Hi Chris,
Good to hear from you! Some replies follow...
I agree with your positive remarks about Raynaud here. I regard
Raynaud(Gross Loser) as one of the easy-to-explain contenders.
I agree that Raynaud is easy to explain. I don't know about Gross Loser,
though... Winning
Hi, this is James G-A replying to Juho...
My assumption was that the fact that there are four parties of about
equal size was known. Since I at some point said that these pirates
would be from different countries, maybe also the exact number of
people in each party is known. In most elections
James G-A replying to Forest
I should have made it more clear that I wasn't talking exclusively about
100% consensus, though that is the (usually impossible) democratic ideal.
But the greater the consensus, the better.
If no significant consensus is possible, then (as Jobst argued) the best
we
James G-A,
You wrote (Fri.Mar.18):
I agree that Raynaud is easy to explain. I
don't know about Gross Loser,
though... Winning votes is most intuitive to me. "This candidate was
opposed by 60% of voters in a pairwise contest! Eliminate him! Bam!" I
guess the GL equivalent would be "This
Below is a draft of a first round proposal for a single
general-election voting method replacement. Comments humbly
requested. Could the explanation be made any clearer?
As discussed previously, Definite Majority Choice (hat-tip to Forest
for the name) is just another name for Ranked Approval
Hello James,
Sorry about causing some gray hair to you. I think the problem is that
we drove into two alternative tracks in the discussion and my text,
when trying to address both of these, was not clear. I hope this mail
improves the situation a bit.
The two tracks that I see are one where we
Mike,
--- MIKE OSSIPOFF [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Kevin--
You suggested that there could be a method in which a majority, who have
transitive strict preferences among all the candidates, could ensure that
some Y won't win, by alternately voting and = in their rankings. You
said that's
On Fri, 18 Mar 2005, James Green-Armytage wrote:
James G-A replying to Forest
I should have made it more clear that I wasn't talking exclusively about
100% consensus, though that is the (usually impossible) democratic ideal.
But the greater the consensus, the better.
If no significant consensus is
On 18 Mar 2005 at 11:01 PST, Araucaria Araucana wrote:
Below is a draft of a first round proposal for a single
general-election voting method replacement. Comments humbly
requested. Could the explanation be made any clearer?
To facilitate collaboration on this proposal, I've started an
Dear Forest Simmons,
Replies follow...
What I mean is the degree of consent.
If you can get 85 percent of the people to agree that plan A is an
acceptable alternative, then I consider that an 85 percent consensus.
I do understand what you're saying, but I'm still not totally
Hi Juho,
Further replies follow on the topic of Smith methods vs.
minimax(margins)...
Sorry about causing some gray hair to you.
Sorry about being peevish in my reply.
track one
one where we talk about dynamics of
sequential mutinies and how the
I tried to post this last night, but found that it didn't arrive, and so I'm
re-sending it:
Dear Markus--
You said:
I wrote (16 March 2005):
I replied that it cannot be said that you proposed wv
methods in general because you didn't propose a general
concept.
You wrote (17 March 2005):
Kevin--
I'd said:
You suggested that there could be a method in which a majority, who have
transitive strict preferences among all the candidates, could ensure that
some Y won't win, by alternately voting and = in their rankings. You
said that's a silly way of voting, and that, because a silly
WDSC's premise says that a majority of the voters prefer X to Y. WDSC's
requirement says that they must have a way to ensure that Y loses, without
reversing a preference.
If that majority rank X over Y, then Y has a majority defeat. A majority
defeat is a 1-defeat majority beatpath.
Chris--
I object far more
to the equal-rank near the top incentive that exists for some voters
(including zero-info. voters) in equal-ranking allowed Winning Votes
defeat-dropper.
I reply:
Remember that it's been shown that every nonrandom method gives some kind of
incentive for strategic
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