On 28 Aug 2005 at 16:55 UTC-0700, Dave Ketchum wrote:
I continue to question adding Approval to Condorcet - can it really
be worth the pain of trying to be understood?
PS - a few days ago I found out about the Condorcet group, that DMC
is important there, and looked for a definition - finding
On 29 Aug 2005 at 12:59 UTC-0700, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Here is another question - will DMC lead to 2-party domination, or
not? To really answer this, it would help to understand optimal
voting strategy in DMC, which is probably beyond reach.
The argument that some ranked methods lead to
I suspect DMC will lead to 2-party domination.
See
http://math.temple.edu/~wds/crv/IncentToExagg.html
and consider this same example under DMC.
If the top-1, top-2, none, or all-3 of
the candidates are approved by all (I do not care which,
so long as you are consistent about it)
then B wins.
Hello Warren, again.
You wrote:
--well, I really dislike that gimmick. It seems to me not to solve anything.
Do you suggest the election system should rather declare one of the
candidates which are not approved by anyone the winner than to demand a
new election because of lack of approved
2. Immunity from second place complaints. Unlike in MinMax and
Beatpath, the DMC winner always defeats the candidate which would win
if the winner were not present.
--nice. Also true of range.
I'm sorry you're wrong here: If ballots are
voters A points B points
60 6040
Dear Kevin!
You wrote, answering Warren:
here is another: consider the horrible DH3 pathology described at
http://math.temple.edu/~wds/crv/DH3.html
which afflicts Borda and many Condorcet methods... does it also afflict
DMC? Again answering this requires some understanding of voting strategy
Dear Warren!
voters A points B points
60 6040
400 100
then B wins although she is obviously defeated by A, the obvious 2nd
place winner.
---I'm sorry but YOU are wrong here. Your precise wording was
always defeats the candidate which would win
6. Robustness against noise candidates.. cloneproof...
--also true of range.
Could you say more precisely what you mean here?
--Range voting is immune to clones in the sense that any number of cloned
candidates, all of whom get the same rangevote scores, can be added to the
scene,
and the
Warren (wds) asked if I could be more precise about reason #17.
17. It is resistant to the burying strategy that plagues some
Condorcet methods. This is related to reason number 9.
The expert on burying in Condorcet methods is James Green-Armytage, who
invented a method called Cardinal
Do you suggest the election system should rather declare one of the
candidates which are not approved by anyone the winner than to demand a
new election because of lack of approved candidates. (I certainly don't
agree to that.)
--yes I do. The job of a single-winner election system is to
On Mon, 29 Aug 2005 11:01:21 -0700 Araucaria Araucana wrote:
On 28 Aug 2005 at 17:19 UTC-0700, Warren Smith wrote:
--(also true of range)
I'm a bit worried here. Heitzig was telling me DMC could be done with
equality rankings
like AB=CD=F too. However... in the plain Condorcet
On Tue, 30 Aug 2005 00:22:59 +0200 Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Hello Warren, again.
You wrote:
--well, I really dislike that gimmick. It seems to me not to solve anything.
Do you suggest the election system should rather declare one of the
candidates which are not approved by anyone the winner
I regard A=B as a declaration of knowledge on the part of the voter.
he is saying I understand A and B and I think they have the same utility.
I regard A?B as a declaration of ignorance from the voter. he is saying
I do not know whether AB or BA, I really am clueless on this matter.
In some
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