Dear Andrew and Stephane! Andrew wrote: > Actually even this weaker claim (as I understand it) is wrong. Consider the > following election with 100 voters: > > 23 A>B>C > 25 A>C>B > 3 B>A>C > 26 B>C>A > 3 C>A>B > 20 C>B>A > > Therefore we have A preferred to B 51-49, A preferred to C 51-49, and B > preferred to C 52-48. So A is a strong Condorcet winner. But consider what > happens when the 3 B>A>C voters decide to bury A, changing their ballots > to B>C>A. Then a cycle results: > > A vs. B: 51-49 > B vs. C: 52-48 > C vs. A: 52-48 > > According to all wv methods, we drop the weaker A vs. B preference, and B > wins.
In DMC, those who prefer A to B can easily protect the A>B defeat by placing their approval cutoff between these two candidates: 23 A>>B>C 25 A>>C>B 03 B>A>C, whatever approval cutoff 26 B>C>A, whatever approval cutoff 03 C>A>>B 20 C>B>A, whatever approval cutoff Same cycle A>B>C>A, approval scores A>50>B, hence B is doubly defeated by A and thus loses in DMC. In view of this counterstrategy, it makes no sense for the B voters to bury A. Yours, Jobst ______________________________________________________________ Verschicken Sie romantische, coole und witzige Bilder per SMS! Jetzt bei WEB.DE FreeMail: http://f.web.de/?mc=021193 ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info