Dave,
--- Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Try:
> 5 a>b
> 2 b>a
> 6 a=b
> By not counting the = we have 5:2
> With counting themwe have 8:5
>
> The > and < determined that a gets 3 more votes than b - to me, strength
> of a's win over b.
It's called "Margins" when defeat stren
On Wed, 23 Feb 2005 22:37:01 +0100 (CET) Kevin Venzke wrote:
Dave,
--- Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
Counting votes:
(wv) seems the appropriate choice. If two voters rank a pair of
candidates (a=b) as equal, then (a>b) and (b>a) should each get one count.
This paragraph is con
I have suggested this enough times that I think we should just abbreviate
it to
IWBUFNTHHTASOTFTTAUIEE.
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> ] On Behalf Of Jim & Mary Ronback
> Sent: Wednesday, February 23, 2005 4:12 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
It would be useful for newcomers to have the acronyms spelled out the
first time they are used in each e-mail, e.g. , SFC, GSFC, SDSC, WDSC,
FBC, CW, ERIRV, AERLO, etc., or point to reference where they are defined.
Thanks,
Jim Ronback
Russ Paielli wrote:
In any case, I must admit
Dave,
--- Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> >>Counting votes:
> >> (wv) seems the appropriate choice. If two voters rank a pair of
> >>candidates (a=b) as equal, then (a>b) and (b>a) should each get one count.
This paragraph is confusing because in WV, a=b is not counted that w
Mike mentioned Nash equilibrium to me a year or two ago. I thought it
was interesting, and we agreed to put some material about it on the
website. For whatever reason, the material never came.
Let me also mention that I had suggested to Mike way back that we
provide proofs for his criteria such
MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp-at-hotmail.com |EMlist| wrote:
What Russ refers to as Weber´s Approval formula, or the Approval
formula, actuallly describes the Better-Than-Expectation strategy that
Forest defined a long time ago on EM. It was demonstrated on EM that, as
I´ve said, by some reasonable appro
On Wed, 23 Feb 2005 08:49:11 -0800 Ted Stern wrote:
On 23 Feb 2005 at 01:00 PST, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Counting votes:
(wv) seems the appropriate choice. If two voters rank a pair of
candidates (a=b) as equal, then (a>b) and (b>a) should each get one count.
The Condorcet array for each prec
What Russ refers to as Weber´s Approval formula, or the Approval formula,
actuallly describes the Better-Than-Expectation strategy that Forest defined
a long time ago on EM. It was demonstrated on EM that, as I´ve said, by some
reasonable approximations, Better-Than-Expectation becomes the same
Before this reply, let me say that my demonstration that Approval soon
arrives at the voter median, when there´s 1 issue-dimension, and probably
Forest´s demonstration that Approval soon arrives at the CW, use the
assumption that the voters and the candidates are the same as in the
previous ele
MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp-at-hotmail.com |EMlist| wrote:
I´d said:
Many strategies can be related to Weber's strategy of voting for
candidates with positive strategic value, according to Weber's strategic
value formula. But that doesn't make them the same strategy, as we've
been using the term here.
Trying to define a complete Condorcet based election method:
Single winners, such as governors, are the topic. PR voting for multiple
member districts deserves its own debate. Likewise Presidential elections
and the Electoral College.
Random? Nothing of such tolerated, except true random reso
Folks,
A few days I posted a message about my new webpage at
http://electionmethods.org/Approval-formula.htm
which explains the "strategy" for deciding which candidates to approve
in an Approval election. Originally this page had no derivation of the
formula because it had already been derived an
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