James, your proof is sound, but here's a shorter one based on Kevin's
comment:
Raynaud eliminates candidates one by one until there is only one candidate
left. At some stage the Smith set must have only one candidate A left.
This candidate A is not beaten pairwise by any of the remaining
Most of the proposed Approval/Condorcet Compromises assume that the CW is
more desirable than the Approval Winner when they are not the same
candidate, i.e. the Approval Winner is only to be considered when there is
no CW available.
That seems to me like a kind of one sided approach to
Jobst, I'm worried about a kind of incentive for insincere voting:
Consider
x ABC
y BCA
z CAB
where max{x,y,z} 50%, x+y+z=100%.
If we do random ballot chain climbing, then the respective winning
probabilities for A, B, and C are z, x, and y.
Supporters of A have an incentive (up to a certain
On 9 Mar 2005 at 10:29 PST, Forest Simmons wrote:
Most of the proposed Approval/Condorcet Compromises assume that the CW is
more desirable than the Approval Winner when they are not the same
candidate, i.e. the Approval Winner is only to be considered when there is
no CW available.
That
