Rob--
You wrote:
That's my central objection to Approval when compared to Schulze(wv) and
other Condorcet-compliant methods. In the vast majority of cases, a
simple sincere ranking works in Schulze(wv). It's what I can do, it's
what I can tell others to do.
I reply:
Sure. Because of SFC, GS
Title: [Condorcet] Re: Voting as duty (was ties & truncation)
Somebody thought that the
candidates would frequently fail to be ratified by the electorate.
Well, if the statisticians
take this into account properly, and submit for ratification only those
candidates that have a 99 percent
Kevin,
you are right in all of your comments. The mix up with PM and CM and rows and
columns was due to me being in an extreme hurry.
Here's another possibility:
A candidate's score is the ratio of the minimum entry in his row of PM and the
maximum entry in his row of CM.
The candidat
Title: Election-methods Digest, Vol 15, Issue 33
Here's the corrected strategy for the case where you
have enough polling information to discern the Smith set:
First identify (with the letter
C) your favorite member of the Smith set (or, if possible, the
uncovered set).
Put your app
Recently Rob Lanphier asked how to determine the strategically optimal approval
cutoff when voting under DMC.
Here are my suggestions:
(1) For the case where you have enough polling information to discern the Smith
set:
First identify (with the letter C) your favorite member of the Smit
