Marcus,
You wrote (Wed.Jun.16):
Dear Chris Benham,
you wrote (15 June 2004):
> According to Mike, it meets his "Weak Defensive Strategy
> Criterion" (WDSC): If a majority prefers one particular
> candidate to another, then they should have a way of
> voting that will ensure that
Dear Chris Benham,
you wrote (15 June 2004):
> According to Mike, it meets his "Weak Defensive Strategy
> Criterion" (WDSC): If a majority prefers one particular
> candidate to another, then they should have a way of
> voting that will ensure that the other cannot win,
> without any member of that
Tom,
--- Tom Ruen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > James,
> I can accept ER-IRV as an experimental method to consider, but I disapprove of the
> name "Equal
> Rankings IRV" ...
> I'd most certainly prefer a
> completely different name for whole votes counted, or if not, then something like
> "Ap
James,
I'm not at all willing to
judge theoretical differences of IRV versus ER-IRV, but I I have strong
opinions on application of approval votes. I take
the "one person, one vote" ideal seriously in politics. I can only seriously
support the option of split-votes for tied rankings as a n
Markus wrote:
>Here is an example where ER-IRV(fractional) violates
>Steve Eppley's "Non-Drastic Defense" criterion:
> 20 A=B=C>E>...
> 20 A=B=D>E>...
> 20 A=C=D>E>...
> 7 B>E>...
> 7 C>E>...
> 7 D>E>...
> 38 E>...
> A majority of the voters strictly prefers candidate A
> to candi
Dear Chris Benham,
you wrote (15 June 2004):
> Judging by the example at Steve Eppley's site, it seems
> to meet his (similar) "Non-Drastic Defense" criterion.
This is Steve Eppley's "Non-Drastic Defense" criterion:
> Non-Drastic Defense: Each voter must be allowed to vote
> as many alternatives
I plead guilty to incomplete thinking.
Not sure if my shorthand would have been so objectionable if the thinking
had been correct (the shorthand was that:
All but T would be the same for all three method details
T would vary to respond to details).
On Sun, 13 Jun 2004 19:42:46 -0400 Jam
James,
--- James Green-Armytage <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : >
> I was encouraged to read Mike Ossipoff's statement that equal
> rankings-allowed IRV, specifically the whole votes version, would be a
> substantial step up from IRV, and would even be superior to approval
> voting.
I prefe
Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>For what follows voting is:
> 1 X (A or B or C)
> 3 D
> 3 T (troublemakers)
>Without equal rankings T votes are scattered to A, B, C, and D wins
>With equal rankings whole votes, T votes are A=B=C and the X vote defines
>the winner (who gets 4 votes).
>
For what follows voting is:
1 X (A or B or C)
3 D
3 T (troublemakers)
Without equal rankings T votes are scattered to A, B, C, and D wins
With equal rankings whole votes, T votes are A=B=C and the X vote defines
the winner (who gets 4 votes).
With equal rankings fractional votes, T votes are A
I wrote:
>
>> Once again, in the whole votes version, if I equally
>> rank A B and C (in first place, for example), my vote will
>> count as a whole vote for each of those candidates in the
>> first round.
James Gilmour replied:
>
>So if you do this but I do not, you get three votes while
James Green-Armytage wrote:
> Once again, in the whole votes version, if I equally
> rank A B and C (in first place, for example), my vote will
> count as a whole vote for each of those candidates in the
> first round.
So if you do this but I do not, you get three votes while I get only o
Dear Voting Gurus,
I was encouraged to read Mike Ossipoff's statement that equal
rankings-allowed IRV, specifically the whole votes version, would be a
substantial step up from IRV, and would even be superior to approval
voting.
I'm wondering how everyone else feels about equal ra
Eric,
--- Eric Gorr <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Based on what I was told by Dave Robinson of http://demochoice.org,
> the problem with whole votes is that it would allow:
>
>some voters will be able to use duplicate votes to bury
>candidates they don't like, giving them an unfair a
Hallo,
Mike Ossipoff wrote (27 March 2004):
> ERIRV(whole) meets WDSC. Surprisingly, ERIRV(fractional)
> seems to also.
ERIRV(fractional) doesn't meet WDSC. Example:
20 A=B=C>E>...
20 A=B=D>E>...
20 A=C=D>E>...
7 B>E>...
7 C>E>...
7 D>E>...
38 E>...
A majority of the v
Hallo,
Mike Ossipoff wrote (27 March 2004):
> Bucklin meets WDSC, SDSC, & Participation.
Bucklin doesn't meet participation. Example:
20 ABC
35 CAB
60 BAC
Bucklin winner is B. However, when I add
30 CBA voters then the Bucklin winner is A.
Markus Schulze
Election-methods ma
On December 1 2003, Chris Benham wrote:
>
>I have changed my mind, and now agree with you that the split-votes
>version
>is better. I think that it is absurd that half an even number of voters
>voting
>AB and the other half BA should have a different effect from all of them
>voting
>A=B, and also
At 7:58 PM -0800 3/26/04, James Green-Armytage wrote:
For single-winner purposes, I have the impression that whole votes are
better, and that is basically what I'm suggesting in lieu of approval
unless someone can convince me otherwise.
Based on what I was told by Dave Robinson of http://de
ERIRV(whole) meets WDSC. Surprisingly, ERIRV(fractional) seems to also.
ERIRV(fractional) fails FBC. ERIRV(whole) probably fails it too.
Bucklin meets WDSC, SDSC, & Participation.
Using consistent naming, ERBucklin(whole) meets WDSC, SDSC, Participation,
and maybe FBC.
If so, that contradicts
Mike Ossipoff wrote:
>Much of the criticism of Approval is done in a vacuum. I always want to
>reply:
>"...So then, Approval is worse thanwhat?"
>IRV?
My reply:
Well, of course Condorcet, as we agree...
But, failing that for whatever reason, how about a version of IRV which
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