Re: [EM] Approval satisfies CC

2004-01-28 Thread Eric Gorr
At 12:45 AM -0500 1/28/04, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Under Approval, if one candidate is preferred / voted higher / approved more than each of the other candidates, then that candidate will win. Therefore Approval meets CC. Approval does not meet CC. Again, you may want to check out: http://electi

Re: [EM] Approval satisfies CC

2004-01-28 Thread Alex Small
Adam Tarr said: >> > Condorcet Criterion (CC) >> > If all votes are sincere, the Ideal Democratic Winner should win if >> one exists. >> >>Under Approval, if one candidate is preferred / voted higher / approved >> more than each of the other candidates, then that candidate will win. > > You're draw

Re: [EM] Approval satisfies CC

2004-01-28 Thread Adam Tarr
Bill Clark wrote: > In Approval Voting, a candidate is "voted higher" by being "approved" > rather than "disapproved." > If one candidate is preferred over each of the other candidates, that > candidate is the Ideal Democratic Winner (IDW). > Condorcet Criterion (CC) > If all votes are sincere, th

Re: [EM] Approval satisfies CC

2004-01-27 Thread [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Bill Lewis Clark wrote: > CC doesn't say anything about requiring "fully specified" preferences. I skipped over this part (because I figured I already knew what a "sincere vote" was, but apparently not:) [ From http://www.electionmethods.org/evaluation.htm ] > A sincere vote is one with no fals

[EM] Approval satisfies CC

2004-01-27 Thread [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[ Quoting from http://www.electionmethods.org/evaluation.htm ] > In Approval Voting, a candidate is "voted higher" by being "approved" > rather than "disapproved." > If one candidate is preferred over each of the other candidates, that > candidate is the Ideal Democratic Winner (IDW). > Condorce