I prefer wv over margins, since I remember convincing arguments for this
(but seem not to have saved those posts).
I grab wvx as a hopefully unique identifier, so that DAVE KETCHUM gets to
define how it works. Once my definition gets heard we can debate whether
it is useful - if it is we can t
Ted Stern wrote:
On 24 Feb 2005 at 18:45 PST, Daniel Bishop wrote:
(quoting Ted):
Counting X1=X2=X3=...=X1000 as a fractional 0.001 vote for each candidate over
every other is both impractical and nearly pointless.
Don't you mean half a vote for each candidate over every other? Of
Daniel,
--- Daniel Bishop <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Don't you mean half a vote for each candidate over every other? Of
> course, if you're using margins, it doesn't make any difference.
>
> At least for single-winner Condorcet elections, I don't think it's
> necessary to explicitly cou
Ted Stern wrote:
On 24 Feb 2005 at 14:17 PST, Dave Ketchum wrote:
I am adding "-wvx" to the subject to debate a=b - time enough to think
about labels if my idea, once understood, survives debate. My thought is
that a=b expresses interest in this pair, just as aa do for wv,
but ranks them equ
MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp-at-hotmail.com |EMlist| wrote:
You haven´t looked at much voting system literature imuch if you haven´t
found articles in which voting system academics say some astoundingly
ridiculous things. Both Bruce Anderson and Niemi have written that
Approval is worse than Plurality.
On 24 Feb 2005 at 14:17 PST, Dave Ketchum wrote:
> I am adding "-wvx" to the subject to debate a=b - time enough to think
> about labels if my idea, once understood, survives debate. My thought is
> that a=b expresses interest in this pair, just as aa do for wv,
> but ranks them equally and the
MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp-at-hotmail.com |EMlist| wrote:
Russ continues:
Let me also mention that I had suggested to Mike way back that we
provide proofs for his criteria such as SFC, GSFC, and others.
I reply:
What does it mean to "prove" a criterion? :-)
One defines a criterion. Then one might prove o
Ted wrote:
> As Kevin has pointed out, by counting a=b as a>b + b>a, winning
> votes (wv) acquires some characteristics of relative margins
> (rm). With your tabulation rule, the margin doesn't change, but
> the winning vote totals do.
Counting A=B as 1/2 A>B + 1/2 B>A is equivalent to using marg
With "Condorcet package" I tried for a complete package for public
elections. Got one complete response which I read as general agreement,
except for whether/how to count a=b.
I remain interested in comments about the package, other than about a=b.
I am adding "-wvx" to the subject to debate a=
Dear Mike,
you wrote (24 Feb 2005):
> Though there's been nearly no interest in my criteria
> on EM, that doesn't mean that they haven't been discussed
> on EM. They've been thoroughly discussed here. Bruce
> Anderson, Markus, Blake, and Richard have been kind enough
> to industriously help look f
On 24 Feb 2005 at 12:31 PST, Paul Kislanko wrote:
> The electorate never sees the pairwise matrix. The voter only submits a
> ranked ballot.
Think AFTER the election. Would you trust a blackbox election scheme? No.
The vote counts would be public.
I'm simply saying, don't put irrelevant detail
On 24 Feb 2005 at 12:24 PST, Paul Kislanko wrote:
>
>
>> -Original Message-
>> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>> ] On Behalf Of Ted Stern
>> Sent: Thursday, February 24, 2005 1:05 PM
>> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>> Subject: [EM] Re: Condorcet package
>> I used 'relative
See below.
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> ] On Behalf Of Ted Stern
> Sent: Thursday, February 24, 2005 1:47 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: [EM] Re: Condorcet package
>
> On 23 Feb 2005 at 11:42 PST, Dave Ketchum wrote:
> >> On 23 Feb
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> ] On Behalf Of Ted Stern
> Sent: Thursday, February 24, 2005 1:05 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: [EM] Re: Condorcet package
> I used 'relative margins' when what I meant to say was 'margins'.
Well, than
On 24 Feb 2005 at 11:47 PST, Ted Stern wrote:
> Your tally method would require extra votes in 9900 pairwise matrix
> locations, each of the 100 fringe candidates getting one vote against each
> of the other 99.
... for the 99% of the ballots that actually don't express any opinion about
any of th
On 23 Feb 2005 at 11:42 PST, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>> On 23 Feb 2005 at 01:00 PST, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>>>Counting votes:
>>> (wv) seems the appropriate choice. If two voters rank a pair
>>> of candidates (a=b) as equal, then (a>b) and (b>a) should each get
>>> one count.
Hi Dave,
Another poin
But, though there´s been nearly no interest in my criteria on EM, that
doesn´t mean that they haven´t been discussed on EM. They´ve been thoroughly
discussed here. Bruce Anderson, Markus, Blake, and Richard have been kind
enough :-) to industriously help look for faults in the criteria, often
On 24 Feb 2005 at 10:25 PST, Ted Stern wrote:
> As Kevin has pointed out, by counting a=b as a>b + b>a, winning votes (wv)
> acquires some characteristics of relative margins (rm). With your tabulation
> rule, the margin doesn't change, but the winning vote totals do.
I must apologize, I introduc
On 23 Feb 2005 at 20:25 PST, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Dave,
> --- Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
>> Try:
>> 5 a>b
>> 2 b>a
>> 6 a=b
>> By not counting the = we have 5:2
>> With counting themwe have 8:5
>>
>> The > and < determined that a gets 3 more votes than b - to me, strength of
Russ said:
Mike mentioned Nash equilibrium to me a year or two ago. I thought it
was interesting, and we agreed to put some material about it on the
website. For whatever reason, the material never came.
I reply:
I didn't have time, Russ. I had other things to do.
Russ continues:
Let me also menti
20 matches
Mail list logo
