Title: Nanson
Sorry, folks, my enthusiasm ran away with me in my earlier message. If candidate A is the Nanson winner, it is still possible for candidate B to beat A in a pairwise contest, so in this case the average voter ranks B above A. It is still true, however, that the average voter
It's true that we we don't discuss most voting systems here--only the ones
that we really like.
(But we discuss IRV and Borda a little, just because they're fairly
frequently proposed or mentioned in popular articles).
Nanson meets Condorcet's Criterion, but it fails all the defensive strat
Mr. Gazeley,
Thank you for writing to the list. I remember your article with I.D.
Hill
about sequential STV. Are you aware of Nic Tideman's CPO-STV?
Anyway, back to your topic. Many of us are aware of Nanson's method, but
it is true that we do not discuss it very often.
My
Title: NANSON - Elections to one seat
I was disappointed to see no reference to Nanson on this site.
Nanson proved in effect that if a series of Borda counts is conducted on the same set of votes, eliminating each time the candidates whose scores are equal to or below the mean, the one can
Steph wrote:
>This amazes me.
>You are not the first to tell me Borda and Condorcet are "equivalent".
>It could be the case in term of determining the winner when there is a
>Condorcet winner.
Nanson is a Borda-elimination method (read: NOT the classic Borda count) and is
Condorcet compliant. T
This amazes me.
You are not the first to tell me Borda and Condorcet are "equivalent".
It could be the case in term of determining the winner when there is a
Condorcet winner.
However, Borda is not cloneproof and I always believed Condorcet methods were.
So, does a susceptibility to cloning affect
Dear List
For interest.
Simon
NANSON'S PROPOSITION
Nanson proved that if a series of Borda counts is conducted on the same
set of votes, eliminating each time the candidates whose Borda scores
are below the average, the one candidate who is left at the end is the
Condorcet winner if there i
If one uses preferential ballots where there is no indifference allowed
in ranking the candidates, and if one gives points to the candidates
where the number of points that candidate i gets for a particular ballot
is the number of candidates ranked below candidate i on that ballot,
then this is
