Hi Russ,
It's good to see you so engaged in the list of late. I regret that I
haven't been participating much in the last few months.
>Let me just
>suggest, however, that it would be useful to distinguish between
>election methods that could be publicly acceptable within our lifetimes
>
Folks,
I realize that this email list is intended for a wide-ranging technical
discussion of election methods, and far be it from me to try to
discourage "brainstorming" for innovative new ideas. Let me just
suggest, however, that it would be useful to distinguish between
election methods that
Dear Jobst,
--- Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> you wrote:
> > Suppose we're using a method that satisfies Clone-Winner:
> >
> > 51 A 49 B
> >
> > A wins. Now replace A with two clones, so
> >
> > 25 A1>A2 26 A2>A1 49 B
> >
> > A1 or A2 will win, but only assuming this is how A
MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp-at-hotmail.com |EMlist| wrote:
>
> Russ quoted my definition of SFC:
>
> SFC:
>
> If no one falsifies a preference, and if a majority prefer the CW to
> candidate Y, and vote sincerely, then Y shouldn´t win.
>
> [end of SFC definition]
> A few days ago, Russ posted a statement
On Mon, 07 Mar 2005 09:39:05 -0800 Ted Stern wrote:
On 6 Mar 2005 at 06:50 PST, Chris Benham wrote:
Oh, by the way, I would *not* allow equal rankings. Why not? I just
don't like them. They strike me as an unnecessary complication and
little more than a way to game the system.
I think an ideal meth
On Mon, 7 Mar 2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
...
Perhaps I should make clear again why I propose randomization in the
first place:
...
Methods such as Condorcet Lottery, RBCC, and RBACC accomplish this ...
But the Condorcet Lottery picks the CW with certainty when there is one.
Wouldn't this encourage
Dear Kevin!
you wrote:
> Suppose we're using a method that satisfies Clone-Winner:
>
> 51 A 49 B
>
> A wins. Now replace A with two clones, so
>
> 25 A1>A2 26 A2>A1 49 B
>
> A1 or A2 will win, but only assuming this is how A voters really vote
> after the cloning operation. In real life I sus
Dear Jobst,
--- Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Dear Kevin!
>
> you wrote:
> > By the way, I think Later-no-harm is very important, in order to coax
> > information out of the voters, and avoid de facto Clone-Winner
> > failures.
>
> I agree with the first, that's why I try to f
Dear Kevin!
you wrote:
> By the way, I think Later-no-harm is very important, in order to coax
> information out of the voters, and avoid de facto Clone-Winner
> failures.
I agree with the first, that's why I try to find a compromise between
LNH and Condorcet.
But what do you mean by "de facto
Jobst,
--- Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Since the topic of "Later no harm" came up again, I would like to point
> out that some randomization can make a Condorcet methods fulfil that
> criterion in a certain sense.
By the way, I think Later-no-harm is very important, in order t
Chris,
--- Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> "Suppose we're using a WV method:
>
> 40 A>B>C
> 35 B>C>A
> 25 C>A>B
>
> There's an A>B>C>A cycle. B>C is the strongest win (75 votes), followed
> by A>B (65 votes) and C>A (60 votes). So C>A is discarded and A wins.
>
> But suppose the
Dear Mike,
I wrote (6 March 2005):
> In my recent mails, I wrote that Mike Ossipoff's concept
> of "majority rejected" candidates cannot be used for other
> election methods than MinMax.
You wrote (7 March 2005):
> But which of my criteria use the term "majority-rejected"?
Did I say that one of
Dear Forest!
You defined TACC+ as:
> After finding the (deterministic) TACC winner, create a lottery based
> on random ballot among the set of all candidates that have at least
> as much approval as the TACC winner.
While that is certainly easier than the other randomized version of TACC
which I
Dear Francoise and Paul,
Greetings from Almunecar. We hope that the winter is treating you well, and
that soon you will be enjoying warmer climates when you go South.
Our Juno system is very strange here. Today is the first day that we can
send
mail. But >I have to quick because after a couple
Since the topic of "Later no harm" came up again, I would like to point
out that some randomization can make a Condorcet methods fulfil that
criterion in a certain sense.
As we know, no deterministic method can fulfil "Later no harm". For the
sake of completeness, here's again a simple counter-exa
Kevin,
You wrote:
"Suppose we're using a WV method:
40 A>B>C
35 B>C>A
25 C>A>B
There's an A>B>C>A cycle. B>C is the strongest win (75 votes), followed
by A>B (65 votes) and C>A (60 votes). So C>A is discarded and A wins.
But suppose the B>C voters see this coming and perhaps don't feel
as strongly
Dave Ketchum wrote:
>Some voters are going to enter duplicate ranks even if it is forbidden,
>so I suggest making it legal and counting accordingly.
Exactly! The simplest method for doing ranked voting (paper ballots with a list of possible ranks next to each name) makes it possible to do equal ra
On 6 Mar 2005 at 06:50 PST, Chris Benham wrote:
>
>> Oh, by the way, I would *not* allow equal rankings. Why not? I just
>> don't like them. They strike me as an unnecessary complication and
>> little more than a way to game the system.
>
> I think an ideal method in an ideal world should allow the
Markus said:
In my recent mails, I wrote that Mike Ossipoff's concept
of "majority rejected" candidates cannot be used for other
election methods than MinMax.
I reply:
But which of my criteria use the term "majority-rejected"?
As I said, my defintiion of defensive strategy uses the term "majority
Russ quoted my definition of SFC:
SFC:
If no one falsifies a preference, and if a majority prefer the CW to
candidate Y, and vote sincerely, then Y shouldn´t win.
[end of SFC definition]
Russ continued:
Here's my comment:
Mike considers this criterion critical and uses it as evidence that
certain C
Russ,
--- Russ Paielli <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Or perhaps you think you
> gain some strategic advantage by ranking them equal -- which is
> precisely one reason I lean toward disallowing it.
You can get an advantage, but it isn't free. So I think when voters
want to use equal ranking,
Daniel Bishop wrote:
Russ Paielli wrote:
Daniel Bishop dbishop-at-neo.tamu.edu |EMlist| wrote:
For example, consider an election with 12 candidates. Your ballot might
look like
_1_ Favorite
_2_ Good #1
_2_ Good #2
_2_ Good #3
_3_ Tolerable #1
_3_ Tolerable #2
_3_ Tolerable #3
_3_ Tolerable #4
_
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