and wouldn't want to attempt more complicated
cases. However, the alternative method that I advocate (statistical
error count) is much simpler and could be easily generalized to work
with multiple candidates and alternative voting systems.
Ken Johnson
Election-methods mailing list - see http
be
your strategy?
Ken Johnson
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
or a couple issues, like gun control,
right-to-life, electoral reform, etc.) I got some (unpleasantly)
surprising results when I put this into my simulations.
Ken Johnson
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
.)
Does anyone have thoughts on how this form of Normalized CR would
perform and how it compares to other methods?
Ken Johnson
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Approval all 5 liberal candidates will get 51 votes and all 5
conservative voters will get 49 votes. Thus the majority candidates will
all be tied, and whatever method is used to break the tie will not
likely result in the most liberal candidate (the CR winner) being selected.
Ken Johnson
(-0.7), C(-0.5), ... J(+0.9)
(rank: J I ... A)
avg CR: A(+0.018), B(+0.014), C(+0.010), ... J(-0.018) (A wins CR)
Approval: A(51), B(51), ... E(51), F(49), ... J(49) (A...E tie
Approval)
Plurality: A(51), B(0), C(0), ... I(0), J(49) (A wins Plurality)
Ken Johnson
Election
this
example conveys the essence of what was happening with my simulations.
Ken Johnson
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
/012689.html
(Search the text for num_candidate=10.)
The main problem I saw with Approval occurred when there are many
candidates, and when everyone votes based on a single election issue. Do
you know if Merrill simulated this case?
Ken Johnson
Election-methods mailing list - see http
), B(0.1), C(1)
1 voter: A(-1), B(1), C(-0.1)
avg CR: A(-1), B(0.19), C(0.89)
approval: A(0), B(10), C(9)
plurality: A(0), B(1), C(9)
Ken Johnson
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
From: MIKE OSSIPOFF [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Mon, 17 May 2004 01:04:39 +
Ken Johnson wrote:
As
I understand it, the main problem with CR is that it is strategically
equivalent to Approval.
I reply:
That might be a problem to those who don't like Approval. But to those of us
who like Approval
.)
Ken Johnson
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Paul Kislanko wrote:
Sent: Friday, April 16, 2004 4:12 PM
(Ken Johnson) ...
In my view, public disclosure of precinct totals should be construed as
a potential violation of voter secrecy. If a high percentage of people
in my precinct vote a particular way, one could draw a highly probable
officials and
auditors who are obligated to maintain such information in confidence.
Ken Johnson
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
This is a follow-up to my previous post, Election-methods digest, Vol 1
#538, Message 2, in which I gave simulation results comparing
performance of various voting methods, using Sincere CR as a comparison
standard. I modified the simulation model to take into account
correlations between CR's
Date: Fri, 02 Apr 2004 21:39:43 -0800
From: Richard Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
...
But what did you think of INI?
-- Richard
In your earlier post (Election-methods digest, Vol 1 #576, Message 7)
you defined INI (Independence of Non-supporting Information) as
If X wins and Y loses, and
Date: Thu, 01 Apr 2004 21:44:08 -0800
Subject: Re: [EM] Does the 'Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion' Imply a
From: James Green-Armytage [EMAIL PROTECTED]
...
I have to say that I don't think it makes sense for an individual to
prefer A to B, B to C, and C to A. It's just
Message: 6
Date: Fri, 02 Apr 2004 23:24:41 -0500
From: Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: election-methods [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Re: [instantrunoff] Drafft of CVD analysis about IRV vs. Condorcet Voting
On Fri, 2 Apr 2004 10:11:03 EST [EMAIL
. software) by which the information on the
paper ballots is transferred to the database.
Ken Johnson
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
. Removing candidate C may make it less likely that voters will
vote sincerely.
Ken Johnson
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
. Are there any good references
you could recommend relating to Approval's vulnerability and Approval/STV?
Ken Johnson
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
From: Steve Eppley [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 2004 20:06:08 -0800
Ken Johnson wrote:
Forest Simmons wrote:
-snip-
A more fundamental goal might be to go with the choice that
would be acceptable to the greatest number of voters.
That sounds like Approval. The method
Forest Simmons wrote:
On Mon, 15 Mar 2004, Ken Johnson wrote:
It may be that majority rule is preferable, but as illustrated above it
is clearly not self-evident that majority rule is always preferable.
Therefore majority rule should not be posited axiomatically; it needs to
be justified
Date: Tue, 9 Mar 2004 00:41:56 +0100 (CET)
From: =?iso-8859-1?q?Kevin=20Venzke?= [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Ken,
--- Ken Johnson [EMAIL PROTECTED] a crit:
My impression was that Arrow stipulated several
basic criteria that any "reasonable" social choice system shoul
Date: Sat, 06 Mar 2004 02:35:02 -0800
From: Ken Johnson [EMAIL PROTECTED]
... I think the cardinal
rating concept provides a useful basis for defining the objective of
election systems (i.e., maximize social utility or social
representation)...
Cardinal ratings are, in my view, a more
for every other
alternative it is ranked as equal to. The alternative with the highest
total score wins. C4 is ranked above C1, C2, C3 (one point each) and
equal to C5, C6 (one-half point each): 1+1+1+1/2+1/2=4.
Ken Johnson
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
o maximize "social utility",
then CR probably represents the simplest and most natural way to
measure (or at least define) social utility, and it should not be
excluded from consideration axiomatically.
Ken Johnson
.
Ken Johnson
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
if Approval is used, over the long run. ...
You could be right, but can you formalize your notion of better
outcomes for society and over the long run in such a way that the
correctness of your belief could be demonstrated by way of a
mathematical proof?
Ken Johnson
Election-methods
r 10
points higher, or anything in between. In my view, "sincere CR" (e.g.
on a scale of 0 to 1, no quantization of rating levels) provides a
meaningful standard for DEFINING the objective of elections, even
though the complication of strategy makes CR an impractical election
method itself.
Ken Johnson
Ken Johnson wrote:
35 (A B) C
30 B (A C)
25 (A C) B
10 (C B) A
(Approved candidates are parenthesized.)
Correction:
35 (A B) (C)
30 (B) (A C)
25 (A C) (B)
10 (C B) (A)
(Approved/unapproved candidates are parenthesized.)
Election-methods mailing list - see http
the election.
Ken Johnson
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
a statistical ensemble of all possible sincere CR rating profiles and
ask, for example, which method selects a winner with the higher
aggregate CR rating on average.
Ken Johnson
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
on this issue.
Ken Johnson
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
of Approval.
Comments?
Ken Johnson
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
- is what's wrong with Average Rating as an election method? Are there
specific theoretical results or illustrative scenarios that demonstrate
its inferiority to other methods?
Ken Johnson
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
voting system
Jan 22, 04 COMPUTERWORLD
http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/0,10801,89290,00.html
Ken Johnson
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Message: 1
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2003 18:29:44 -0800 (PST)
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Verifiable secure voting using dual half pixel receipts
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Ken Johnson wrote:
As I understand it, a ballot receipt contains
and, if necessary,
order a recount or revote.
This kind of process lacks the technological sex appeal of Chaum's
proposed bit-mask method, but I think most voters would perceive this
type of process to be simpler and more transparent and trustworthy than
one relying on high-tech hocus-pocus mechanisms.
Ken
on a small random sampling of the
ballots would be a viable alternative to ballot serialization.)
Ken Johnson
Dave Ketchum wrote:
Perhaps we fight too much:
After the election each ballot has a home on the CD, with a fixed
position.
This position must get decided before the ballot gets
Original Message
Subject:
Re: [EM] Re: touch screen voting machines
Date:
Mon, 17 Nov 2003 13:34:45 -0800
From:
Ken Johnson [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To:
Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED
, just
hold another election. Computerization, combined with robust
verification means, should make voting processes and software as
efficient and reliable as commercial financial systems, so this should
be an exceptionally rare occurence.
Ken Johnson
Election-methods mailing list - see
, the
election can be verified without having to actually do a full manual count.
Ken Johnson
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
is nullified.
With this type of process there is no problem using black-box,
proprietary voting software, because it gives the voters themselves (not
just a few compter experts) the ability to confirm correctness of the
result.
Ken Johnson
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Message: 1
From: Eron Lloyd
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