Re: [EM] Re: Condorcet's strategy problem

2005-09-13 Thread Adam Tarr
[EMAIL PROTECTED]On 9/13/05, MIKE OSSIPOFF <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > wrote:  I'll start looking for a BeatpathWinner FBC failure example, but I hope others will too, because it isn't so easy to find one. There was an FBC failure example posted recently.  It arises from a cycle with a lot of sincere ind

[EM] Re: Condorcet's strategy problem

2005-09-13 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF
Rob-- You wrote: can you give an example of your nightmare scenario with a winning votes method? Since there's a number of us advocating Schulze(wv), can you use that as a baseline? I reply: Someone posted a wv failure-example to EM a while back. I'll try to find another example, but I admi

Re: [EM] Condorcet's strategy problem

2005-09-13 Thread Rob Lanphier
On Wed, 2005-09-14 at 03:13 +, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote: > As Warren said, wv's problems in public political elections are enough to > recommend other methods instead, for public political elections. WV's > problem in public political elections is its FBC failure. In public > political elections,

[EM] Condorcet's strategy problem

2005-09-13 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF
First, Condorcet's method, as the term is used here, is too broad a category. It refers to all the pairwisei-count methods that solve circular ties based on dropping weakest defeats or keeping strongest defeats. So I'd rather just discuss the wv Condorcet methods. I'll refer to them as "wv".

[EM] RE: [Condorcet] Why Schulze is Better than DMC

2005-09-13 Thread Simmons, Forest
Title: Re: [Condorcet] Why Schulze is Better than DMC There are other objective measures of complexity besides the ones mentioned by Jobst. (He mentioned computational complexity from the point of view of the smallest accurate description of the method or algorithm, as well as the minimal

[EM] Jobst: Strategy-Free Criterion

2005-09-13 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF
EM Members-- Sorry to break my retirement promise again, but this time it will just be temporary. At almost the exact same time that I retired from voting systems, a Range-Voting advocacy organization was formed, and I couldn't resist taking part to some small extent. In for a dime, in for a

[EM] RE: [Condorcet] Truncation

2005-09-13 Thread Kevin Venzke
Hi, --- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : >Kevin may have talked me out of Condorcet entirely (unless truncation >is better handled, and unless there is a decent consideration of >approval cutoff.) Truncated candidates are considered tied with each other, and ranked strictly be

Re: [EM] Copeland, CDTT

2005-09-13 Thread Kevin Venzke
Dear Jobst, --- Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > Does the CDTT have any other significance than the connection with Minimal > Defense? In other > words, what would you think of a method satisfying minimal defense but not > CDTT? I would rather let Markus discuss such issues as trun

Re: [EM] Citation for immunity to strategic voting?

2005-09-13 Thread Andrew Myers
On Tue, Sep 13, 2005 at 09:45:12AM +0200, Jobst Heitzig wrote: > > Dear Andrew and Stephane! > > Andrew wrote: > > Actually even this weaker claim (as I understand it) is wrong. Consider the > > following election with 100 voters: > > > > 23 A>B>C > > 25 A>C>B > > 3 B>A>C > > 26 B>C>A > > 3 C>

[EM] Re: Can we come to consensus? this way?

2005-09-13 Thread Araucaria Araucana
Abd ulRahman Lomax lomaxdesign.com> writes: > Not permitting truncation would involve considering ballots as > spoiled which are not complete, I think I remember reading that this > is actually done in some countries. Personally, I find it just as > offensive as spoiling ballots because the vot

[EM] Re: approval strategy in DMC

2005-09-13 Thread Araucaria Araucana
Simmons, Forest up.edu> writes: > > > Jeff Fisher recently opined that DMC voters would > likely adopt the strategy of approving all candidates that they considered > certain to be beaten pairwise by their Favorite. This > would put these candidates in a better position to doubly defeat t

Re: Re: [EM] Citation for immunity to strategic voting?

2005-09-13 Thread stephane.rouillon
Sorry if I was not clear enough. All the comments I made were relevant only to truncation strategies... As you just showed, order reversal (burying for the intimates) can get even a strong Condorcet winner. Two analysis could help go further in that direction: - Is there some level that makes a Co

Re: [EM] Citation for immunity to strategic voting?

2005-09-13 Thread Jobst Heitzig
Dear Andrew and Stephane! Andrew wrote: > Actually even this weaker claim (as I understand it) is wrong. Consider the > following election with 100 voters: > > 23 A>B>C > 25 A>C>B > 3 B>A>C > 26 B>C>A > 3 C>A>B > 20 C>B>A > > Therefore we have A preferred to B 51-49, A preferred to C 51-49, a

Re: [EM] Copeland, CDTT

2005-09-13 Thread Jobst Heitzig
Dear Kevin! Does the CDTT have any other significance than the connection with Minimal Defense? In other words, what would you think of a method satisfying minimal defense but not CDTT? Yours, Jobst Kevin Venzke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> schrieb am 13.09.05 06:31:34: > > Rob, > > --- Rob Lanphie