so they are decades away from suggesting that others do research
into preferential voting.
We just got to see Simmons talking about clocks. In general edges and
surfaces of an X-wins polytope won't arrange into a circle (or loop).
--- Craig Carey, Auckland, New Zealand
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/politicians-and-polytopes/messages
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ngs).
The reason the input stage code was missing, is to help you get attached.
E.g. some concrete to keep you at the bottom of the water off the edge of
the wharf, and eventually you would be cataloguing the fish and boots.
At 2005-02-01 04:03 + Tuesday, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
>
>
At 2005-01-31 15:27 + Monday, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
...
>I"d said:
>
>>Of course, we'd all like to believe that anyone can be reached. I found
>>that to not be so, and so I blocked Russ's e-mail, and that led to his
>>raging and ranting on EM.
>
>That is another lie, folks. What happened was t
about atoms but who can only think about getting material
published in chemistry journals.
---
I should get some evidence from Mr SCHULZE that shows that he has written a
computer program in the last 40 years.
At 2005-01-29 17:27 +0100 Saturday, Kevin Venz
olytope. Mr Schulze seems to just never use the word "polytope". I should
archive the reasoning for that, provided less than 250 pages in length.
>Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] **2
>Date: Sun, 10 Sep 2000 14:01:35 +0300 (IDT)
>From: Ron Holzman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
itly to get on
>the computer.
---
OSSIPOFF seems to never use the vertical column of characters on the
left hand side. I.e. the characters are ">" or "|"; and he does not quote
other people's e-mail messages.
(The Qualcomm company that makes Eu
he 50% majority quota is not an ideal.
Suppose this 3 candidate election has exactly 1 winner:
52% (A)
51% (B)
-3% (C)
A 50% quota will find 2 winners, which makes that rule/test be
inconsistent with a "Right number of winners" axiom. I assume that it is
too petty to ke
Blaming Russ is extraordinary since you (MIKE) have 10 layers of an
ability to make the definition unusable or worse.
Quite possibly your plan is to produce a much worse website.
One idea can lead to a massive improve: reject all wordings that a
quantifier eliminating software solver can't unde
ns and polytopes mailing
list. He presumably finds it unsatisfactory in some way.
With the incomprehensible first ranking Condorcet method
designers creating rules that malfunction badly in 1 candidate
elections, it is unsatisfactory to let that be ignored.
Perhaps the USA subscribers coul
ce when 4 candidates, that deletes the 4th preference and
reduces the number of papers from 65 to 41.
However Mr Schulze might want to use a QE logic equation that
defines "strategy-proofness".
If Mr Schulze fails, then Mr Venkze could have an attempt.
Much of the problem is to
This message does nothing mope than fram up Mr May as being dishonest
enough to use the word "strictly prefer". So I want to see a retraction
or an apology.
The words "strictly prefer" have not been defined by Mr Schulze.
I guess Mr May did not have Shulze's purpose of pretending to know
someth
t;majority rule" [not ignoring the 2nd preference for some values of "t"]
Their plain English meaning and the other words would torpedo and sink the
theorem of Mr K. May.
At 2005-01-02 21:37 +1300 Sunday, Craig Carey wrote:
...
>| Chris Benham wrote (1 Jan 2005):
>| > T
At 2005-01-02 08:44 -0500 Sunday, Eric Gorr wrote to Election-Methods-List
>Craig Carey wrote:
>>At Sat Jan 1 16:08:58 PST 2005 , Marcus Shulze wrote:
>> | Hallo,
>>
>> That is an incorrect spelling of "hello".
>
>Yes, it is.
>
>It's German.
Schulze explaining that he does not understand my
questions.
It seems that Mr May would not mix with the group that want to
keep secret the fact that 2 candidate elections have FIVE
kinds of ballot papers.
---Craig Carey
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
At 2004-11-29 06:39 Monday, Diana Galletly wrote:
>On Mon, 29 Nov 2004, Craig Carey wrote:
...
>Why? Different methods can be used for different purposes -- does one
>seek a consensus opinion (voting on a proposal), does one wish to represent
>a wide spectrum of views (many places in
At 2004-11-29 06:39 Monday, Diana Galletly wrote:
>On Mon, 29 Nov 2004, Craig Carey wrote:
>newsgroups are not accessible (much) beyond the boundaries of the University;
>but in any case they are ucam.*, not cam.*. cam.* is for the wider population
>of Cambridge and Cambridgeshi
me error was also made in a speech that you gave.
>four errors in the first two paragraphs that he wrote concerning me,
>I decided to persevere a little further in attempting to decipher his
>message. I think that this is the crucial bit:
>
>Craig Carey wrote:
>
>> Also,
>
>Cardinal pairwise paper pdf
>http://www.mcdougall.org.uk/VM/ISSUE19/I19P2.PDF
>
>
I wrote on the message of Mr Green-Armytage:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/single-transferable-vote/message/332
| Message 332
|
| From: Craig Carey <[EMAIL PROTECTE
to be fair to individuals,
maybe Jobst could free up some knowledge on how to pick a partner.
Some Christians believe that children get taught worthless or wrong
material and then it has to be redone because the first teachings
were simply not good enough (German bible schools).
Craig Carey <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>Auckland, New Zealand
Nullo metro compositum est (trans. It doesn't rhyme)
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
list on the topic of
designing preferential voting methods. I use algebra and I seem to be
the only one. There is nothing indicating that Mr Schudy was speaking
on behalf of Mr SCHULZE.
Craig Carey
single-transferable-vote, politicians-and-polyopes
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
At 2004-09-06 12:26 +0200 Monday, Markus Schulze wrote:
>Dear Craig Carey,
>
>you wrote (6 Sep 2004):
>> MR SCHULZE was showing real ruthlessness to me at the times
>> I asked for information on how he created the "X over Y"
>> subtotal. I still DO NOT HAVE
At 2004-09-05 22:57 +0200 Sunday, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
...
>. It is a
>trivial task to design a ballot in which the voter can choose to either:
> (i) mark one candidate as first choice or several as the top set, or
That could extend the rules to the Block vote (k marks for k winners)
d be unaware of). The
principle might be indifference. This is not a CVD list where callousness
is on show.
Politicians and Polytopes (unpopular with USA though heavily advertised
by dmoz.org mirror pages (unlike stv-voting):
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/politicians-and-polytopes
"Germany has to do a lot better tha
ss the same
nearly parallel light beams that vision or illumination could or would
use ?.
Specifically, I ask if the trait of sincerity (of single preferences)
can pass from preference to preference. There are 2 cases here, of
"papers" being real-worldish, and being a mathematical idea.
ver that is a rule that MIKE (and
Richard too ?) just don't like to write on.
Is that "over" a "strictly prefer" type of "over" or just an
OSSIPOFF "over" ?. One is associated no right to know.
Keep going Mr Moore. Naturally all your efforts would be rejected at
the end for requiring unfairness. But I need some real attempts to
get MIKE's definitions salvaged and floated up.
Craig Carey
http://groups.yahoo.com/groups/politicians-and-polytopes
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ndidate election's results.
The classic "anonymity" rule stops that sort of
But a method derived from axioms won't need an anonymity rule.
=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=
At 2004-02-12 11:57 + Thursday, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
...
>Richard continued:
>
>Here are my "votes-only" definiti
MIKE has
not formed a belief that fairness (e.g. from Rob Lanphier) is
desirable. Perhaps Mr Lanphier also does not harbour a desire to
be fair to subscribers (he did contemplate have votes over the
posters).
Nothing improves here, after all, I am writing on the intellctual
interests of US students and s
as grounds for not reponding to
request #3 (it asked for all the proofs).
All that Steve Eppley research using computers and random numbers
has been blown away by the new disclosure that most preferential
voting methods have been checked,and to be rough, failed or
something, by a pairwise comparing rule.
Craig Carey
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
t such text here
Also, don't forget to briefly refresh your self with the core beliefs
of a following the cult of claiming to have proofs that never will
exists the people who are members don't like math, etc., etc., etc.:
http://www.electionmethods.org/evaluation.htm
Craig Carey <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>Auckland, New Zealand
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ity to lose all arguments on fairness
and how to model it. He instead says that his personal choice is
the judge. Notwithstanding how he never pens a word in defence of
fairness, we still would check that his rules are fair.
---
To some extent this is a problem with Dave Clark. He went to
school and learnt how to read and write. Then he finds garbage
and then did not simply and readily identify them as such. Instead
he was trying to repair the meaning. The purpose of the creator
of the rules is set against fairness and even if the Mike's
thought of the moment could be recovered, it is best to not do
that while the dark purpose of the rules has not been properly
inquired into.
Craig Carey
>From correct axioms to right STV-ishy voting algorithms:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/politicians-and-polytopes/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
At 2004-01-08 20:21 + Thursday, Diana Galletly wrote:
>On Fri, 9 Jan 2004, Craig Carey wrote:
>
>> Simulated annealing is using random numbers to get around multiple
>> minima.
>
>Why on earth does one need to "get around" multiple minima (I assume
ver and solve the two 3 candidate
problems. It could be a major result and the first since the Kenneth May
2 candidate result of the 1950s.
Craig Carey
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
:
:
[my private reply to Mr Davison's question to EML, which was sent while
I was not subscribed:]
...
: >[EM] Craig's Folly and Dan's Folly are two peas in a pod:
: >Donald Davison [EMAIL PROTECTED]
: >Mon Dec 29 22:20:13 2003
: ...
: >And Craig replied: "It does sound quite
nst P2 is further unbreakable guarantee that they would
be rejected
Even worse is the exploding quantity of facets in the Condorcet variant
solutions. This is a new aspect to Condorcet that has not been
written on. It is like the number of facts is rising powers faster.
No one knows what the rul
more monotonic.
Readers may read the old message of July here:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/single-transferable-vote/message/248
From: Craig Carey <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Thu Jul 24, 2003 10:44 pm
Subject: IRV measured: it is over 2x unfairer (than 1/3 quota AV)
It did
Ada 95 programs. It would be truly
suspect if people eventually produced a belief that they can't
do algebra since it seems that the algebra of 1 winner elections
is dead easy. Members can do better than secretly fantasize that
they flunks checkups on maths ability: instead they can positively
critici
At 2003-12-21 12:28 +0100 Sunday, Markus Schulze wrote:
>
>Dear Mike,
>
>when I wrote (on 15 Dec 2003) that you called your implementation
>"Floyd algorithm" there was no reason for me to believe that you
>have changed your opinion recently. Craig Carey claimed th
.).
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Is this actually true enough Marcus ? (Re: [EM] Two Paramount Criteria
At 2003-12-20 11:05 +0100 Saturday, Markus Schulze wrote:
...
>Craig Carey wrote (20 Dec 2003):
...
>> (1) The number of winners should be correct.
>&g
At 2003-12-18 13:29 -0800 Thursday, Forest Simmons wrote:
>For me two paramount criteria are
>
>(1) simplicity of optimal or near optimal strategy, and
>
>(2) as much voting power as possible consistent with (1).
>
That is not based on evidence, Mr Simmons.
The so called Schulze method (that rece
n candidates then it gives n times its
weight or it gives oly 1 times its weight. Condorcet rolls the
sick grasshoppers into the tobacco and leaves it as a rolled
together fix solving the problem of public interests vs private
interests.
Subject: [EM] Voting Matters, Issue 17
| [EM] Voting Matte
r others to interact, you
might admit to what others have known all along: as a theorist you
full collection of relevant useful principles is missing.
I may be leaving in a few days or weeks and perhaps you would go back
that previous system that ran OK: you dropped out when I showed up.
Mr Schul
ct axioms in private.
I see that Mr Marcus Schulze got his comments very badly
designed. Mr Schulze wrote as if he failed to detect the worthlessness
of the paper of Mr Donald Saari and Mr Steve Barney.
I guess it is fixable for that was not a final release, but in
the Condorcet fanatic's wor
Correction: in my last message (partly quoted here), change the words
. . .!> "also wins V4B: V4 ="
to
. . . . "also wins this next election"
---
>(5) By (4) and the axiom of Truncation Resistance, B wins V4:
>
>V4 =
> (AB.) 34.33%
> (BC.) 28.57%
> (C..) 37.01%
>
>(6.1) By
he owned a whole
lot of people that were voters. Then he said that they were sincere,
i.e. he carefully allowed each one of them to be liars. Also the liars
were ignored. As might be expected, Mr Gorr did not get to infer any
new equations representing justice from those ideas.
Craig Carey
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
out twice as
unfair or 2.3 times as unfair or so, than the quite unsatisfactory
method that eliminates all candidates except the FPTP-wise best 3.
Then the method uses a 1/3 quota to eliminate the remaining candidates.
Then 1 winner is found.
Craig Carey <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>Auckland,
your axioms. E.g. your hope of sincerity may contradict monotonicity.
Craig Carey
Single Transferable Vote: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/single-transferable-vote
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
TV ?
+ linearity: ruling out curves. (rule P2)
+ more refined decisions (an appended preference) does not upset
what was done. A need to keep the decision making simple.
(rule of truncation resistance).
+ etc.
Note that they are not in the theorem but are things of political
choosers of pre
ackwards compatible way, and then restore meaning,
we MUST know it right o strip off Arrow's writings.
No principle there saying that there is a right to a 0..1 powerful
vote.
All of these next are pointless and fit to be ignored: IIA,
dictatorial, Pareto.
To Mr witless I retain my private me
At 2003-07-14 09:22 -0700 Monday, Rob LeGrand wrote:
>Craig Carey wrote:
>> Votes Percentage
>>+--+ -
>>| A 50,000,001 199,999,999 | 20.004 49
ts.
(PS. In New Zealand, the threshhold vanishes on a political party if they
can win a single electorate. For some, there is proportionally under the
threshold.)
---
I regard the following as unimportant.
At 2003-07-14 01:40 +0200
Mr Keshet of the wikipedia.org website gave grounds saying he could not unstand
the lot and dashed off.
I have produced something that can be put into advocacy material.
Here I show that the Alternative Vote will almost negate (i.e. wrongly lose)
the votes of 105 million Americans (after the nu
ies over there to put against the man
of principle. : http://www.wikipedia.org/
What is an "X" in the criterion Blake ?: a candidate?, an alternative?,
or a preference?. Your monotonicity rule can't fail the Alternative Vote.
Craig Carey
Auckland, New Zealand
http://groups.yahoo.co
ey failed IRV instead of finding the worst
failure (37.4% of USA is deprived of a right to vote or whatever).
He rejected tests returning Real values: they can find the worst.
That can be time consuming.
I am troubled with reply at all to my reasoning the real reasoning
he used (if different) and the
ied design. So some of the fails are turned into
passes.
Mr Keshet has only webpages and words but the ideas on them define
Mr Keshet, the wikipedia censor of me using no reasoning that is
actually accessible with the usual details expected of information
requests about adminsitrative decisio
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