Dear Mike,
you wrote (12 Mar 2005):
Majority rejected was never a criterion.
Wrong. It was one of your criteria. You called this
criterion Generalized Majority Criterion (GMC).
Markus Schulze
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Dear Forest!
You wrote:
Unfortunately, reverse TACC is not monotonic with respect to approval.
If the winner moves up to the top approval slot without also becoming
the CW, she will turn into a loser.
That's right.
You continued:
However, the following chain filling method is monotonic:
Hi folks. A quick question:
Does anyone know how Ramon Llull's pairwise procedure worked? Was it an
iterative procedure (voting between options two at a time), or did it use
ranked ballots? Was the aim to select a candidate who won all of their
pairwise comparisons? How did the method
Dear James Green-Armytage,
please read:
http://www.math.uni-augsburg.de/stochastik/pukelsheim/2001a.html
Markus Schulze
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Dear James!
Llull designed election methods under the assumption that there is a
best candidate which only has to be found. Obviously he implicitly
assumed that the voters vote not in their personal interest but in the
general interest to find the best candidate.
As Pukelsheim writes in the text
Dear Ted!
You wrote:
I explored TACC with some enthusiasm over the last couple of days.
It's astonishing that a method that simple could give such nice results,
isn't it? That was a fabulous idea by Forest to construct chains in
order of approval! I still want to explore his Needle method in
Eric Gorr recently posted a link to a one-page document by Jim Lindsay
explaining why he and many political activists prefer IRV to Condorcet,
Approval, and other methods.
One of Jim's criteria was system easily explained. Surprisingly, he
put somewhat for both IRV and Condorcet.
IRV is much
On 12 Mar 2005 at 02:20 PST, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Forest!
You [Forest] wrote:
Unfortunately, reverse TACC is not monotonic with respect to approval.
If the winner moves up to the top approval slot without also becoming
the CW, she will turn into a loser.
That's right.
You
On 12 Mar 2005 at 05:04 PST, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Ted wrote earlier:
-- the Nash equilibrium will occur with
40: ABC
35: BCA
25: CAB
which again has B winning.
Why is that? Can you argue for this equilibrium in more detail? It was
always my impression that in most
I mostly agree with Russ.
Another reason why IRV is popular is that it's basically an expanded and automated version of an election method already used for many local elections in the US, as well as elections to some higher offices in at least 2 states (Nebraska and Louisiana): 2-step runoff.
Dear Ted,
Your TAB method is what I used to call Approval Seeded Bubble Sort.
Then after a year of thinking that it was my invention I came across an
article about the Kemeny Order in which the authors called our bubble
sort process Local Kemenization and suggested using it as a way of
refining
Ted Stern tedstern-at-mailinator.com |EMlist| wrote:
Thanks to both of your responses, I have an idea now that I think will work,
and it should have (my) desired quality of encouraging generous approval
cutoff and ranking of candidates below the cutoff.
Basically, the idea is simply Beatpath:
Kevin's Approval Runoff in which low approval candidates are eliminated
until there is a Condorcet Winner, can also be described as follows:
Pick the lowest approval score candidate that beats all of the candidates
with greater approval scores.
Proof of equivalence:
Kevin's winner KW has to
I'd like to clarify a bit about this method. First, the rule itself:
*Drop the weakest defeat that is in a cycle, until there is an unbeaten
candidate.*
Does that sound right?
Next, I have a question about how this method compares to another
method:
*If there are no
James Green-Armytage jarmyta-at-antioch-college.edu |EMlist| wrote:
Russ wrote:
One of Jim's criteria was system easily explained. Surprisingly, he
put somewhat for both IRV and Condorcet.
IRV is much easier to explain than Condorcet, and I believe that is the
primary reason that it is more
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