on how you hold a great
hi everyone,
hopefully this isn't OT.
Iraq's election was just conducted using closed list PR. as I
understand it, there were over 7000 names across all the party lists.
If they had used open list PR, would voters have to select across all
7000 names? or do countries that use open list
Countries use a wide variety of methods. Sometimes a voter has a
possibility to choose one of the lists and then choose one or more
candidates within the list (preferential voting). More rarely, however,
voters can simultaneously vote for candidates on more than one list (so
called panachage).
Gervase,
Thanks for taking time to explore. And nice text graphics for the clock!
It turns out that as long as you allow only strict rankings, the center of
gravity of the distribution will fall in the the four hour (i.e. 120
degree) sector of the clock face centered on the Borda winner, so
. 100 . . voter utility or rating . . 0
2 Bush . Perot . . . . . . . . . Clinton
1 Perot . . . . . . . . . Bush . Clinton
2 Clinton . Perot . . . . . . . . . Bush
I'm aware of the problems with interpersonal comparison of utilities,
but have a hard time
From: Daniel Bishop [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Condorcet failure of Approval Voting (was Re: Dave
reply)
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
...
[Dave] continued:
BUT the voter's actions, such as strategy, have to be based on what
is practical for voters to learn and use (it is too easy for EM
From: Russ Paielli [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Re: simulating an Approval campaign/election
Rob LeGrand honky1998-at-yahoo.com |EMlist| wrote:
You're simulating a DSV (Declared-Strategy Voting) election with
Approval. My current research is on just that topic, though I'm
also interested
Russ wrote:
Interesting. Do you mind if I ask why you are interested in
Declared-Strategy Voting as opposed to Undeclared-Strategy
Voting?
DSV is the invention of Lorrie Cranor and the subject of her
dissertation (http://lorrie.cranor.org/dsv.html). Declared just
means that a voter declares a
That no subject posting was just a slip of the Return key while scrolling
down the EM digest. Sorry for the bother.
Forest
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