Back when there was a push to get an IRV initiative on the Oregon ballot I
sat in on some of the FairVoteOregon meetings, including the one in which
the final wording of the initiative and the wording of the voter
information pamphlet entry were being hashed out.
All the rhetoric was repetition of
James Gilmour wrote:
>My hypothesis
>is that politicians and the general public are likely to reject both the
>election result and the
>voting system if the voting system allows the "weak middle" to come
>through and win when that "weak
>middle" has the first-preference support of only a very small
Hi James,
On May 19, 2004, at 3:42 PM, James Gilmour wrote:
James Green-Armytage suggested:
48: Bush > McCain > Gore
3: McCain > Bush > Gore
49: Gore > McCain > Bush
My hypothesis is that politicians and the general public are likely to
reject both the election result and the voting system if the
James Green-Armytage suggested:
> Let's try to follow through with one of these examples
> until the end. Let's say that in a presidential election, the
> ballots cast are
>
> 48: Bush > McCain > Gore
> 3: McCain > Bush > Gore
> 49: Gore > McCain > Bush
>
> The Condorcet winner is M
The controversial example:
49 A>C>B
48 B>C>A
3 C>B>A
Two ways of putting voter's internal preferences behind that (Both sets
of ratings exhibit the above rankings):
*{number of voters} {A's rating}, {B's rating}, {C's rating}:
*49 .03,.01,.02
*48 .01,.03,.02
*3 .01,.02,.03
IRV = B; all others
THANK You Ken!
I will look at the 48/49/3 example for ammunition, with these platforms
(here C deserves more votes - my main desire was that A and B each have
serious backers and enemies):
49 A
reduce population growth, overpopulation becoming a serious problem).
48 B
punishes those
Adam H Tarr wrote:
>
> >James Gilmour wrote:
> >> Now consider:
> >> 49 A >> 48 B >> 3 C >> IRV winner = B; CW winner = C.
> >> I doubt very much whether most electors would accept C as the "winner"
> >> if this were an election for State Governor, much less for a directly
> >> elected Presi
It looks like you're trying to set up a straw man, but I think the
reasoning is pretty sound. This very thing happened with Dean and
Kerry before the nomination was locked up - people that would "ideally"
prefer Dean to Kerry would vote for Kerry, because the herd was going
with Kerry.
Curt
O
Not to defend IRV, but I agree with James on this count. If a thin
majority preferred B to A, but then found after the election that A
received many first place votes, while B received hardly any, I'd bet
money that some people would switch their votes from B to A, possibly
enough to swing the
James Gilmour said:
No, there is no sophistry in my argument.
I reply:
Call it what you want. You're saying we shoudn't respect the voted wishes of
those people because you think that they might change their preferences.
Does it occur to you that that is a rather weak argument for disregarding
s
James Gilmour said:
But if you did decide this by a separate run-off election, I should not be
surprised to find large
numbers of voters changing their preferences in that run-off election, and
in so doing, reject the
CW.
I reply:
Why should they change their preference, James? So that IRV's win
James Gilmour wrote:
>Now consider:
>49 A48 B 3 CIRV winner = B; CW winner = C.
>I doubt very much whether most electors would accept C as the "winner" if
>this were an election for
>Sate Governor, much less for a directly elected President of the USA. If
>anyone has evidence to the
>contrar
On May 17, 2004, at 4:54 AM, Ken Taylor wrote:
Sorry, but this inspired my sleep deprived brain. Has anyone noticed
that
many of the discussions on this list follow a familiar pattern? To wit:
Anti-IRVer: Here is an example that proves that IRV does not select
the same
answer as Condorcet, there
quot; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Sunday, May 16, 2004 11:42 PM
Subject: Re: [EM] IRV's "majority winner". What if we let the people choose?
>
> James Gilmour wrote:
> >
> > Now consider:
> > 49 A > 48 B > 3 C > IRV winner = B; CW winner
>> Now consider:
>> 49 A> 48 B> 3 C> IRV winner = B; CW winner = C.
>> I doubt very much whether most electors would accept C as the "winner"
>> if this were an election for State Governor, much less for a directly
>> elected President of the USA. If anyone has evidence to the contrary I'd
>>
Dear James Gilmour,
Let's try to follow through with one of these examples until the end.
Let's say that in a presidential election, the ballots cast are
48: Bush > McCain > Gore
3: McCain > Bush > Gore
49: Gore > McCain > Bush
The Condorcet winner is McCain, and the IRV winner
James Gilmour wrote:
>
> Now consider:
> 49 A 48 B 3 C IRV winner = B; CW winner = C.
> I doubt very much whether most electors would accept C as the "winner"
> if this were an election for State Governor, much less for a directly
> elected President of the USA. If anyone has evidence to th
> Curt Siffert <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> >Honestly, though, I don't believe the 3/49/48 scenario would ever
> >happen in a political election. For a candidate to have gathered
> >enough support to even compete in an election, he or she
> would have to
> >have a significant amount of first-p
> James Gilmour wrote:
> >49 A >48 B > 3 C [and expressed doubts about whether the public would accept a
> voting system that chose C as the winner]
>
> What I see here is a highly polarized electorate. The
> A-first voters place B last, and vice versa. Both A-first
> and B-first voters c
Curt Siffert <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>Honestly, though, I don't believe the 3/49/48 scenario would ever
>happen in a political election. For a candidate to have gathered
>enough support to even compete in an election, he or she would have to
>have a significant amount of first-place support
James Gilmour wrote:
>49 A48 B 3 Chttp://electorama.com/em for list info
Adam
Thanks for your helpful comments.
> I think that such a vote could be "marketed" in a way that
> would make it relatively uncontroversial. "In cases with no first-place
> majority winner,
> Condorcet chooses the compromise candidate with the broadest base of
> support."
Maybe, but I rem
James Gilmour wrote:
I am suggesting they would vote sincerely but then reject the outcome of
their own actions when they saw the consequences and all the evidence. I
am also suggesting that if they fully understood that such outcomes were
possible, they would reject a voting system that could
> James Gilmour wrote:
> > > >49 A > > >48 B > > > 3 C >
> >James Green-Armytage replied:
> > > Well, if the votes were sincere to begin with, then it is
> > > axiomatic that C will win a runoff election against B.
> >
> >But if you did decide this by a separate run-off election, I shoul
Curt Siffert wrote:
> In 2000, the nation collectively and clearly preferred Gore to Nader.
> The point remains, though, regarding system of values.
Exactly.
> People like to circle the wagons and don't like to be wrong.
I'm not sure I completely understand your meaning - the problem of a s
In 2000, the nation collectively and clearly preferred Gore to Nader.
The point remains, though, regarding system of values. People like to
circle the wagons and don't like to be wrong. Their preferences can
change due to knowledge of how others have voted. Just look at the
Democratic Primary
Curt Siffert wrote:
> I like this example a lot because I think it approaches the
> nut of what social choice should actually mean.
>
> The first case is pretty uncontroversial. What makes the second case
> interesting is that there's this psychological impact to it.
This is the real issue. A
James Gilmour wrote:
> >49 A >48 B > 3 C
James Green-Armytage replied:
> Well, if the votes were sincere to begin with, then it
> is axiomatic that C will win a runoff election against B.
But if you did decide this by a separate run-off election, I should not be
surprised to find large n
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >Now consider:
> >49 A >48 B > 3 C >IRV winner = B; CW winner = C.
> >I doubt very much whether most electors would accept C as
> the "winner"
> >if this were an election for Sate Governor, much less for a directly
> >elected President of the USA. If anyone h
I like this example a lot because I think it approaches the nut of what
social choice should actually mean.
The first case is pretty uncontroversial. What makes the second case
interesting is that there's this psychological impact to it.
One good idea to explore is if each individual voter *kn
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>Now consider:
>49 A48 B 3 CIRV winner = B; CW winner = C.
>I doubt very much whether most electors would accept C as the "winner" if
>this were an election for
>Sate Governor, much less for a directly elected President of the USA. If
>anyone has evidence to the
>c
> MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote
> Sent: Saturday, May 15, 2004 5:54 AM
>
> But what if we let the people choose between IRV's winner and
> the CW when
> they differ. You know what will happen. The CW will win every time.
I wonder. Consider:
35 Ahttp://electorama.com/em for list info
The "majority winner" that IRVers so often boast of will often have another
candidtate preferred to hir by a majority. Avoidably choosing someone in
violation of voted majority wishes. A peculiar notion of a "majority
winner".
But what if we let the people choose between IRV's winner and the CW
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