Dear Mike!
Although I don't believe in measurable individual utilities in the first
place, here's some thoughts on the even more questionable notion of
social utility:
In replying to Andrew, you stated a seemingly trivial truth:
That's CR. If voters have no wish to maximize their own utility
I'm starting to think that an approval cutoff option may be too
complicated for a public DMC proposal.
It now seems to me that a graded ballot with C as the lowest passing
grade is fairly intuitive and with 8 approved ranks leaves sufficient
room for voter expression.
But mainly, 16 ranks (0 --
Hello Gervase,
On Mar 24, 2005, at 03:00, Gervase Lam wrote:
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2005 09:15:52 +0200
From: Juho Laatu
Subject: [EM] Sincere methods
I already gave some support to seeing MinMax (margins) (least
additional votes) as one potential sincere method (criticism
received too).
If you want
Hello Chris,
I have one generic comment on evaluation of different voting methods.
Examples that include both sincere votes and altered votes nicely
demonstrate the possibilities of strategic voting, but when the voting
method gets a pile of ballots to be counted, no knowledge of which
votes
Date: Fri, 25 Mar 2005 09:25:46 +0100
From: Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Andrew: Sincere methodsd
...
The median is a simpler, more accurate, and more robust measure of
social utility than the sum! It has the additional advantage that we
need not assume that utilities possess
So I suggest to measure social utility by the LOWER QUARTILE of the
individual utilities (= that utility value where one quarter of the
voters is below and three quarters of the voters are above).
Perhaps this will even make CR a somewhat more strategy-resistant method
since we use a much more
James,
You wrote:
Given sincere votes, this may be interesting, but if votes are not
necessarily sincere, it would be quite possible for all candidates to
receive a social utility of 0. That is, the lower quartile feature makes
the method into a kind of 3/4 supermajority method.
However, scoring
Fan de Condorcet wrote:
James,
You wrote:
Given sincere votes, this may be interesting, but if votes are not
necessarily sincere, it would be quite possible for all candidates to
receive a social utility of 0. That is, the lower quartile feature makes
the method into a kind of 3/4 supermajority
Jobst--
You wrote:
The median is a simpler, more accurate, and more robust measure of
social utility than the sum!
I reply:
Probably so.
You continued:
It has the additional advantage that we
need not assume that utilities possess an additive scale.
True, but there's a good reason for judging a
How would Median CR work? What would be the exact wording of its balloting
and count rules?
And, for me more important, would it keep CR's compliance with FBC and WDSC?
...and would it keep CR's social optimization advantage, that if people vote
to maximize their utility expectation, then, with
Yes, judging by the archives, Rob started EM in February '96. But a posting
from Steve in EM's 1st month, February '96, shows that the Single-Winner
Committee had been operating for some time before that.
I include, in this posting, below, a copy of a May '96 posting of mine to
EM. But you
The way to choose a single-winner method is on the basis of what standards
you want, what you want from a single-winner method.
Since you're into electoral reform, I needn't tell you what the lesser-of-
2-evils problem is, and you don't need me to tell you that the lesser-of-2-
evils problem
Let me demonstrate this with an example. A much more reasonable
un-contrived example than the ones in the anti-Condorcet paper:
Voters' sincere preferences:
40%: Dole, Clinton, Nader
25%: Clinton
35%: Nader, Clinton, Dole
[The Clinton voters have no 2nd choice listed for simplicity, because
it
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