Kevin--
I'd said:
Of course if the C voters and B voters aren't sure which of {B,C} is the
CW, and neither wants to elect A, and neither wants to be had by the other,
then both the B voters and the C voters should rank B and C, in sincere
order of preference, applying ATLO immediately below thei
James--
You said:
Mike, here is my proposed definition of strong majority rule. Your
feedback is welcome, as is all other feedback.
Definition of strong majority rule criterion: If voters cast ballots
sincerely, and the voting method in question always chooses a member of
the sincere Smith
MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp-at-hotmail.com |EMlist| wrote:
Forest was the first to mention the Better-Than-Expectation strategy for
Approval--the strategy whereby a voter votes for the candidates who are
better than his/her expectation for the election, better than the value
of the election. So the vot
Forest was the first to mention the Better-Than-Expectation strategy for
Approval--the strategy whereby a voter votes for the candidates who are
better than his/her expectation for the election, better than the value of
the election. So the voter using that strategy votes for a candidate if that
. 100 . . voter utility or rating . . 0
2 Bush . Perot . . . . . . . . . Clinton
1 Perot . . . . . . . . . Bush . Clinton
2 Clinton . Perot . . . . . . . . . Bush
I'm aware of the problems with interpersonal comparison of utilities,
but have a hard time view
Mike, sounds like we agree that there would be a "market" for
"super-proxies" that would have a lot of voters choosing to use them
for voting.
It also sounds like we agree that these voting issues will need a lot
of hashing out in terms of finding amendments, and coalitions, etc.
The problem w
You wrote:
I like that, but one thing that strikes me about it is that it would
still require a person to make a judgment on every issue - whether they
want to keep their proxy, or vote directly, or switch their proxy, etc.
I reply:
Yes, now we have no such decision to make, and so we get to let ou
Ernest Prabhakar wrote:
I don't think that such an algorithm is actually well-defined. I
believe you'd need some sort of initial conditions, and if you didn't
specify them explicitly then they'd be determined implicitly by the way
you ran the algorithm. And any sort of random initial conditions
Dear all
I find this "debate" about the Floyd Algorithm ( or more accurately who said what about who and when) extremely uninteresting and not very constructive.
Is it really that important to get the last word in?
David Gamble
PS This is the second time I've sent this E-mail have problems with
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Bart Ingles wrote:
>
> >I think when mentioning criteria, it's a good idea to also state why
> >those criteria might be important. For example, to me criteria such as
> >FBC and Participation are important because they relate to a voting
> >system's immunity to the
Bart Ingles wrote:
>I think when mentioning criteria, it's a good idea to also state why
>those criteria might be important. For example, to me criteria such as
>FBC and Participation are important because they relate to a voting
>system's immunity to the Duverger effect.
>Approval meets both of
The more I think about it the more I like the class of methods that
convert sets of CR ballots into sets of approval ballots.
If the conversion is according to some reasonable procedure, then there is
little incentive for the voters to second guess the method. In any case
the over-wise voter can
Your welcome. A search for "Knesset election" finds
http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0n0r0 which shows the
percentage of votes for each party in the most recent elections. Note that
the smallest party, United Arab List, got 2.1%. I have never heard of any
party getting a seat with
At 10:18 PM -0700 7/13/03, Alex Small wrote:
In my opinion, Arrow's theorem is more impressive when you have as few
assumptions as possible. When the list of incompatible assumptions is
large, somebody can say "Well, duh! If you pile on a whole bunch of
assumptions you're likely to make the task
Bart Ingles said:
>
> I think there have been several incarnations of Arrow's theorum. The
> original 1951 version used monotonicity, IIAC, non-imposition, and
> non-dictatorship. I think Alex is describing the 1963 version. Both
> are described in the 2nd edition of Arrow's "Social Choice and
>
I think there have been several incarnations of Arrow's theorum. The
original 1951 version used monotonicity, IIAC, non-imposition, and
non-dictatorship. I think Alex is describing the 1963 version. Both
are described in the 2nd edition of Arrow's "Social Choice and
Individual Values". It's st
At 5:27 PM -0700 7/13/03, Alex Small wrote:
Eric Gorr said:
Would it be accurate to say that you disagree with Arrow that a
voting system should be monotonic? (IRV is not)
I don't recall monotonicity being one of the conditions of Arrow's
Theorem. Maybe in some more elaborate forms it is, but th
Eric Gorr said:
> Would it be accurate to say that you disagree with Arrow that a
> voting system should be monotonic? (IRV is not)
I don't recall monotonicity being one of the conditions of Arrow's
Theorem. Maybe in some more elaborate forms it is, but the most basic
statement of Arrow's Theorem
At 6:57 PM -0400 7/13/03, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The answer to this question is yes. The more I look at single winner
methods the more flaws I find with all of them. I would probably now
describe IRV as the least worst single seat method as opposed to the
best.
What about situations where PR
Eric Gorr wrote:
I don't understand what your problem is with electing candidates who
are the most preferred by the majority of people. Isn't that the
point of single-winner elections?
Or is your real problem with single-winner elections as you would
rather see everything move to PR?
The a
Quoting Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> Maybe time for new traditions. A and B had core
> support. They also each
> had core enmity, and ranked ballots allowed both
> support and enmity to be
> expressed.
Well said! One of the attributes with IRV by supporters
is that it shows depth of su
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