Ken Johnson wrote:
>The proposed "Normalized CR" method is as
>follows:
>(1) Voters give candidates CR ratings. There no need for any range limit
>- any finite CR value, positive or negative, can be allowed.
>(2) Apply an additive shift to each voter's CR profile so that the sum
>of the absolut
Steph wrote:
>This amazes me.
>You are not the first to tell me Borda and Condorcet are "equivalent".
>It could be the case in term of determining the winner when there is a
>Condorcet winner.
Nanson is a Borda-elimination method (read: NOT the classic Borda count) and is
Condorcet compliant. T
First, some etymological junk: I don't think "parliament" is a good name for the
proxy assembly, since parliament implies parlay, i.e. debate, and that body will
have lots of members who don't discuss their vote with anyone. Then again,
"house" implies a physical location as well. Perhaps "ass
>> Now consider:
>> 49 A> 48 B> 3 C> IRV winner = B; CW winner = C.
>> I doubt very much whether most electors would accept C as the "winner"
>> if this were an election for State Governor, much less for a directly
>> elected President of the USA. If anyone has evidence to the contrary I'd
>>
Curt wrote:
>I should have been more clear - Such an IRV scheme has no effect on
>making it more likely their candidate will win or that their interests
>will
>be reflected. They can't win the EC until they have 270 EVs, at which
>point they're not exactly a third party anymore.
Sure. That's a
Dave wrote:
> Destroying the EC is neither practical nor useful.
> There are doable improvements for the EC.
> IRV people need to be locked out of this debate.
>
>Practical nor useful?
> Not practical, for it requires at least some of the low population
>states to approve a Co
Curt wrote:
>Due to the fact that the EC requires a majority (not plurality) to win
>outright, and due to the winner-take-all nature of the states, this is
>how the EC encourages a two-party system.
I think it's more accurate to say that the EC greatly benefits from a two
party system, than to
Bill Clark wrote:
>By way of comparison, I'd consider Plurality a drop of water in a gallon
>of sewage, IRV maybe a couple drops of water in a gallon of sewage -- and
>even Condorcet would amount to some mixture of sewage and water. They're
>all flawed systems, if you want to get down to it.
I t
>I implemented the PR-enforcing Condorcet algorithm I described in my recent
>mail to this list, as part of the CIVS voting web service. If you would like
>to try it out (and give me some testing!), visit the following URL and vote on
>the "ice cream assortment" election:
>
>http://www5.cs.cornell
Bart wrote:
>It's probably a safe bet that almost everyone
>who voted for Nader (at least in a competitive state such as Florida)
>didn't much care what happened between Bush and Gore, and placed a
>higher value on placing a protest vote.
I don't buy this. The fact is that, even in a battlegroun
(Sometimes top-posting feels right.)
David's post is an example of one of the more novel arguments for IRV.
Basically, it goes like this:
Axiom 1 - We're electing a legislature. There are three (perhaps more)
parties. The "centrist" party is the weakest, in terms of first-place
preference.
Eric wrote:
>At 7:17 PM -0500 1/24/04, Bill Lewis Clark wrote:
>
>> It's nowhere near as good as Condorcet
>>(IMHO) but it's not "change for the sake of change."
>
>Apparently, it is.
My position on IRV's advantages over plurality is this:
AS LONG AS you have two major factions that have comfor
>Incidentally, I've read claims in the past that there are potential
>scenarios in which IRV even does worse than Plurality, and I've conceded
>these as being true but describing extremely unrealistic situations.
>People have asked me in private correspondence what these situations might
>be, and
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