Russ, --- Russ Paielli <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > Or perhaps you think you > gain some strategic advantage by ranking them equal -- which is > precisely one reason I lean toward disallowing it.
You can get an advantage, but it isn't free. So I think when voters want to use equal ranking, it probably makes the result better than if they can't. Suppose we're using a WV method: 40 A>B>C 35 B>C>A 25 C>A>B There's an A>B>C>A cycle. B>C is the strongest win (75 votes), followed by A>B (65 votes) and C>A (60 votes). So C>A is discarded and A wins. But suppose the B>C voters see this coming and perhaps don't feel as strongly between B and C. They might instead vote B=C>A. When that happens, there is still a cycle, but now B>C is the weakest win with only 40 votes. Now C wins. (Incidentally, this also works in the CDTT method I suggest. The CDTT is {a,b,c} at first; when the B>C voters rank B=C, the CDTT becomes just {c}.) I don't consider that the B>C voters get this advantage for free. In order for it to work, they have to give up the opportunity to distinguish between B and C. If you didn't allow equal ranking, the B>C voters would either be out of luck, or they would have to realize that voting C>B>A or perhaps just "C" is what it takes to get their compromise choice instead of their last choice. Kevin Venzke Découvrez le nouveau Yahoo! Mail : 250 Mo d'espace de stockage pour vos mails ! Créez votre Yahoo! Mail sur http://fr.mail.yahoo.com/ ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info