For anyone who needs "ballot-counting code," I suggest you try my
Graphical Voter Interface (GVI), which you can find at
http://ElectionMethods.org/GVI.htm . GVI is professional-quality
software that goes way beyond a command-line interface. It is close to
usable in a real public election. Scre
Recently Jobst introduced us to the idea of electing a "lottery" that, in
turn, picks the winner.
Here's one way that idea could be applied to the obstreperous ballot set
49 C
24 B
27 A>B :
First we introduce the lotteries A', B', and C' :
A' means a toss up between B and C.
B' means a toss u
Forest Simmons simmonfo-at-up.edu |EMlist| wrote:
Russ brought up the issue of effectiveness of Approval.
I think that we are mostly in agreement now that Approval locks on to
the CW fairly quickly when there is a CW. "Quickly" can even mean
during the first election if DSV is used, or if partia
Hallo,
Example 4:
10 ABCD
15 BACD
20 CABD
3 ABCD
Suppose Craig Carey's IFPP method is being used.
In the first round, the quota is 12. D is eliminated in the
first round. In the second round, the quota is 16 so that A
and B are eliminated and C wins.
When 7 C voters
Forest wrote:
> Actually, DSV with Strategy A can sometimes converge to a stable
> equilibrium even when there is no Condorcet Winner:
>
> 4900 C
> 2400 B
> 2700 A>B
You're right. I forgot to disclose my assumption of strict
preferences. A better way to say what I meant: When for every
candidat
From: Rob LeGrand <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: [EM] Re: simulating an Approval campaign/election
Russ wrote:
You seem to have confirmed my hypothesis that, in the idealized
case (DSV batch mode), Approval voting almost always converges on
the Cordorcet winner if one exists, but rarely (never?) conv
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