Chris Benham chrisbenham-at-bigpond.com |EMlist| wrote:
Russ,
I agree with Kevin V.'s last post in this thread. You wrote:
The same considerations apply to the "top-two Approval pairwise
runoff" method I suggested a few days ago. If the "turkey raisers" or
cloners succeed, they have simply f
I already mentioned that, under the question that asked if methods should
force people to vote sincerely, I added one that asks if a method should get
rid of the lesser-of-evils problem.
I've also added one more question: Under the question that asks if
simplicity (or something) is more impo
A few comments about the questionaire:
It asked if a method should force people to vote honestly. I answered "--"
because the freedom to vote honestly is important, rather than being forced
to.
I added "to allow people to vote honestly", just below that. But, to clarify
the meaning, today I
It's true that we we don't discuss most voting systems here--only the ones
that we really like.
(But we discuss IRV and Borda a little, just because they're fairly
frequently proposed or mentioned in popular articles).
Nanson meets Condorcet's Criterion, but it fails all the defensive strat
Approval has no such problem because the Bush supporters can simply vote
for both Bush-A and Bush-B. If they tie, a coin is flipped and one is
elected. Since they are exact clones, either one will do.
Clones aren't necessarily identical. People who prefer the clone set to all
others can hav
I'm going to indent this so that it will be clearer. But, because experience
has shown that e-mail can scramble indentations, I'm going to number and
letter the subject headings too:
This, like most of what I say about ranking strategy, is about the
acceptable/unacceptable situation.
It's
In a rather careless error, I said yesterday that IRV fails IICC, the weaker
relative of ICC that involves an indifferent set instead of a clone set.
Actually IRV passes that, just as it passes ICC. IICC is easier to pass, and
I don't know of anything that passes ICC without passing IICC. I ha
I wrote:
>> This is new to me. Under what conditions/assumptions does approval have
>> an order reversal incentive? Can you give an example where order
>reversal
>> achieves something that cannot be achieved equally well without order
>> reversal?
>
Bart, you replied:
>It's sometimes called
James replying to Mike, on the subject of ICC definitions...
James:
>So, ICC definition is changed to this, for use in evaluating non-ranked
>methods:
Mike:
>I trust that you meant "in evaluating both rank and non-rank methods".
>The
>kind of ICC that you describe applies meaningfully and usefull
Mr. Gazeley,
Thank you for writing to the list. I remember your article with I.D.
Hill
about sequential STV. Are you aware of Nic Tideman's CPO-STV?
Anyway, back to your topic. Many of us are aware of Nanson's method, but
it is true that we do not discuss it very often.
My
Russ, you write:
>Let me explain how I intuitively think about clones. Forget the formal
>definition and just think of clones as being perfectly identical to each
>other.
Even though it strikes some people as counter-intuitive, the formal
definition is already well-established. If you d
Title: NANSON - Elections to one seat
I was disappointed to see no reference to Nanson on this site.
Nanson proved in effect that if a series of Borda counts is conducted on the same set of votes, eliminating each time the candidates whose scores are equal to or below the mean, the one can
Paul,
--- Paul Kislanko <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> I am not entirely sure who said what because of the way Mike constructs his
> emails, and I don't really care anymore about what you "experts" think one
> way or another, but Mike (or somebody) wrote:
> > Set S is a clone set if, for every pa
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